The New Puritans. By Mark Oppenheimer.

The New Puritans: When Did Liberals Become So Uptight? By Mark Oppenheimer. The New Republic, July 15, 2013.

Fear of Rand Paul’s Rise. By Ben Domenech.

Fear of Rand Paul’s Rise. By Ben Domenech. Real Clear Politics, July 19, 2013.

Domenech:

Michael Gerson is terrified of Rand Paul. “This disdain for Lincoln is not a quirk or a coincidence. Paulism involves more than the repeal of Obamacare. It is a form of libertarianism that categorically objects to 150 years of expanding federal power. During this period, the main domestic justification for federal action has been opposition to slavery and segregation. Lincoln, in the Paulite view, exercised tyrannical powers to pursue an unnecessary war. Similarly, Paulites have been critical of the 1964 Civil Rights Act for violating both states’ rights and individual property rights — an argument Rand Paul himself echoed during several interviews as a Senate candidate. This does not make Paulites racists. But it does make them opponents of the legal methods that ended state-sanctioned racism. . . . What does this mean for the GOP? It is a reminder that, however reassuring his manner, it is impossible for Rand Paul to join the Republican mainstream. The triumph of his ideas and movement would fundamentally shift the mainstream and demolish a century and a half of Republican political history. The GOP could no longer be the party of Reagan’s internationalism or of Lincoln’s belief in a strong union dedicated to civil rights.”

 

I am unfamiliar with the moment when Gerson, unstoppable promoter of paternalistic big government that he is, was bequeathed the ability to define the Republican mainstream. But Gerson’s depiction of the libertarian view of the Confederacy is simply fraudulent. I hear far more defenses of the South’s approach from Pat Buchanan sympathizers than from libertarians. Paleoconservatives may find much worthy of defense in the Confederate state, but consider: The Confederate Constitution amended the US Constitution to better facilitate technocratic rule. The Confederate ruling ideology, derived from John C. Calhoun's concurrent majorities, remains current in leftist thought today (see Lani Guinier). The Confederacy was the first to introduce mass conscription. The Confederacy staged a series of repressions and massacres against local autonomy (east Tennessee, central Texas, Alabama, Mississippi, western North Carolina, etc.). The Confederacy imposed an internal-passport regime for civilian travel later echoed by European autocracies. The Confederate state took over most of its own economy by war's end. And the Wilsonian “progressives” contained a surprising number of Confederate sympathizers who saw it as a noble experiment and set about applying its principles in the form of the segregating the federal government, fomenting the Klan, and more.

 

Agrarian non-interventionists have their sympathies for the Confederacy (see Copperhead, which glorifies the Sixties peaceniks – the 1860s), but that’s hardly a viewpoint unique to libertarianism. And for those who actually study history, the idea that the Confederacy was a liberty-oriented alternative to Lincoln and the Union is absurd – in many ways, its worst aspects were the forerunner of the modern technocratic top-down state.

 

Beyond getting the definitions wrong – and purposefully so, in a Sharptonesque manner – Gerson’s attempt to define Rand Paul as someone who cannot shape the future Republican coalition is just the latest sign of how afraid the party’s elite are of the rising coalition of libertarian youngsters and the populist middle class. “Since 2010, almost all the intellectual energy in the Senate has come from Tea Party lawmakers like Rand Paul and Mike Lee, who tend to be relatively dovish, skeptical of foreign aid, concerned about civil liberties, and contemptuous of neoconservatives. Making the case for an activist foreign policy has fallen largely to Sens. John McCain and Lindsey Graham, both of whom increasingly resemble the aging characters in Kingsley Amis’s The Old Devils, shambling around the Senate chamber and waxing nostalgic about the good old days when they could bomb other countries in peace. Beyond Rep. Tom Cotton, the neoconservative darling who still staunchly defends the Iraq intervention, there’s little fresh blood among Republican hawks in Congress these days. So perhaps it makes sense for Liz Cheney, the daughter of one of the architects of Bush-era foreign policy, to provide a Senate counterbalance to Paul.”

