Setting the Record Straight About the White Working Class. By Henry Olsen. The American, October 17, 2013.
The working class vote of 2012 has different concerns than the working class vote of 1979. By Tim Montgomerie. ConservativeHome, November 20, 2012.
Henry Olsen: The GOP needs to be more inclusive. Video. American Enterprise Institute, November 8, 2012. YouTube.
Olsen:
One of
the most talked about groups in recent elections has been the white working
class. Although the group has declined as a share of the nation since World War
II, it is still very large at nearly 40 percent of the national electorate.
Understanding its views and values is essential to political victory, so it
isn’t surprising that politicians of all stripes are working hard to gain such
an understanding. Andrew Levinson’s insightful new book The White Working Class Today: Who They Are, How They Think, and How Progressives Can Regain Their Support tries to provide his fellow
progressives with a road map for success with a group Democrats have lost by
double digits in recent elections. But the book is more valuable as a source of
data and information crucial to strategists of all ideological stripes.
Levinson
argues that the white working class, contrary to most elite opinions, is not a
largely Republican constituency even though Republicans have won the group by
double-digit margins in recent elections. He persuasively documents this with
opinion surveys that show that these voters are less ideologically conservative
than generally recognized. He further shows that many white working class
voters hold contradictory views on most issues, views that blend themes from
the right and the left. Accordingly, Levinson argues that progressives can
target these “moderates” by changing their message from a “we know best”
top-down approach to a “you’re right, and we’re here to help you” bottom-up
one. This message can succeed, he says, only by engaging in a serious ground
game that literally meets these voters where they live and brings their voices
to Washington year-round.
Levinson
is at his best when describing the attitudes and lives of today’s white working
class. Census data, for example, demonstrates that white working class voters
earn less and work more in physically demanding jobs than do more educated
whites. Working class men and women are very likely to work in jobs that pay
them an average of $21,000 (women) to $31,000 (men) a year. At these wages, it
would take two full-time average jobs for a family to earn the median American
family income, which perhaps explains why divorce rates are much higher among
working class couples today. A single working class mother, however, must be
under even greater stress. With her meager earnings, she is highly likely to
require government aid to pay for medical care and child care, which places the
Obama campaign’s Julia film (and his electoral success among single women) in
its proper context.
The Working Class Divide: Big Ten versus SEC
All
members of the white working class are not alike, of course, and it is
essential to look carefully at their differences. The most important but
overlooked traits are religion and region.
There
is a very large difference between how southern and non-southern working class
whites vote, one Levinson indirectly points toward. He finds, as one might
expect, that evangelicals hold more conservative views on most issues than do
mainline Protestants, especially those dealing with morality and religion. But
on core issues of the size of government or the need for government to help the
poor, both branches of Protestantism are largely in agreement, only slightly
favoring a smaller government and largely supporting more help for the needy
even if it means going further into debt. These findings give Levinson hope
that progressives can win moderate working class voters.
However,
it is not clear whether Levinson has much to worry about. Only 20 percent of
evangelicals hold a BA or higher, which means that attitudes specific to
evangelicals are more likely to be found among working class voters. But since
evangelicals disproportionally live in or near the South, that means as an
electoral matter their views (and their Republican voting patterns) are more of
a southern phenomenon than a working class one. Other working class voters who
live in large numbers outside the South are less socially conservative and less
focused on religion, and hence are less likely to vote Republican.
A
deeper dive into the data sources Levinson examines further documents this
North-South white working class divide. White Catholics, a group Levinson
curiously overlooks, represent about 17 percent of Americans and are a much
higher percentage in key midwestern swing states such as Michigan, Iowa, and
Wisconsin. The Pew data for Catholics show they are much closer to mainline
Protestants than evangelicals on social and economic issues. Since most working
class whites living outside the South and border states are either Catholics or
mainline Protestants, one would expect to find that support for Democrats and
President Obama is much greater among northern and midwestern working class
whites than among southerners.
That is
in fact what the data show. Political scientist Larry Bartels, writing in the
respected electoral blog The Monkey Cage, finds that President Obama won a
majority among non-southern whites in households earning less than $45,000 a
year. The president’s margin among Levinson’s core working class white
households — those earning $30,000 a year or less — rises to 55 percent. This
figure is supported by exit poll data cited by the National Journal’s Ron
Brownstein that shows President Obama carried whites without a college degree
in Iowa, received 49 percent of their votes in New Hampshire, and 45 percent in
Wisconsin. In each state, between 52 and 55 percent of residents are either
mainline Protestant or Catholic. Unless Levinson hopes for even larger margins,
it seems progressives already are attractive to moderate, non-evangelical
working class whites.
