Friday, August 9, 2013

Richard Dawkins and Neil DeGrasse Tyson on Islam.

Richard Dawkins on Islam. Twitter, August 8, 2013.

All the world’s Muslims have fewer Nobel Prizes than Trinity College, Cambridge. They did great things in the Middle Ages, though.

Richard Dawkins Twitter.

Islam and the Left. Video. Cathy Areu  interviewed by Greg Gutfeld. The O’Reilly Factor. Fox News, August 9, 2013.

Richard Dawkins’ tweets on Islam are as rational as the rants of an extremist Muslim cleric. By Nesrine Malik. The Guardian, August 8, 2013.

Neil DeGrasse Tyson and the Myth of Islamic Anti-Science. By Arsalan Ibrahim.
The Daily Banter, August 12, 2010.

Neil DeGrasse Tyson: The Islamic Golden Age. Naming Rights. Video. uzomad, March 18, 2012. YouTube. Also here.




Neil DeGrasse Tyson: The Effect of Islam on Science in the Middle East, 9th-12th Centuries. Video. theinquisitor, February 8, 2007. YouTube.



How Al Qaeda Won the Arab Spring. By Marc Lynch.

The Gift. By Marc Lynch. Foreign Policy, August 8, 2013. Also here.

How the Arab Spring turned out to be a win for al Qaeda.

MOOC Fever Breaks. By Walter Russell Mead.

MOOC Fever Breaks. By Walter Russell Mead. Via Meadia, August 9, 2013.

Online education can be good or cheap, but not both. By Reihan Salam. Reuters, July 26, 2013.

Israel and the Gulf States: It’s Complicated. By Raphael Ahren.

Israel and the Gulf states: It’s complicated. By Raphael Ahren. The Times of Israel, August 9, 2013.

Exploiting Egypt’s Rape Culture for Political Gain. By Anna Lekas Miller.

Exploiting Egypt’s Rape Culture for Political Gain. By Anna Lekas Miller. The Nation, August 8, 2013.

Thursday, August 8, 2013

What Is Libertarian Populism? By Conn Carroll.

What is libertarian populism? By Conn Carroll. Washington Examiner, August 8, 2013.

Democrats Have Become the Party of Concentrated Elite Power. By Yuval Levin. NJBR, July 31, 2013. With related articles and link to NJBR posts on libertarian populism.

The New Republican Party. By Ronald Reagan. NJBR, April 2, 2013.

Why Isn’t Rick Santorum the GOP 2016 Frontrunner? By Byron York.

Why isn’t Rick Santorum the GOP 2016 frontrunner? By Byron York. Washington Examiner, August 7, 2013.

In the Middle East, Follow the Violence. By Evelyn Gordon.

In the Middle East, Follow the Violence. By Evelyn Gordon. Commentary, August 7, 2013.

Israelis Immune to Peace Optimism. By Jonathan S. Tobin.

Israelis Immune to Peace Optimism. By Jonathan S. Tobin, Commentary, August 7, 2013.

Palestinian leader in Canada: Shoot Israeli Jews if they don’t leave Jerusalem. JTA, August 5, 2013.

Fatah celebrates murder. By Itamar Marcus and Nan Jacques Zilberdik. Palestinian Media Watch, August 6, 2013.

Glorifying terrorists and terror. Palestinian Media Watch.


Tobin:

There may be no objective reason to believe that the new round of peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians will succeed and a good chance that they will actually make things worse in the Middle East. But that hasn’t stopped Secretary of State John Kerry’s fans on the op-ed pages of our leading newspapers from continuing to applaud his efforts. Both the Washington Post’s David Ignatius and the New York Times’s Thomas Friedman think Kerry’s efforts are inspired and even clever. But apparently most Israelis don’t agree. That’s the takeaway from a new poll conducted by the Israeli Democracy Institute and Tel Aviv University published yesterday.
 