Concerned neoconservatives have nothing to fear on this count. If Paul is correct about the trajectory of the coalition, his views will achieve more prominence. But there will be a debate first, and the people will decide who they agree with. It could be a messy debate, public and ugly on the stage in Iowa, but that debate will happen. If Gerson and his allies have confidence in the strength of their ideas, they should be prepared to make the case for them . . . not attempt to escape the debate by writing Senators – particularly those with a young, passionate following – out of the party.

 

 

Rand Paul: Conviction Politician. By Michael Gerson.

Rand Paul: Conviction Politician. By Michael Gerson. Real Clear Politics, July 19, 2013. Also at the Washington Post.

Gerson:

To this point, Sen. Rand Paul of Kentucky has been the Republican flavor of the year. Events from the IRS scandal to NSA revelations to the Obamacare train wreck have corroborated libertarian suspicions of federal power. And Paul has shown serious populist skills in cultivating those fears for his political benefit. For a while, he succeeded in a difficult maneuver: accepting the inheritance of his father’s movement while distancing himself from the loonier aspects of his father’s ideology.

 

But now Paul has fallen spectacularly off the tightrope. It turns out that a senior member of his Senate staff, Jack Hunter, has a history of neo-Confederate radio rants. And Paul has come to the defense of his aide.

 

Paul’s attempt to dismiss the matter has only added to the damage. “It was a shock radio job,” the senator explains. “He was doing wet T-shirt contests. But can a guy not have a youth and stuff? People try to say I smoked pot one time, and I wasn’t fit for office.”

 

But Hunter’s offenses were committed as an adult. They included defending a regime founded on slavery, comparing Abraham Lincoln to Saddam Hussein and raising (in Hunter’s words) a “personal toast every May 10 to celebrate John Wilkes Booth’s birthday.” This was not a single, ideological puff but rather a decade spent mainlining moonlight and magnolias in the ruins of Tara.

 

Paul is rumored to be considering a 2016 presidential run. So his dismissal of the sympathetic treatment of a presidential assassin as the equivalent of sponsoring a wet T-shirt contest requires some explanation. The easier political course for Paul would have been to cut this embarrassing tie and reduce the damage. He still might be forced to do so. But his reluctance is revealing.

 

This would not be the first time that Paul has heard secessionist talk in his circle of confederates — I mean, associates. His father has attacked Lincoln for causing a “senseless” war and ruling with an “iron fist.” Others allied with Paulism in various think tanks and Web sites have accused Lincoln of mass murder and treason. For Rand Paul to categorically repudiate such views and all who hold them would be to excommunicate a good portion of his father’s movement.

 

This disdain for Lincoln is not a quirk or a coincidence. Paulism involves more than the repeal of Obamacare. It is a form of libertarianism that categorically objects to 150 years of expanding federal power. During this period, the main domestic justification for federal action has been opposition to slavery and segregation. Lincoln, in the Paulite view, exercised tyrannical powers to pursue an unnecessary war. Similarly, Paulites have been critical of the 1964 Civil Rights Act for violating both states’ rights and individual property rights — an argument Rand Paul himself echoed during several interviews as a Senate candidate.

 

This does not make Paulites racists. But it does make them opponents of the legal methods that ended state-sanctioned racism.

 

To put the best construction on it, Paulites tend to hate war and federal coercion in any form, even in causes generally regarded as good. They opposed the Cold War and nearly every post-World War II American exercise of power. They equate the war on terrorism with militarism, imperialism and empire. And they remain unhappy about the War of Northern Aggression.

 

Not all libertarians, of course, view Appomattox as a temporary setback. A libertarian debate on the topic: “Lincoln: Hero or Despot?” would be two-sided, lively and well-attended. But Paulism is more than the political expression of the Austrian school of economics. It is a wildly ambitious ideology in which Hunter’s neo-Confederate views are not uncommon.

 

What does this mean for the GOP? It is a reminder that, however reassuring his manner, it is impossible for Rand Paul to join the Republican mainstream. The triumph of his ideas and movement would fundamentally shift the mainstream and demolish a century and a half of Republican political history. The GOP could no longer be the party of Reagan’s internationalism or of Lincoln’s belief in a strong union dedicated to civil rights.