The Conservatives’ Midwestern Mind
These
findings suggest that conservatives, not progressives, are the ones in need of
an electoral strategy to capture this key segment of the electorate. The data
Levinson provides should serve as a starting point for any thoughtful
conservative who wants to regain the White House and the Senate.
Conservatives
currently rely on three primary messages to reach these non-evangelical white
working class voters. First, delegitimize government by arguing that it is
unable to help them get ahead and raise their families whereas the private
sector can. Second, argue that when government does act, it too often does so
on behalf of undeserving groups, usually illegal immigrants and those who
refuse to work. Third, emphasize that conservatives stand on the side of
religious liberty and traditional moral values. However, data show that the
white working class is not nearly as receptive to these messages as many
conservatives hope.
The
data show that the white working class does not like government, but has
serious questions about whether it can get ahead in today’s economy. A 2011
Washington Post poll found that 43 percent of whites without college degrees
believed that hard work was no longer a guarantee of success. Nearly half
thought they did not have the education or skills to compete in today’s job
market. Attitudes like this strongly suggest that many working class whites do
not instinctively see personal benefits flowing from an untrammeled market.
Many
members of the white working class are particularly suspicious of the idea that
business leaders and financial experts have their interests at heart. Levinson
cites data for the white working class from a 2011 Pew survey, Beyond Red vs. Blue, that shows that well over half believe that business makes too much
profit and that Wall Street does more to hurt than to help the economy.
Three-quarters believe that a few large companies hold too much power. These
voters do see government as a problem, but they also believe that big
government is not the only obstacle in their paths.
Working
class whites also hold more nuanced views on immigration and government’s role
to provide for the poor than conservatives usually surmise. Levinson shows that
large majorities of working class whites think increased immigration is bad for
America and favor increased border security rather than immigration reform. But
they also strongly oppose free trade agreements. Pew found that the poorest and
least-educated part of the white working class, labeled “Disaffecteds,” think
free trade agreements are bad for the United States by a two-to-one margin.
These people are being pressed by competition from foreigners at home
(immigration) and abroad (free trade), and they don’t like it. Conservatives
therefore often do not gain the political advantage on immigration that they
seek because their free trade views convince working class whites that
conservatives are not on their side.
Working
class white attitudes toward government help for the poor are also nuanced. The
Pew study found that half of the white working class believes poor people have
hard lives because government benefits don’t go far enough and that government
should go deeper into debt to help needy Americans. This attitude exists even
among usually conservative evangelicals.
Most
importantly, delegitimizing government does not cause the white working class
to distrust or oppose all government activity, especially those programs that directly
impact them. For example, the Pew survey found that 82 percent of
“Disaffecteds” oppose cutting Social Security and Medicare to help reduce the
federal budget deficit. Only 17 percent favor focusing on cutting major
programs to reduce the deficit compared with 59 percent of “Staunch
Conservatives.”
Conservatives
since 1980 have hoped to garner the votes of these economically moderate voters
by emphasizing “social issues.” It is true that white working class voters are
likely to say that religion is an important part of their lives, and even among
Pew's economically distressed “Disaffecteds,” 41 percent say they attend
religious services at least weekly. But that formal religious commitment does
not extend to making social issues a top voting priority.
Levinson’s
data show that the white working class is at best morally moderate. Only 52
percent of whites who have never attended college say that a belief in God is
needed to live a moral life. They oppose efforts to get government more
involved in protecting traditional morality by a 50-39 percent margin. On
homosexuality, 55 percent of whites with a high school degree or less think
homosexuality should be accepted by society.
Data
for non-evangelical whites with no college experience are not provided, but we
should assume given what the data do show about evangelicals generally that
these numbers would be even more tilted towards the moral moderation of
mainline Protestants and Catholics in this group. Outside of the South and
evangelical outposts, then, the stereotypical Reagan Democrat simply doesn’t
exist.
These
data should not come as a surprise to conservatives or the GOP political class.