While a large majority of both Jewish and Arab Israelis favor conducting peace talks, most Israeli Jews think it would be a mistake for their country to follow Kerry’s advice and withdraw almost completely from the West Bank and dismantle many settlements, even if the Jewish state were allowed to retain most of the major settlement blocs:
The poll … found that 63 percent of Jews in Israel oppose a withdrawal to the 1967 lines with land swaps as part of any peace arrangement with the Palestinian Authority, even if it meant Israel would hold onto the Etzion Bloc, directly south of Jerusalem; Ma’aleh Adumim, east of the capital; and Ariel in the central West Bank about 34 kilometers (21 miles) east of Tel Aviv. Assuming Israeli retention of Ariel, Ma’aleh Adumim and other settlement blocs, 58% of Jewish respondents were opposed to the dismantling of other settlements.
 
The poll was conducted among 602 respondents in late July, after the announcement of new peace talks with the Palestinians, and has a statistical error of 4.5%. According to the survey, 50% of Jewish Israelis also oppose the transfer of Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem to Palestinian Authority control with a special arrangement for Jewish holy sites.
These results, which seemingly contradict other surveys that show that a majority would back a peace deal if it were put to a referendum, will doubtlessly be interpreted in some quarters as evidence that proves Israelis really don’t want peace. But all these numbers tell us is that most Israelis have a better understanding of Palestinian political culture than Kerry, Friedman, or Ignatius. Though the desire for peace in Israel remains high, if most there don’t think territorial withdrawals are a good idea, it’s because they have no faith in the willingness of the Palestinians to make peace or to abstain from violence even if an accord was signed.
 
Let’s start by noting that most Israelis find it impossible to forget something that the peace processers keep trying to flush down the memory hole: the Palestinians have already rejected Israeli offers of statehood and withdrawal from almost all of the West Bank three times. With Hamas still in control of Gaza, the notion that a weak Mahmoud Abbas would accept a deal that the more powerful Yasir Arafat refused requires a leap of faith that most sensible people are unable to make.
 
But even if we leave aside that natural skepticism, why wouldn’t most Israelis accept such withdrawals in exchange for a peace agreement? Aren’t they persuaded by demographic arguments that claim that a continuation of the status quo will ultimately compromise Israel’s Jewish majority? And don’t they think the country would be more secure if it had an internationally recognized border that kept most of the Palestinian Arabs outside of the Jewish state?
 
Most Israelis would probably be happier if there were no demographic threat, even if the predictions of doom might be exaggerated. There’s also no question that they desire peace as ardently as those who think the country must be saved from itself.
 
But the problem is that, unlike Kerry, Friedman, and Ignatius, they also remember what happened when their country withdrew every settlement, soldier, and individual Jew from Gaza. The result was the creation of a terror state on their doorstep and few in Israel want to risk repeating that mistake in the far more strategic West Bank. Simply put, they don’t trust Abbas and his Fatah Party, which demanded the release of terrorists with blood on their hands as the price for the privilege of negotiating with them and continues to laud murderers of Jews as heroes in their official media, to make peace. If a majority thinks creating a sovereign state largely along the 1967 lines where Israeli forces could not enter is a mistake, it’s because their experience teaches them that doing so would be an invitation to more violence. Similarly, the lack of enthusiasm for dividing Jerusalem must be seen as a vote of no confidence in the willingness of the PA to not use their foothold in the city to unleash a new wave of violence.
 
That said, I still think that if Abbas were to actually sign a peace deal recognizing the legitimacy of a Jewish state and giving up the “right of return” for the descendants of the 1948 Arab refugees, a majority of Israelis might vote to approve such an agreement even if it included the withdrawals that most now think would be foolish. But since few believe Abbas can do that, talk about giving up territory merely for the sake of an accord that seems a pipe dream is inevitably seen as quixotic.
 
This poll should serve as a reminder that the calls for Israel to take great risks in the name of peace in the absence of any indication the other side means business are bound to fall on deaf ears. Neither Prime Minister Netanyahu nor his people are likely to be scared into making such sacrifices by threats of future Palestinian violence, as Ignatius thinks is Kerry’s plan. In the absence of a genuine sea change in Arab political culture that would enable Abbas to credibly pledge to keep the peace, a majority of Israelis obviously think they are better off not weakening their security. If Israelis are largely immune to peace process enthusiasm, it is because they understand their antagonists a lot better than many Americans do.