 

The Hunter matter is also a reminder that Paul is a conviction politician. His convictions, however, are the problem. In January, Hunter wrote that the “philosophy hasn’t substantively changed” between Ron Paul and his son. Rand Paul’s goal is to legitimize the Paulite movement, not repudiate its worst elements. But his ties to those elements may put an upward limit on his political rise.

In Egypt They Hate Us, They Really Hate Us. By Marc Lynch.

They Hate Us, They Really Hate Us. By Marc Lynch. Foreign Policy, July 19, 2013. Also here.

When anti-Americanism is this popular in Egypt, Washington should stay as far away as it can.

Lynch:

This week, Hosni Mubarak’s old media boss, Abdel Latif el-Menawy, published an astonishing essay on the website of the Saudi-funded, Emirati-based satellite television station Al Arabiya. Menawy described a wild conspiracy in which the U.S. ambassador to Egypt, Anne Patterson, directed Muslim Brotherhood snipers to murder Egyptian soldiers.

 

It would be easy to dismiss the ravings of an old Mubarak hand if they were not almost tame compared with the wild rumors and allegations across much of the Egyptian media and public. Even longtime observers of Egyptian rhetoric have been taken aback by the vitriol and sheer lunacy of the current wave of anti-American rhetoric. The streets have been filled with fliers, banners, posters, and graffiti denouncing President Barack Obama for supporting terrorism and featuring Photoshopped images of Obama with a Muslim-y beard or bearing Muslim Brotherhood colors.

 

A big Tahrir Square banner declaring love for the American people alongside hatred for Obama rings somewhat false given the fierce, simultaneous campaign against CNN and American journalists. The rhetoric spans the political spectrum: veteran leftist George Ishaq (Patterson “is an evil lady”), the Salafi Front (calling for demonstrations at the U.S. Embassy against foreign interference), the reckless secularist TV host Tawfik Okasha (whipping up xenophobic hatred), leaders of the Tamarod campaign (refusing to meet with Deputy Secretary of State William Burns because the United States “supports terrorism”), and Brotherhood leaders (blaming the United States for the military coup).

 

The tsunami of anti-American rhetoric swamping Egypt has been justified as a legitimate response to Washington’s supposed support for the now-deposed Muslim Brotherhood government. There is no doubt that many Egyptians on both sides are indeed enraged with U.S. policy toward Egypt. Nor is there any doubting the intensity of the anti-Brotherhood fever to which Washington has so effectively been linked. Nor, finally, could anyone really disagree that the United States has failed to effectively engage with or explain itself to the intensely polarized and mobilized new Egyptian public.

 

Still, there is clearly more going on than just a response to current U.S. policies. Hostile media campaigns and anti-American sentiments long predate the rise of Mohamed Morsy and his Muslim Brotherhood. Mubarak’s regime made an art form of using the state media to bash America while pliantly going along with American policies. Those legacies have left enduring habits of political thought. Today’s rhetoric and methods feel eerily familiar, even with their turbocharged energy and distinctive tropes. The overall effect is High Mubarakism, in which state and “independent” media churn up anti-Americanism, anti-Islamism, and extreme nationalism to legitimate the state’s rule.

 

What’s new is the intensity of the anti-Brotherhood views around which the campaign is built. This cements a widespread acceptance of these populist messages and methods among many Egyptians who would have angrily scorned them under Mubarak. The polarizing dynamics are fueled, at least among the politically engaged public, by jingoistic media and by the amplifying, accelerating effects of social media. A handful of liberal voices and veteran revolutionaries are pushing back on this trend, but they are swimming against a fierce tide for now. They will likely seem prescient should those activists who try to challenge the new government find themselves targeted through use of the same discourse, just as they were under Mubarak and by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) in 2011.

 

Egypt’s resurgent nationalism offers a potent lesson in the darker side of the new Arab public sphere. The proliferation of satellite television and social media has undeniably given a new platform to individual voices, protest movements, and contentious public debate. But the same platform is equally available to regimes, to illiberal forces of both Islamist and secularist varieties, and to populists of all description. The new media environment has proved ideal for the rapid, unchecked spread of rumors and allegations, for the enforcement of the new party line, and for the mobilization of rage against alleged enemies of the state – whether American, Brotherhood, Palestinian, Syrian, or Turkish.

