Mead:
The Syrian refugee disaster is a result of the Middle East’s failure to grapple with modernity and Europe’s failure to defend its ideals.
The
migration crisis enveloping Europe and much of the Middle East today is one of
the worst humanitarian disasters since the 1940s. Millions of desperate people
are on the march: Sunni refugees driven out by the barbarity of the Assad
regime in Syria, Christians and Yazidis fleeing the pornographic violence of
Islamic State, millions more of all faiths and no faith fleeing poverty and
oppression without end. Parents are entrusting their lives and the lives of
their young children to rickety boats and unscrupulous criminal syndicates
along the Mediterranean coast, professionals and business people are giving up
their livelihoods and investments, farmers are abandoning their land, and from
North Africa to Syria, the sick and the old are on the road, carrying a few
treasured belongings on a new trail of tears.
It is
the first migration crisis of the 21st century, but it is unlikely to be the
last. The rise of identity politics across the Middle East and much of
sub-Saharan Africa is setting off waves of violence like those that tore apart
the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th and 20th centuries. The hatreds
and rivalries driving endangered communities to exile and destruction have a
long history. They probably have a long future as well.
What we
are witnessing today is a crisis of two civilizations: The Middle East and
Europe are both facing deep cultural and political problems that they cannot
solve. The intersection of their failures and shortcomings has made this crisis
much more destructive and dangerous than it needed to be—and carries with it
the risk of more instability and more war in a widening spiral.
The
crisis in the Middle East has to do with much more than the breakdown of order
in Syria and Libya. It runs deeper than the poisonous sectarian and ethnic
hatreds behind the series of wars stretching from Pakistan to North Africa. At
bottom, we are witnessing the consequences of a civilization’s failure either to
overcome or to accommodate the forces of modernity. One hundred years after the
fall of the Ottoman Empire and 50 years after the French left Algeria, the
Middle East has failed to build economies that allow ordinary people to live
with dignity, has failed to build modern political institutions and has failed
to carve out the place of honor and respect in world affairs that its peoples
seek.
There
is no point in rehearsing the multiple failures since Britain’s defeat of the
Ottoman Empire liberated the Arabs from hundreds of years of Turkish rule. But
it is worth noting that the Arab world has tried a succession of ideologies and
forms of government, and that none of them has worked. The liberal nationalism
of the early 20th century failed, and so did the socialist nationalism of
Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser and his
contemporaries. Authoritarianism failed the Arabs too: Compare what Lee Kwan Yew created in resource-free
Singapore with the legacy of the Assads in Syria or of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.
Today
we are watching the failure of Islamism. From the Muslim Brotherhood to Islamic
State, Islamist movements have had no more success in curing the ills of Arab
civilization than any of the secular movements of the past. Worse, the brutal
fanaticism and nihilistic violence of groups like Islamic State undercuts
respect for more moderate versions of Islamic spirituality and thought.
The
Turks and the Iranians have had more economic and institutional success than
the Arabs, but in both Turkey and Iran today, the outlook is bleak. Iran is
ruled by a revolutionary alliance of reactionary clerics and hungry thugs, and
it is committed to a regional policy of confrontation and sectarian war. Like
the Soviet Union, Iran is an uneasy conglomeration of national and cultural
groups held together by a radical but increasingly stale ideology. Turkey, too,
is cursed by blind Islamist enthusiasm and unresolved ethnic and ideological
chasms. Neither country is immune to the violence sweeping the region, and
neither country has been able to develop policies that would calm rather than
roil their turbulent surroundings.
At the
same time, foreign values are challenging traditional beliefs and practices
across the region. Women throughout the Islamic world are seeking to shape
theological and social ideas to better reflect their own experience. Modern
science and historical and textual criticism pose many of the questions for
traditional Islamic piety that 19th-century science and biblical criticism
posed for Christianity. Young people continue to be exposed to information,
narratives and images that are difficult to reconcile with traditions they were
raised to take for granted.
As
hundreds of thousands of refugees stumble from the chaos of an imploding Arab
world toward Europe, and as millions more seek refuge closer to home, we see a
crisis of confidence in the very structures of Middle Eastern civilization,
including religion. Reports that hundreds of Iranian and other refugees from
the Islamic world are seeking Christian baptism in Europe can be seen as one
aspect of this crisis. If people feel that the religion they were raised in and
the civilization of which they are a part cannot master the problems of daily
life, they will seek alternatives.
For
other Muslims, this means the embrace of radical fundamentalism. Such
fanaticism is a sign of crisis and not of health in religious life, and the
very violence of radical Islam today points to the depth of the failure of
traditional religious ideas and institutions across the Middle East.
In
Europe and the West, the crisis is quieter but no less profound. Europe today
often doesn’t seem to know where it is going, what Western civilization is for,
or even whether or how it can or should be defended. Increasingly, the
contemporary version of Enlightenment liberalism sees itself as fundamentally
opposed to the religious, political and economic foundations of Western
society. Liberal values such as free expression, individual self-determination
and a broad array of human rights have become detached in the minds of many
from the institutional and civilizational context that shaped them.
Capitalism,
the social engine without which neither Europe nor the U.S. would have the
wealth or strength to embrace liberal values with any hope of success, is often
seen as a cruel, anti-human system that is leading the world to a Malthusian climate
catastrophe. Military strength, without which the liberal states would be
overwhelmed, is regarded with suspicion in the U.S. and with abhorrence in much
of Europe. Too many people in the West interpret pluralism and tolerance in
ways that forbid or unrealistically constrain the active defense of these
values against illiberal states like Russia or illiberal movements like radical
Islam.