Israel’s Security Paradox: Never Safer and Never More Uncertain. By Frida Ghitis.

Israel’s Security Paradox: Never Safer and Never More Uncertain. By Frida Ghitis. The Atlantic, August 6, 2013.

Kerry Is Daring to Fail in the Mideast. By Thomas L. Friedman.

Daring to Fail. By Thomas L. Friedman. New York Times, August 6, 2013.

Wednesday, August 7, 2013

The Tea Party’s Path to Irrelevance. By James Traub.

The Tea Party’s Path to Irrelevance. By James Traub. New York Times, August 6, 2013.

The Great Egyptian Schism. By Fouad Ajami.

The Great Egyptian Schism. By Fouad Ajami. Real Clear Politics, August 7, 2013. Also at Advancing a Free Society.

Having It All Without Having Kids?

Having It All Without Having Kids? Video panel with Alisyn Camerota, Monica Crowley, and Kirsten Powers. America Live. Fox News, August 7, 2013.

Should we care that smart women aren’t having kids? By Sadhbh Walshe. The Guardian, August 7, 2013.

The Feminists are Repeating Themselves. By Rush Limbaugh. RushLimbaugh.com, August 7, 2013.

Old Videos of Rush Limbaugh with Phil Donahue and William Shatner.

Rush Limbaugh with Phil Donahue and Vladimir Pozner, 1993. Part 1. Part 2. Video. YouTube.






Rush on Donahue, 1992. Video playlist in 7 parts. YouTube.

Rush Limbaugh with William Shatner, 2009. Video. YouTube.



Russia’s Tiny Cold War. By George Friedman.

Russia’s Tiny Cold War. By George Friedman. Real Clear World, August 6, 2013.

Vlad the Impaler. By Kori Schake. Foreign Policy, August 8, 2013. Also here.

Reza Aslan on “Zealot” Controversy.

Reza Aslan on “Zealot” Controversy. Video. Imus in the Morning. Fox Business, August 6, 2013.

Review of Zealot: The Life and Times of Jesus of Nazareth by Reza Aslan. By Stuart Kelly. The Guardian, August 7, 2013. Hostile review.

The Book That Changed Reza Aslan’s Mind About Jesus. By Joe Fassler. The Atlantic, August 6, 2013.

Return of the Jesus Wars. By Ross Douthat. NJBR, August 4, 2013. With related articles.

Reza Aslan Misrepresents His Scholarly Credentials on Fox News. By Matthew J. Franck. NJBR, July 29, 2013. With related articles and videos.

The Myth of an “Isolationist” GOP. By Jonah Goldberg.

The Myth of an “Isolationist” GOP. By Jonah Goldberg. National Review Online, August 7, 2013.

Rumors of Republicans “returning” to a more dovish foreign policy are grossly exaggerated — in every way.

Major Hasan’s Death Spree. By Michelle Malkin.

Major Hasan’s Death Spree. By Michelle Malkin. National Review Online, August 6, 2013.

Political correctness has trumped truth in the Fort Hood massacre.

Republicans, White Voters and Racial Polarization. By Ross Douthat.

Republicans, White Voters and Racial Polarization. By Ross Douthat. New York Times, August 6, 2013.

Why White Voters Will Flee a White-Only Party. By Alex Roarty. National Journal, August 1, 2013.

Killing the Immigration Bill, Polarizing America. By Ryan Lizza. The New Yorker, July 12, 2013.

The Electoral Roots of America’s Dysfunctional Government. By Alan I. Abramowitz. Paper prepared for presentation at Conference on Governing in Polarized Times, Rothermere American Institute, Oxford University, Oxford, England, April 17, 2013.

The Beltway Burkeans vs. Heartland Populists. By Ben Domenech. NJBR, July 2, 2013. With related articles by Sean Trende.

The “Country Party” and the “Court Party.” By Ross Douthat. NJBR, July 28, 2013. With related articles.