Canadian conservative political wunderkind Patrick Muttart discovered these
trends of economic and moral moderation among the Canadian white working class,
especially its Catholic members, back in the middle of the last decade. He used
that information to propel Prime Minister Stephen Harper to three straight
election wins. Real Clear Politics’ Sean Trende has noted that Ross Perot in
1992 hiked turnout and got a large vote share in regions of the country
dominated by white, non-evangelical working class voters by running on such an
economically and socially moderate platform. This “Perotlandia” is also the
part of the country that saw the largest declines in turnout between 2008 and
2012. Nevertheless, I suspect these data remain shocking to most on the right.
Do Conservatives Really Love Raymond?
Conservatives
ought to be worried about these findings, but they ought to be more worried
about the moral consensus that animates them. Today’s conservative movement
increasingly emphasizes “getting ahead,” “owning your own business,” and economic
dynamism as essential to the American dream. That’s what “you built that” was
all about. For whites without any college education, however, these are largely
alien concepts.
Levinson
does a great job in outlining the moral worldview of these voters. They aren’t
simply not attracted to these goals; they define themselves in opposition to these goals.
Levinson
draws on ethnographic studies to show that for the typical white working class
person, family and stability are more important than career and upward
mobility. They saw their middle-class bosses as people who “worried all the
time,” were “cold and snobbish,” and as “arrogant, very arrogant people.” They
saw their work as “just a job,” not a rewarding activity of itself. As befits
people who work in teams and do heavy labor, they saw collegiality and
practical knowledge to be of greater worth than individual striving and
theoretical knowledge. Levinson describes this combination as a “distinct
combination of viewing work, family, friends, and good character as central
values in life while according a much lower value to wealth, achievement, and
ambition.”
Perhaps
this is the conclusion of a progressive seeing the white working class world
through very rose colored glasses. But why, then, did über-conservative Patrick
Muttart find exactly the same values among white workers in his studies?
Muttart
expressed nearly identical sentiments in an extended interview he gave me in
2010. Working class whites, he told me, are fiscally conservative (low taxes) but
economically populist (suspicious of trade, outsourcing, and high finance).
They are culturally orthodox but not generally concerned with social issues
because their lives won’t change much no matter the outcome. Most importantly,
they are modest in their aspirations for themselves. They do not aspire to be
“Type A business owners”; they want to go to work, do what’s asked of them, not
have too much stress in their lives, and spend time with their families. They
want structure and stability in their lives so that things they need are taken
care of and they don’t have to worry.
If
Muttart and Levinson are correct, and I think they are, then both parties have
huge problems attracting these voters. But conservative Republicans have the
greater problem because these voters have resisted orthodox Republican economic
policies, such as reducing entitlement spending, for decades.
Packers and Lions and Bears: Oh My!
Conservatives
who want to regain the presidency cannot ignore these facts. The road to the
White House runs through the working class voter, whether he is white and
non-evangelical, as is the case in the Midwest, or Hispanic and marginally
Catholic, as is the case in Florida, Colorado, and Nevada. To win their votes,
conservative Republicans must first win their trust.
They
can do that if they demonstrate that they understand and respect the moral
underpinning of working class life. That moral view places emphasis on hard
work and effort and gives respect to those who perform it, regardless of how much
money is directly earned. It is one that emphasizes that life is about much
more than making money or getting ahead: it’s about family, friends, and
experiencing the time we have on Earth. Such views cannot be derided as
“whiling away the time”; they are central to the working class world and must
be respected.
These
views lead to a substantial, but not a dominant, role for government in
people’s lives. Government should be prepared to help people where they cannot
always help themselves, through regulation and redistribution if necessary.
Even school vouchers, a conservative Holy Grail, is at heart a redistributive
policy that taxes the well-off to give money to the working class to afford a
decent education for their kids.
But a
conservative theory of government will be substantially different from a
progressive one because conservatives understand better than do progressives
that working class voters are makers of their own lives. A conservative
approach would emphasize that help would only go to those who help themselves
and to those who need it. That means strong work and behavior conditions
attached to entitlements and welfare policies, and sharply reducing corporate
welfare and tax deductions for the well-to-do. A conservative approach would
reduce where possible government’s monopoly provision of services and let
people choose from among providers competing for their favor. A conservative
approach would recognize that citizenship means more than voting, and
accordingly do more to help people whose lives are unduly stressed because of
economic dislocation.
Progressives
offer the working class handouts and hands-on regulation of their lives.
Libertarian-inspired Republicans offer them a hands-off society that is
indifferent to their fate. Conservatives should offer them a new deal. They
should offer them what they really want: a hand up.