Europe’s
approach to the migration crisis brings these failures into sharp relief. The
European Union bureaucracy in Brussels has erected a set of legal doctrines
stated in terms of absolute right and has tried to build policy on this basis.
Taking its cue from the U.N.’s 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
other ambitious declarations and treaties, the EU holds that qualified
applicants have an absolute human right to asylum. European bureaucrats tend to
see asylum as a legal question, not a political one, and they expect political
authorities to implement the legal mandate, not quibble with it or constrain
it.
This
is, in many ways, a commendable and honorable approach. Europeans are rightly
haunted by what happened in the 1930s when refugees from Hitler’s Germany could
often find no place to go. But solemn declarations to “do the right thing” do
not always lead to sound policy.
Under
normal circumstances, the rights-based, legalistic approach can work reasonably
well. When refugee flows are slack, the political fallout from accommodating
them is manageable. But when the flow of desperate people passes a certain
threshold, receiving countries no longer have the will (and, in some cases, the
ability) to follow through. Ten thousand refugees is one thing; 10 million is
another. Somewhere between those extremes is a breaking point at which the political
system will no longer carry out the legal mandate. To pretend that this isn’t
true is to invite trouble, and Europe is already much closer to a breaking
point than Brussels or Berlin would like to admit.
In
eastern and central Europe, the social and economic conditions for absorbing
mass migration from the Middle East simply don’t exist. The relatively
homogenous ethnic nation states that now comprise the region were created
through generations of warfare, often accompanied by episodes of ethnic cleansing
and genocide. Most of these states enjoyed a brief period of independence
between the two world wars and were then engulfed, first by the Nazis and later
by the Soviet empire. Their independence and security still feel fragile, and
most of their citizens still believe that the role of the state is to protect
the well-being of their own ethnic group and express its cultural values.
Larger,
more self-confident and richer societies in Europe’s west and north are better
prepared to cope with immigration. But rules that work for Germany and Sweden
can produce uncontrollable backlashes in other parts of Europe. Add to this
picture the continuing budgetary and welfare crises and the mass youth
unemployment in many Eurozone economies, and it is easy to envision a point at
which Europe’s capacity to absorb refugees reaches a ceiling.
And the
flow of refugees to Europe could easily grow. The Turkish war against the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party could escalate. Social breakdown or the victory of
radical Islamist forces in Egypt could provoke a mass flight of the Copts, the
last remaining large Christian population in a region that has seen one
Christian community after another exterminated or forced into exile over the
last 150 years. The sectarian war in Syria could intensify and spread into
Lebanon. The intensifying religious conflict across the Sahel and northern
sub-Saharan Africa could create the kind of political and economic insecurity
that would produce vast flows of desperate migrants and asylum seekers.
The
breaking point may be reached sooner rather than later. In the short term,
Europe’s attempts to welcome and resettle refugees will accelerate the flow.
The news that rich countries like Germany are welcoming migrants will stimulate
many more people to hit the road. Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the
European Commission, is calling on member states to accept 160,000 migrants
through a quota system. What will be the response when the number of migrants
shoots well past that number?
The EU
has failed to see that refugee and asylum policy must have three distinct
components: the compassionate embrace of those in great need, a tough-minded
effort to reduce the flow at the source by correcting or preventing the
problems that give rise to it, and an effective border-control regime that
limits the number of refugees and migrants who reach EU soil.
When it
comes to reducing the number of migrants at their source, the Europeans have
gotten it partly right. The EU has been relatively generous with
economic-development aid to North Africa and the Middle East. That aid often
falls short of the hoped-for results, but at least the Europeans are trying.
There
is a second dimension to this policy that runs into a buzz saw of European assumptions
and beliefs: the security question. Poverty is one driver of migration to
Europe, but what has turned a policy problem into an international crisis is
the intersection of poverty and insecurity. It is the brutal war in Syria that
has displaced millions of people from their homes and sent them streaming into
refugee encampments from Amman to Budapest. It was the breakdown of order in
post-intervention Libya that made the Libyan coast a point of embarkation for
desperate refugees from Libya and farther south.
The
humanitarian question of refugees and asylum seekers cannot be separated from
the bankruptcy of Western security policy in Syria and Libya, and the
bankruptcy of Western policy cannot be separated from the long-standing
difficulties that many European states have in taking a responsible attitude
toward questions of military security.
The
utter failure of Western policy in both Libya and Syria has to be seen for what
it is: not just a political blunder but a humanitarian crime. The feckless mix
of intervention and indifference in Libya and the equally feckless failure to
intervene in Syria have helped to trigger the flows of migrants that are
overwhelming Europe’s institutions.
It is
impossible to have a humane and sustainable asylum policy without an active and
engaged foreign policy that from time to time involves military action. The
West’s current stance on human rights and asylum is reminiscent of the liberal
approach to questions of peace and war in the early 1930s. On the one hand, the
West adopted a high-minded, legalistic stand that declared war illegal (the
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928); on the other, we adhered to a blind commitment to
disarmament. A noble ideal was separated from any serious effort to create the
conditions that would make it achievable.
The dream of a liberal, humanitarian peace that both the Obama administration and the EU share may not be achievable in the wicked and complicated world in which we live. It certainly cannot be achieved with the kinds of policies now in favor in capitals on both sides of the Atlantic.
The dream of a liberal, humanitarian peace that both the Obama administration and the EU share may not be achievable in the wicked and complicated world in which we live. It certainly cannot be achieved with the kinds of policies now in favor in capitals on both sides of the Atlantic.