Tuesday, August 6, 2013

The Coming of Al Qaeda 3.0. By Bruce Reidel.

The Coming of Al Qaeda 3.0. By Bruce Reidel. The Daily Beast, August 6, 2013.

Reidel:

In case anyone needed reminding, the recent global terror alert illustrates that, 15 years after its first attacks on America, Al Qaeda is thriving. The coup in Egypt and the chaotic aftermath of the Arab awakening is only going to add more militants to this army of radicals. Failed revolutions and failing states are like incubators for the jihadists, a sort of Pandora’s Box of hostility and alienation.
 
The news that al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and his man in Yemen, Nasr al Wuhayshi, were communicating and hatching plots to attack Western targets in the region is no surprise. Like any CEO of a multinational company, Zawahiri is in regular communication with al Qaeda’s half dozen regional franchises—just as Osama bin Laden was before he was killed.
 
What is new is the rapid growth of these franchises—associated cells and sympathetic movements from Algeria to Aden. The uprisings that swept the Middle East two years ago initially threatened al Qaeda by suggesting a better alternative to terror and jihad in the form of democracy and peaceful change. Now the revolutions have all but failed, creating more chaos than constitutions, and Twitter is not mobilizing reform. The pandemonium in Syria, Libya, and Egypt, are like a hothouse for al Qaeda, which is thriving just as it has in Somalia and Afghanistan.
 
But Egypt is the most critical piece. Zawahiri was taken by surprise in 2011 when the revolution swept President Hosni Mubarak from power. Indeed, his first statements on the revolution bordered on the incoherent. But his message has since then become clear.
 
Last week, al Qaeda issued a statement from his hideout in Pakistan that urged Egyptians to fight the army coup. Zawahiri said the Egyptian Army is an American tool and that the coup was fueled by Saudi and Gulf money.
 
In an I-told-you-so moment, Zawahiri reminded the Muslim Brotherhood—and the now-ousted President Mohamed Morsi—that al Qaeda had always maintained that nothing was to be gained through the ballot box and that jihad was the only viable path to power.
 
Zawahiri seems to have calculated that the army coup will radicalize millions of Muslim Brotherhood members, driving them into the embrace of al Qaeda, and that Egypt will revert to the terror and violence that wracked it in the early 1990s.
 
He may be right. In Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, al Qaeda has made unprecedented gains recently due to growing Sunni anger. This growth in these al Qaeda franchises has been encouraged by Zawahiri in covert and overt messages for two years.
 
Jihadists from Chechnya to Copenhagen have followed his advice and flocked to Syria to join the jihad. Hundreds have “martyred” themselves fighting Syrian despot Bashar al Assad. Jail breaks in Iraq, Libya, and Pakistan have freed more than a thousand Qaeda prisoners in the last month alone, a move Zawahiri has also lauded. In Yemen the American-backed government in Sana has made some gains this year and has had a better record on reform than many other postrevolutionary regimes. Yet al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is still attracting Yemenis and Saudis angered by drones, poverty, and desperation.
 
Most of al Qaeda's energy and Zawahiri's effort is focused on the crisis inside the Arab and Islamic worlds for now. The new generation of al Qaeda—AQ 3.0, if you like—is more focused on the nearby enemy close to home than the faraway enemy in America and Europe. For now at least. But easy targets like the natural-gas plant in Algeria attacked last winter by an Qaeda cell based in Libya and Mali allow local groups to kill dozens of foreign "crusaders." And embassies are always favorite targets. After all, that is how al Qaeda started 15 years ago this month when it blew up our missions in Kenya and Tanzania.
 
The Obama administration is right to alert the public to this threat. When it can, it should share more intelligence about how al Qaeda works, protecting collection sources, of course, but revealing how the enemy thinks and what its goals are. For example, two years after bin Laden's safe house in Pakistan was found, there must be more documents that can be shared with the public to heighten awareness and understanding about the inner workings and global connections of our still deadly enemy.
 