 

While this virulent Egyptian populism has many targets, Washington remains a distinctly valued target. Denouncing the United States is politically useful to every Egyptian faction. The SCAF, like Mubarak, finds anti-Americanism useful in masking its strong relationship with Washington. Secular elites and felool (“remnants” of Mubarak’s regime) find it useful in deflecting attention from their own return to grace. The Muslim Brotherhood finds it useful in returning to the movement’s own anti-American comfort zone. Anti-Brotherhood activists find it useful as a way of appealing to nationalist public opinion to justify support for the coup. (Leaders of the anti-Morsy Tamarod campaign have been notably enthusiastic about this extreme state-nationalist agenda.)

The anti-American rhetoric that has always flowed freely through the Egyptian media has been mirrored in public opinion. Again, this long predates Egypt’s revolution or the election of a Muslim Brotherhood government. In May 2008, only 4 percent of Egyptians agreed that the “United States will allow people in this region to fashion their own political future as they see fit without direct U.S. influence,” while only 6 percent approved of the leadership in Washington, according to polling by Gallup. This changed very briefly after Obama’s election and his June 2009 speech at Cairo University, as approval of the United States in Gallup polling peaked in mid-2009 at 37 percent. But that number crashed below even George W. Bush levels within a year. In late 2011 (well before Morsy or the Muslim Brotherhood took power), over 70 percent of Egyptians opposed U.S. economic aid to Egypt. Back when the SCAF (not Morsy) aggressively prosecuted (and the media demonized) U.S.-funded NGOs, virtually nobody – including the NGOs – was willing to stand up and defend such aid. Few Egyptians think they will suffer politically by bashing America.

 

Washington has clearly struggled to respond effectively to this hostile, polarized, and intensely mobilized arena. It isn’t clear that any alternative course would have been received more positively, given the public mood. In my view, Washington was right to focus on the democratic process rather than supporting individual groups, whether the Brotherhood or secular activists. It was clearly right to give the Muslim Brotherhood the chance to govern when it won elections. It was right to try to keep a low profile and not be seen as trying to shape Egyptian political outcomes. But Washington also made many mistakes, of course, such as being overly accommodating in public toward the SCAF in the first year and a half of the transition and toward President Morsy when he took inflammatory and anti-democratic measures. And the Obama administration consistently failed to communicate these principles in a way compelling to the Egyptian public.

 

For many months – particularly after Morsy’s November constitutional power grab – a wide range of Egyptian and American analysts had urged the administration to speak out more clearly in defense of liberal values and push the Morsy government harder in public on human rights and tolerance. This would have been the right public stance. But nothing short of full-throated endorsement of one side’s position would likely have been heard amid the din of Egypt’s polarized politics. It’s easy to see why Washington’s attempt at a low profile and evenhandedness managed to antagonize both sides. There’s little tolerance for those in the middle when every Egyptian political trend has adopted the classic Bush position of “you’re either with us or against us.”

 

Typically, this would be the time for me to call for renewed public diplomacy to try to combat anti-American misconceptions and convince Egyptians of American intentions. But let’s be real. American efforts to push back against the most outlandish allegations are certainly worthwhile, but have obvious limitations. No, American battleships are not moving toward Egypt to launch an invasion. No, Ambassador Patterson did not conspire with the Muslim Brotherhood or offer to sell the pyramids to Israel. No, Obama is not a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and isn’t going to be impeached over secret payments to them. All well and good, but entrenched opinion is unlikely to be moved.

 

What about the broader arsenal of public diplomacy? Once upon a time, the expensive American Arabic-language satellite television Alhurra was supposed to be the kind of news source that would break through such a hostile media fog. But as has been the case since its launch, it has made virtually no difference or impact on the Egyptian debate. Nor does it appear that the much-touted digital diplomacy, whether Facebook pages or Twitter feeds, has made many inroads into a public debate dominated naturally enough by Egyptians themselves. When such online accounts have made news, it has usually been for the wrong reason.

 

A much broader, more vigorous effort to engage publicly and privately across all Egyptian political groups and segments of the population in the last few years is always good advice. Now isn’t really the moment, though. Accusations of having met with U.S. officials are once again a valued currency in Egyptian politics. Efforts to engage either with the U.S. Embassy or with high-level visitors like Deputy Secretary Burns just give the invitees the opportunity to grandstand by ostentatiously refusing to meet them.

