Israel Is Losing the Long Game. By George Friedman. Real Clear World, July 29, 2014.
Friedman:
We have
long argued that the Arab-Israeli conflict is inherently insoluble. Now, for
the third time in recent years, a war is being fought in Gaza. The Palestinians
are firing rockets into Israel with minimal effect. The Israelis are carrying
out a broader operation to seal tunnels along the Gaza-Israel boundary. Like
the previous wars, the current one will settle nothing. The Israelis want to
destroy Hamas’ rockets. They can do so only if they occupy Gaza and remain
there for an extended period while engineers search for tunnels and bunkers
throughout the territory. This would generate Israeli casualties from Hamas
guerrillas fighting on their own turf with no room for retreat. So Hamas will
continue to launch rockets, but between the extreme inaccuracy of the rockets
and Israel’s Iron Dome defense system, the group will inflict little damage to
the Israelis.
War Without a Military Outcome
The
most interesting aspect of this war is that both sides apparently found it
necessary, despite knowing it would have no definitive military outcome. The
kidnapping and killing of three Israeli teenagers followed by the incineration
of a Palestinian boy triggered this conflict. An argument of infinite
regression always rages as to the original sin: Who committed the first crime?
For the
Palestinians, the original crime was the migration into the Palestinian mandate
by Jews, the creation of the State of Israel and the expulsion of Arabs from
that state. For Israel, the original sin came after the 1967 war, during which
Israel captured the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem. At
that moment, the Israelis were prepared to discuss a deal, but the Arabs
announced their famous “three nos” at a meeting in Khartoum: no negotiation, no
recognition, no peace. That locked the Israelis into an increasingly rigid
stance. Attempts at negotiations have followed the Khartoum declaration, all of
which failed, and the “no recognition” and “no peace” agreement is largely
intact. Cease-fires are the best that anyone can hope for.
For
Hamas, at least – and I suspect for many Palestinians in the West Bank – the
only solution is Israel’s elimination. For many Israelis, the only solution is
to continue to occupy all captured territories until the Palestinians commit to
peace and recognition. Since the same Israelis do not believe that day will
ever come, the occupation would become permanent.
Under
these circumstances, the Gaza war is in some sense a matter of housekeeping.
For Hamas, the point of the operation is demonstrating it can fire rockets at
Israel. These rockets are inaccurate, but the important thing is that they were
smuggled into Gaza at all, since this suggests more dangerous weapons
eventually will be smuggled in to the Palestinian territory. At the same time,
Hamas is demonstrating that it remains able to incur casualties while
continuing to fight.
For the
Israelis, the point of the operation is that they are willing to carry it out
at all. The Israelis undoubtedly intend to punish Gaza, but they do not believe
they can impose their will on Gaza and compel the Palestinians to reach a
political accommodation with Israel. War’s purpose is to impose your political
will on your enemy. But unless the Israelis surprise us immensely, nothing
decisive will come out of this conflict. Even if Israel somehow destroyed
Hamas, another organization would emerge to fill its space in the Palestinian
ecosystem. Israel can’t go far enough to break the Palestinian will to resist;
it is dependent on a major third-party state to help meet Israeli security
needs. This creates an inherent contradiction whereby Israel receives enough
American support to guarantee its existence but because of humanitarian
concerns is not allowed to take the kind of decisive action that might solve
its security problem.
We thus
see periodic violence of various types, none of which will be intended or
expected to achieve any significant political outcome. Wars here have become a
series of bloodstained gestures. There are some limited ends to achieve, such
as closing Palestinian tunnels and demonstrating Palestinian capabilities that
force Israel into an expensive defensive posture. But Hamas will not be
defeated, and Israel will make no concessions.
Sovereignty and Viability Problems
The
question therefore is not what the point of all this is – although that is a
fascinating subject – but where all this ends. All things human end. Previous
longstanding conflicts, such as those between France and England, ended or at
least changed shape. Israel and Palestine accordingly will resolve their
conflict in due course.
Many
believe the creation of a Palestinian state will be the solution, and those who
believe this often have trouble understanding why this self-evidently sensible
solution has not been implemented. The reason is the proposed solution is not
nearly as sensible as it might appear to some.
Issues
of viability and sovereignty surround any discussion of a Palestinian state.
Geography raises questions about the viability of any Palestinian polity.
Palestine has two population centers, Gaza and the West Bank, which are
detached from one another. One population center, Gaza, is an enormously
crowded, narrow salient. Its ability to develop a sustainable economy is
limited. The West Bank has more possibilities, but even it would be subordinate
to a dynamic Israel. If the Palestinian workforce is drawn into the Israeli
economy, both territories will become adjuncts to Israel. Within its current
borders, a viable Palestine is impossible to imagine.