When the CIA revealed Zawahiri’s communication with the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musssb al-Zarqawi in 2005, it highlighted a high level of disagreement within al Qaeda that hurt the movement. According to the Qaeda narrative, America is an enemy of Islam that supports oppressive military dictators and greedy royal princes who, in turn, rule by repression and secretly partner with Israel. How Obama handles events in Cairo this summer will impact that narrative for years to come.
 
Unfortunately, the ill-starred Arab Awakening is fueling more anger and frustration in the Islamic world, converting more people to jihad. After 15 years, there is no end in sight to al Qaeda. And the new generation—AQ 3.0—may be with us for years to come.


“Total Destruction and Devastation”: George Washington Orders the Ethnic Cleansing of the Iroquois, 1779.

The Wyoming Valley Massacre, July 3, 1778. By Alonzo Chappel, 1858.

“Total Destruction and Devastation”: George Washington Orders the Ethnic Cleansing of the Iroquois, 1779. Instructions to General John Sullivan, May 31, 1779. Founders Online.

Total Ruin. By Logan Beirne. Blood of Tyrants: George Washington and the Forging of the Presidency, Chapter 26. New York: Encounter Books, 2013.

History of Sullivan’s Campaign Against the Iroquois. By A. Tiffany Norton. Lima, N.Y., 1879.


Washington:

Sir,
 
The expedition you are appointed to command is to be directed against the hostile tribes of the six nations of Indians, with their associates and adherents. The immediate objects are the total destruction and devastation of their settlements and the capture of as many prisoners of every age and sex as possible. It will be essential to ruin their crops now in the ground and prevent their planting more.
 
The troops to be employed under your commmand are—Clintons, Maxwells, Poors and Hands Brigades and ten independent companies raised in the State of Pennsylvania—In Hands Brigade, I comprehend all the detached corps of Continental troops now on the Susquehanna and Spencers regiment—Cortlandts I consider as belonging to Clintons Brigade—Aldens may go to Poors & Butlers & the rifle corps to Maxwells or Hands according to their comparative strength and circumstances.
 
Clintons Brigade you are informed has been ordered to rendezvous at Conojoharie, subject to your orders either to form a junction with the main body on the Susquehannah, by way of Otsege—or to proceed up the Mohawk river and co-operate in the best manner circumstances will permit—as you judge most adviseable.
 
So soon as your preparations are in sufficient forwardness, you will assemble your main body at Wyoming and proceed thence to Tioga, taking from that place the most direct and practicable route into the heart of the Indian settlements—You will establish such intermediate posts as you think necessary for the security of your communication and convoys, nor need I caution you, while you leave a sufficiency of men for their defence to take care to diminish your operating force as little as possible. A post at Tioga will be particularly necessary—either a stockade Fort or an intrenched camp—if the latter a blockhouse should be erected in the interior.
 
I would recommend that some post in the center of the Indian Country should be occupied with all expedition, with a sufficient quantity of provision, whence parties should be detached to lay waste all the settlements around with instructions to do it in the most effectual manner, that the country may not be merely overrun but destroyed.
 
I beg leave to suggest as general rules that ought to govern your operations—to make rather than receive attacks, attended with as much impetuosity, shouting and noise as possible, and to make the troops act in as loose and dispersed a way as is consistent with a proper degree of government concert and mutual support—It should be previously impressed upon the minds of the men wherever they have an opportunity, to rush on with the war hoop and fixed bayonet—Nothing will disconcert and terrify the Indians more than this.
 
I need not urge the necessity of using every method in your power, to gain intelligence of the enemy’s strength motions and designs; nor need I suggest the extraordinary degree of vigilance and caution which will be necessary to guard against surprises from an adversary so secret desultory & rapid as the Indians.
 
If a detachment operates on the Mohawk River the commanding Officer should be instructed to be very watchfull that no troops come from Oswegatchie and Niagara to Oswego without his knowledge; and for this purpose he should keep trusty spies at those three places to advertise him instantly of the movement of any party and its force. This detachment should also endeavour to keep up a constant intercourse with the main body.
 
More than common care will be necessary of your arms and ammunition from the nature of the service—They should be particularly inspected after a rain or the passage of any deep water.
 