 

Public diplomacy isn’t going to solve America’s Egypt problem, I’m afraid. This emphatically does not mean that Washington should ignore Egyptian voices or give up on efforts at broader, deeper engagement, though. Washington should pay close attention to what it is hearing from the Egyptian public, even while recognizing the politics driving those messages. It is never a good idea for U.S. policy to hunker down, convinced by its own messaging or dismissive of widely circulating ideas or critiques.

 

The overwhelming lesson of the last few years should be that publics matter, in all their variety and internal contradictions, even if it is difficult to predict exactly how or where their impact will manifest. Public diplomacy should be seen here as a long-term strategic investment, not as a quick fix. The Obama administration should certainly engage more broadly with a wide cross-section of Egyptian opinion and craft a more compelling narrative to make sense of its seemingly contradictory policies. It should do so even as it understands that little it says or does will make any immediate difference in Egypt’s highly polarized, intensely politicized public sphere, where anti-Americanism is a surefire and cost-free political winner.

The Arabs’ Spring and Our Mindset. By Paul R. Pillar.

The Arabs’ Spring and Our Mindset. By Paul R. Pillar. The National Interest, July 17, 2013.

The Rise of Sectarian Populism in the Middle East. By Scott Helfstein.

The Rise of Sectarian Populism. By Scott Helfstein. The National Interest, July 18, 2013.

The Zimmerman Verdict and the Resurrection of the Old Jim Crow. By Lisa Sharon Harper.

The Zimmerman Verdict and the Resurrection of the Old Jim Crow. By Lisa Sharon Harper. Sojourners, July 18, 2013.

Has the G.O.P. Gone Off the Deep End? By Thomas B. Edsall.

Has the G.O.P. Gone Off the Deep End? By Thomas B. Edsall. New York Times, July 17, 2013.

Right-wing talk shows turned White House blue. By Paul Goldman and Mark J. Rozell. Reuters, April 11, 2013.

Republicans Still Think We’re the Problem. By Rush Limbaugh. RushLimbaugh.com, July 18, 2013.

Rush:

So this explains why the left is always trying to drive me and other conservative talk radio hosts and other conservatives off the air. They’re trying to save the GOP. Ladies and gentlemen, let me tell you what this means. I’ve told you over and over again that the left – and I’m now gonna expand that to say “Washington.”  Washington will always tell us what they fear. That was why they set out to destroy Sarah Palin.

 

They fear you.

 

They fear conservatives.

 

Conservatives are the monkey wrench.

 

You all are the only thing standing in the way of Washington transforming this country into something it was not founded to be, and this story in the New York Times has multiple purposes. It tells us who they fear, and it also illustrates who they're going to try to destroy and who they have been trying to destroy. We even have people in the Republican Party who profess to be conservatives, but they’re not. They profess to be.

 

They’re constantly urging “caution” and “reason” and “restraint” and things. And while doing that, they claim to be objecting to the same things we do. They claim not to like Obamacare. They claim not to really like amnesty and immigration reform. But their solutions are to trash us – to trash conservatives – and prepare ineffective, minimalistic policies that end up involving more government.

Fear of the Missing White Voters. By Dan McLaughlin.

Fear of the Missing White Voters. By Dan McLaughlin. RedState, July 17, 2013.

The Baseless Hatred of the EU Towards Israel. By Melanie Phillips.

The baseless hatred of the EU towards Israel. By Melanie Phillips. MelaniePhillips.com, July 16, 2013.

Rolling Stone, Begging the World to Pay Attention Again. By Jim Geraghty.

Like a Crazy Ex, Rolling Stone Desperately Hoping You’ll Pay Attention to Them Again. By Jim Geraghty. National Review Online, July 18, 2013.

How the Palestinian Leadership Is Ignoring History. By Alan Dershowitz.

How the Palestinian Leadership Is Ignoring History. By Alan Dershowitz. The New Republic, September 28, 2011.