From
the Israeli point of view, creating a Palestine along something resembling the
1967 lines (leaving aside the question of Jerusalem) would give the
Palestinians superb targets, namely, Tel Aviv and Haifa. Given its history,
Israel is unlikely to take that risk unless it had the right to oversee
security in the West Bank in some way. That in turn would undermine Palestinian
sovereignty.
As you
play out the possibilities in any two-state solution, you run into the problem
that any solution one side demanded would be unbearable to the other. Geography
simply won’t permit two sovereign states. In this sense, the extremists on both
sides are more realistic than the moderates. But that reality encounters other
problems.
Israel’s High-Water Mark
Currently,
Israel is as secure as it is ever likely to be unless Hamas disappears, never
to be replaced, and the West Bank becomes even more accommodating to Israel.
Neither of these prospects is likely. Israel’s economy towers over its
neighbors. The Palestinians are weak and divided. None of Israel's neighbors
pose any threat of invasion, a situation in place since the 1977 neutralization
of Egypt. Jordan is locked into a close relation with Israel, Egypt has its
peace treaty and Hezbollah is bogged down in Syria. Apart from Gaza, which is a
relatively minor threat, Israel’s position is difficult to improve.
Israel
can’t radically shift its demography. But several evolutions in the region
could move against Israel. Egypt could change governments, renounce its treaty,
rearm and re-enter the Sinai Peninsula. Hezbollah could use its experience in
Syria to open a front in Lebanon. Syria could get an Islamic State-led
government and threaten the Golan Heights. Islamists could overthrow Jordan's
Hashemite monarchy and pose a threat to the east. Turkey could evolve into a
radical Islamic government and send forces to challenge Israel. A cultural
revolution could take place in the Arab world that would challenge Israel's
economic superiority, and therefore its ability to wage war. Iran could smuggle
missiles into Gaza, and so on.
There
is accordingly an asymmetry of possibilities. It is difficult to imagine any
evolution, technical, political or economic, that would materially improve
Israel’s already dominant position, but there are many things that could weaken
Israel – some substantially. Each may appear far-fetched at the moment, but
everything in the future seems far-fetched. None is inconceivable.
It is a
rule of politics and business to bargain from strength. Israel is now as strong
as it is going to be. But Israel does not think that it can reach an
accommodation with the Palestinians that would guarantee Israeli national
security, a view based on a realistic reading of geography. Therefore, Israel
sees little purpose in making concessions to the Palestinians despite its
relative position of strength.
In
these circumstances, the Israeli strategy is to maintain its power at a maximum
level and use what influence it has to prevent the emergence of new threats.
From this perspective, the Israeli strategy on settlements makes sense. If
there will be no talks, and Israel must maintain its overwhelming advantage,
creating strategic depth in the West Bank is sensible; it would be less
sensible if there were a possibility of a peace treaty. Israel must also
inflict a temporary defeat on any actively hostile Palestinian force from time
to time to set them back several years and to demonstrate Israeli capabilities
for psychological purposes.
The
Palestinian position meanwhile must be to maintain its political cohesion and
wait, using its position to try to drive wedges between Israel and its foreign
patrons, particularly the United States, but understanding that the only change
in the status quo will come from changes outside the Israeli-Palestinian
complex. The primary Palestinian problem will be to maintain itself as a
distinct entity with sufficient power to resist an Israeli assault for some
time. Any peace treaty would weaken the Palestinians by pulling them into the
Israeli orbit and splitting them up. By refusing a peace treaty, they remain
distinct, if divided. That guarantees they will be there when circumstances
change.
Fifty Years Out
Israel’s
major problem is that circumstances always change. Predicting the military
capabilities of the Arab and Islamic worlds in 50 years is difficult. Most
likely, they will not be weaker than they are today, and a strong argument can
be made that at least several of their constituents will be stronger. If in 50
years some or all assume a hostile posture against Israel, Israel will be in
trouble.
Time is
not on Israel’s side. At some point, something will likely happen to weaken its
position, while it is unlikely that anything will happen to strengthen its
position. That normally would be an argument for entering negotiations, but the
Palestinians will not negotiate a deal that would leave them weak and divided,
and any deal that Israel could live with would do just that.
What we
are seeing in Gaza is merely housekeeping, that is, each side trying to
maintain its position. The Palestinians need to maintain solidarity for the
long haul. The Israelis need to hold their strategic superiority as long as
they can. But nothing lasts forever, and over time, the relative strength of
Israel will decline. Meanwhile, the relative strength of the Palestinians may
increase, though this isn’t certain.
Looking
at the relative risks, making a high-risk deal with the Palestinians would seem
prudent in the long run. But nations do not make decisions on such abstract
calculations. Israel will bet on its ability to stay strong. From a political
standpoint, it has no choice. The Palestinians will bet on the long game. They
have no choice. And in the meantime, blood will periodically flow.