After you have very thoroughly completed the destruction of their settlements; if the Indians should show a disposition for peace, I would have you to encourage it, on condition that they will give some decisive evidence of their sincerity by delivering up some of the principal instigators of their past hostility into our hands—Butler, Brandt, the most mischievous of the tories that have joined them or any other they may have in their power that we are interested to get into ours—They may possibly be engaged, by address, secrecy and stratagem, to surprise the Garrison of Niagara and the shipping on the lakes and put them into our possession. This may be demanded as a condition of our friendship and would be a most important point gained—If they can render a service of this kind you may stipulate to assist them in their distress with supplies of provisions and other articles of which they will stand in need, having regard in the expectations you give them to our real abilities to perform. I have no power at present to authorise you to conclude a treaty of peace with them but you may agree upon the terms of one, letting them know that it must be finally ratified by Congress and giving them every proper assurance that it will. I shall write to Congress on the subject and endeavour to obtain more ample and definitive authority.
 
But you will not by any means listen to overture of peace before the total ruin of their settlements is effected—It is likely enough their fears if they are unable to oppose us, will compel them to offers of peace, or policy may lead them, to endeavour to amuse us in this way to gain time and succour for more effectual opposition. Our future security will be in their inability to injure us the distance to which they are driven and in the terror with which the severity of the chastisement they receive will inspire Peace without this would be fallacious and temporary—New presents and an addition of force from the enemy would engage them to break it the first fair opportunity and all the expence of our extensive preparations would be lost.
 
When we have effectually chastised them we may then listen to peace and endeavour to draw further advantages from their fears. But even in this case great caution will be necessary to guard against the snares which their treachery may hold out—They must be explicit in their promises give substantial pledges for their performance and execute their engagements with decision and dispatch. Hostages are the only kind of security to be depended on.
 
Should Niagara fall into your hands in the manner I have mentioned—you will do every thing in your power for preserving & maintaining it, by establishing a chain of posts, in such manner as shall appear to you most safe and effectual and tending as little to reduce our general force as possible—Th however we shall be better able to decide as the future events of the campaign unfold themselves—I shall be more explicit on the subject hereafter.
 
When you have completed the objects of your expedition, unless otherwise directed in the mean time, you will return to form a junction with the main army by the most convenient expeditious and secure route according to circumstances—The Mohawk river, if it can be done without too great risk, will perhaps be most elegible on several accounts. Much should depend on the relative position of the main army at the time.

As it is impossible to foresee what may be the exigences of the service in this quarter, this united with other important reasons makes it essential that your operations should be as rapid and that the expedition should be performed in as little time as will be consistent with its success and efficacy.

And here I cannot forbear repeating my former caution, that your troops may move as light and as little encumbered as possible even from their first outset—The state of our Magazines demands it as well as other considerations—if much time should be lost in transporting the troops and stores up the river—the provisions for the expedition will be consumed and the general scantiness of our supplies will not permit their being replaced—conse the whole enterprise may be defeated—I would recommend it to you for this purpose that the General Officers should make an actual inspection of the baggage of their several Brigades and absolutely reject to be left behind, at proper places every articles that can be dispensed with on the expedition—This is an extraordinary case and requires extraordinary attention.
 
Relying perfectly upon your judgment prudence and activity—I have the highest expectation of success equal to our wishes; and I beg leave to assure you, that I anticipate with great pleasure, the honor which will redound to yourself and the advantage to the common cause, from a happy termination of this important enterprise.


How We Lost Yemen. By Gregory D. Johnsen.

How We Lost Yemen. By Gregory D. Johnsen. Foreign Policy, August 6, 2013. Also here.

The United States used the Pakistan playbook on Yemen’s terrorists. It didn’t work.

Poll: Israeli Jews Say They Are Pessimistic About the Peace Process. By Gil Hoffman.

Poll: Israeli Jews say they are pessimistic about peace process. By Gil Hoffman. Jerusalem Post, August 6, 2013.

In the Arab Middle East, Science Lags Behind the West. By Lee Smith.

In the Arab Middle East, Science Lags Behind the West. By Lee Smith. Tablet, July 31, 2013.