Dershowitz:

Palestinians are in the process of seeking sovereignty from the United Nations, but in doing so, they are asking for more than what was offered them in any prior negotiation with Israel—including during the talks involving President Clinton and Ehud Barak in 2000 and 2001. Rather than more, it is imperative that the Palestinians get less.

 

It is imperative to world peace that the Palestinians pay a price—even if it’s only a symbolic price—for rejecting the generous Clinton/Barak offer and responding to it with a second intifada in which 4,000 people were killed. It is also important that Israel not return to the precise armistice lines that existed prior to the 1967 war. If the Palestinians were to achieve a return to the status quo prior to Jordan’s attack on Israel in June of 1967, then military aggression will not have been punished, it will have been rewarded. That’s why Security Council Resolution 242—which was essentially the peace treaty that resulted from the end of the Six Day War—intended for Israel to retain territory necessary to give it secure boundaries (Indeed, in the formal application submitted by Abbas, he sought membership based on UN General Assembly Resolution 1810-11 of November 29, 1947, which would put the borders where they were before the Arab armies invaded the new Jewish state in 1948. This would reward multiple aggressions.)

 

Yet, however important it is that aggressive and unjustified violence not be rewarded, the international community seems bent on doing just that. If the end result of Jordan’s 1967 attack on Israel—an attack supported by the Palestinian leadership and participated in by Palestinian soldiers—is that the Palestinians get back everything Jordan lost, there will be no disincentive to comparable military attacks around the world. If the Palestinians get more than, or even as much as, they rejected in 2000 and 2001 (and did not accept in 2007), then further intifadas with mass casualties will be encouraged. A price must be paid for violence. That’s how the laws of war are supposed to work and there is no reason to make an exception in the case of the Palestinians.

 

I support a two-state solution based on negotiation and mutual compromise. But the negotiations must not begin where previous offers, which were not accepted, left off. They must take into account how we got to the present situation: The Arab rejection of the UN partition plan and the attack on the new Jewish state that resulted in the death of one percent of Israel’s population; the attack by Jordan and its Palestinian soldiers against Israel in 1967, which resulted in Israel’s capture of the West Bank; Israel’s offer to trade captured land for peace that was rejected at Khartoum with the three infamous “no’s”—no peace, no recognition, no negotiation; Israel’s generous offer of statehood in 2000-2001 that was answered by violence; and Olmert’s subsequent, even more generous, offer that was not accepted by President Abbas.

 

Efforts to achieve peace must look forward but they must not forget the past. A balance must be struck between not rewarding past violence and not creating unreasonable barriers to a future peace. But the Palestinians made it clear last week that they reject such balance.

 

I was at the United Nations on Friday when President Abbas made his speech demanding full recognition of Palestine as a state with the borders as they existed just before the Jordanians and Palestinians attacked Israel. In other words he wants a “do over.” He wants the nations that attacked Israel to suffer no consequences for their attempt to destroy the Jewish State. He wants to get back The Western Wall, The Jewish Quarter, and the access road to Hebrew University. Only then will he begin negotiations from this position of strength. But why then negotiate if the UN gives him more than he can possibly get through negotiation? Will he be in a position to seek less from Israel than what the UN gave him? Will he survive if he is seen as less Palestinian than the UN? Abbas blamed Israel for the self-inflicted wound the Palestinians cynically call the Nakba (the catastrophe). He denied the Jewish history of the land of Israel and he quoted with approval his terrorist predecessor Arafat. He refused to acknowledge Israel’s legitimate security needs. Abbas’s message, in sum, left little or no room for further compromise.

 

I also sat in the General Assembly as Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu offered to begin negotiations with Abbas, with absolutely no preconditions, in New York, at the United Nations, that very day. He said he would come to Ramallah to negotiate with him or keep the door of his Jerusalem office open. He did not even require as a precondition to negotiations that the Palestinians acknowledge what the UN recognized in 1947—namely, that Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people.

 

Although many in the international communities and on the editorial pages of newspapers claim that Abbas wants to negotiate a two-state solution, while Netanyahu has refused to do so, the truth was on full and open display at the General Assembly on Friday: Netanyahu wants to negotiate a peace now, whereas Abbas wants to win recognition from the United Nations before any negotiations begin. As Netanyahu put it: “Let’s stop negotiating about negotiating and let’s just start negotiating right now.”

 

If the Palestinians accept Netanyahu’s offer to negotiate a peaceful two-state solution, it will get a real state on the ground—a state that Israel, the United States, and the rest of the international community will recognize. It will not be on the pre-1967 borders because the Palestinians are not entitled to such borders and because such borders are not conducive to peace, but it will be close. The Palestinians will get a viable state and Israel will get a secure state.

 

If, on the other hand, the UN were to reward nearly a century of Palestinian rejectionism and violence by simply turning the clock back to 1967 (or 1947), it will be encouraging more cost-free rejectionism and violence. The Palestinians must pay a price for the thousands of lives their rejectionism and violence have caused. The price must not be so heavy as to preclude peace, but it must be heavy enough to deter war.

The Arabs Will Have Their Gettysburgs. By Leon Hadar.

The Arabs Will Have Their Gettysburgs. By Leon Hadar. The National Interest, July 17, 2013.

Tomorrow There Will Be No More Two-State Solution—and Then What? By Yuval Diskin.

Tomorrow There Will Be No More Two-State Solution—and Then What? By Yuval Diskin. Tablet, July 17, 2013.

The Boring Palestinians. By Bret Stephens.

The Boring Palestinians. By Bret Stephens. Wall Street Journal, July 15, 2013.

Stephens:

And yet for all its presumed importance, the Palestinian saga has gotten awfully boring, hasn't it? The grievances that remain unchanged, a cast of characters that never alters, the same schematics, the clichés that were shopworn decades ago. If it were a TV drama, it would be “The X-Files”—in its 46th season. The truth is out there. Still. We get it. We just don't give a damn anymore.

 

Little wonder that when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was interviewed over the weekend by CBS’s Bob Schieffer, the topics were Iran, Egypt and Syria, with no mention of Palestinians. Granted, news is a fickle business and what bleeds leads, but the omission was telling all the same. The region is moving tumultuously forward. Israel is dynamic, threatened, divided, innovative, evolving. Egypt careens between revolution and restoration. Lebanon is on the brink, Iran is on the march, Syria is in its agony. America is beating a retreat.

 

Only the Palestinians remain trapped in ideological amber. How long can the world be expected to keep staring at this four-million-year-old mosquito?

 

For the usual stalwarts and diehards, the answer will always be: as long as it takes. Palestinians will say it’s on account of their supposedly unique experience of injustice and oppression. Professional peace processors think it’s because of the supposed centrality of the Palestinian drama to all other Middle Eastern conflicts. The Israeli left and its sympathizers in the West are convinced that Palestine is the key to Israel’s survival as a Jewish and democratic state.

 

All of which is stale bread. Take the most jaundiced view of Israeli behavior toward the Palestinians over the past dozen years: Does it hold a candle to what Bashar Assad does in any given week to his own people in Homs and Aleppo? Take the most exaggerated view of the dearness of Palestine to Egyptians on the streets of Cairo or Turks in the squares of Istanbul: How does their sympathy for Gaza compare with their outrage toward their own governments?

 

As for the view that Israel needs to separate itself from Palestinians for its own good, that’s as true as it is beside the point. The issue for Israel isn’t whether it has a theoretical interest in a Palestinian state. It does.

 

But everything hinges on whether such a state evolves into another Costa Rica—or descends into another Yemen. So far the evidence points toward Yemen. Is it any wonder that, given the choice between a long-term moral threat to their character as a state and a near-term physical threat to their existence as a nation, ordinary Israelis should be more concerned with the latter?

Mindless Hatred on the Ninth of Av. By Jonathan S. Tobin.

Mindless Hatred on the Ninth of Av. By Jonathan S. Tobin. Commentary, July 16, 2013.

Tisha B’Av: The Great Divide. By Paula R. Stern. The Times of Israel, July 16, 2013.

The Scourge of Mideast Skepticism. By Jeremy Ben-Ami.

The Scourge of Mideast Skepticism. By Jeremy Ben-Ami. New York Times, June 16, 2013.

Palestinians Protest Against Normalization with Israel. By Khaled Abu Toameh.

Palestinians protest against meetings between PLO officials, Israeli politicians. By Khaled Abu Toameh. Jerusalem Post, July 15, 2013.

Demonstrators condemn meetings, call for "cleansing" the PLO of “the generals of normalization with Israel.”

The U.S. Should Not Suspend Aid to Egypt. By Aaron David Miller.

Dumb and Dumber. By Aaron David Miller. Foreign Policy, July 15, 2013.

No, the United States should not suspend aid to Egypt.

New EU Directive Bars All Dealings with Israeli-held Areas Over the Pre-1967 Lines. By Gavriel Fiske.

New EU directive bars all dealings with Israeli-held areas over the pre-1967 lines. By Gavriel Fiske. The Times of Israel, July 16, 2013.

When Europe demanded Israel surrender the Western Wall. By Haviv Rettig Gur. The Times of Israel, July 16, 2013.

The first casualty of the EU settlement directive: John Kerry. By Avi Isaacharoff. The Times of Israel, July 17, 2013.

“What occupation?” Naftali Bennett asks, rejecting Palestinian state. By Gavriel Fiske and Elie Leshem. The Times of Israel, June 17, 2013.

Medical Mystery Solved: Rochelle Harris, 27-Year Old British Woman, Has Maggots Removed From Her Ear.

Rochelle Harris, British Woman, Has Flesh-Eating Worms Removed From Her Ear. By Marc Lallanilla. The Huffington Post, July 17, 2013.

Horrified British woman, 27, discovers that headaches and scratching sounds inside her head are FLESH-EATING MAGGOTS after trip to Peru. By Rachel Reilly. Daily Mail, July 16, 2013.

On Wall Street, a Culture of Greed Won’t Let Go. By Andrew Ross Sorkin.

On Wall Street, a Culture of Greed Won’t Let Go. By Andrew Ross Sorkin. New York Times, July 15, 2013.

Wall Street in Crisis: A Perfect Storm Looming. Labaton Sucharow’s U.S. Financial Services Industry Survey, July 2013.

Race, Politics and the Zimmerman Trial. By Jason L. Riley.

Race, Politics and the Zimmerman Trial. By Jason L. Riley. Wall Street Journal, July 15, 2013.

Sex on Campus: She Can Play That Game, Too. By Kate Taylor.

Sex on Campus: She Can Play That Game, Too. By Kate Taylor. New York Times, July 12, 2013.

“Sex on Campus” Writer Responds to Questions and Complaints. By Margaret Sullivan. New York Times, June 16, 2013.

What Hooking Up at Penn Is Really About. By Amanda Wolkin. Philly Magazine, July 15, 2013.

Young People Who Sacrifice Romance for “Unencumbered Striving.” By Conor Friedersdorf. The Atlantic, July 15, 2013.

Sex and the College Girl. By Nora Johnson. The Atlantic, November 1957.

Sex and the College Girl, 1957 vs. 2013. By Caroline Kitchener. The Atlantic, July 16, 2013.

Northeastern Liberal Elites in an Uproar After New York Times Magazine Discovers Women Driving the Hookup Culture. By Rush Limbaugh. RushLimbaugh.com, July 17, 2013.

Advice for the Young Women of Princeton: Find a Husband. By Susan A. Patton. NJBR, April 1, 2013. With related articles.

Who Ruined the Humanities? By Lee Siegel.

Who Ruined the Humanities? By Lee Siegel. Wall Street Journal, July 12, 2013. Also here.

Who Ruined the Humanities: A Response to Lee Siegel’s WSJ Essay. Schola Stephaniae, July 25, 2013.

Response to the Wall Street Journal’s “Who Ruined the Humanities?” The Grad Student, July 28, 2013.

The Humanities in Crisis? Not at Most Schools. By Scott Saul. NJBR, July 3, 2013.

Humanities Committee Sounds and Alarm. By Jennifer Schuessler. NJBR, June 22, 2013. With related articles.

The Higher Education Scandal. By Harvey Mansfield. NJBR, May 20, 2013.

Why Grad Schools Should Require Students to Blog. By Maria Konnikova. NJBR, April 21, 2013.

Professors on the Production Line, Students on Their Own. By Mark Bauerlein. NJBR, February 23, 2013.

The Humanities and Common Sense. By Roger Berkowitz. NJBR, February 20, 2013.