Christianity After Constantine. By Walter Russell Mead. Via Meadia, January 23, 2013.
Religion As An Activity Engaged In By Consenting Adults In Private. By Peter Berger. The American Interest, January 23, 2013.
Berger:
But I
do want to make a general observation: In all these cases the authorities
accused of violating the plaintiffs’ rights operate with a definition of
religion as a private matter to be kept out of public space. There is here a
general issue of government overreach, as clearly illustrated by the (still
unresolved) attempt by the Obama administration to force Catholic institutions
to provide contraception coverage in their employees’ health plans. Beyond
that, though, there is a very ideological view of the place of religion in
society. In other words, religion is to be an activity engaged in by consenting
adults in private. The attorney for the Judeo-Christian side in the
aforementioned American case had it quite right when he compared the treatment
of his client’s religion with measures of disease control. This is not an
attitude one would expect to find in a Western democracy. It is curiously
reminiscent of policies toward religion in Communist countries and toward
non-Muslims under Islamic rule.
An
aggressive secularism seems to be on the march in all these cases. It seems
more at home in Europe, which is far more secularized than America. Even in the
United Kingdom, it seems, the drums of the French Revolution still reverberate.
But how is one to explain this sort of secularism in the United States? The
“nones”—that is, those who say “none” when asked for their religious
affiliation by pollsters—are a very mixed lot. One theme that comes through is
disappointment with organized religion. There is an anti-Christian edge to
this, since Christian churches continue to be the major religious institutions
in this country. Disappointment then, or disillusion—but why the aggressive
hostility? There is yet another theme that comes through in the survey data: An
identification of churches (and that means mainly Christian ones) with
intolerance and repression. I think that this is significant.
Let me
venture a sociological hypothesis here: The new American secularism is in
defense of the sexual revolution. Since the 1960s there has indeed been a
sexual revolution in America. It has been very successful in changing the mores
and the law. It should not be surprising that many people, especially younger
ones, enjoy the new libidinous benefits of this revolution. Whether one
approves or deplores the new sexual culture, it seems unlikely to be reversed.
Yet Christian churches (notably the Catholic and Evangelical ones) are in the
forefront of those who do want to reverse the libertine victory. Its
beneficiaries are haunted by the nightmare of being forced into chastity belts
by an all too holy alliance of clerics and conservative politicians. No wonder
they are hostile!
Mead:
For
most of Western history, ever since Constantine linked the church and the state
in the ancient Roman Empire, Christians set the cultural and political rules
that governed society. When it came to public morality the church and the
people agreed more than they disagreed. Whatever people did in their private
lives, everyone agreed publicly that the legal and ecclesiastical definitions
of marriage should line up. To them, lifelong, heterosexual monogamy wasn’t a
specifically Christian idea, or even a religious idea, but merely the
commonsensical solution to the problem of sex and babies.
No
longer. Today churches themselves don’t agree about what defines marriage. Many
condone divorce; others don’t. Some churches celebrate gay weddings; others
hold that all homosexual acts are sinful. Some churches frown on premarital
sex; others say live and let live. And even greater diversity exists in society
at large. In a democratic society, laws about marriage reflect the majority’s
views. A century ago, this wasn’t a problem because the majority of individuals,
as well as churches, agreed about what marriage was. Today, no such consensus
exists.
Where
we disagree with Berger, then, is that the conflict over public morality isn’t
a cage match between a unified Christian body and a unified secular movement.
Society is becoming so diverse that any civil law on marriage will coincide
with fewer people’s beliefs about what the law should be. This breakdown of
cultural consensus is going to haunt American jurisprudence and political
discourse for the foreseeable future.
But
Berger is right that traditional Christian teachings on sex are, rightly or
wrongly, driving hostility to Christianity. These teachings—no sexual
intercourse outside heterosexual marriage, ever—have never been particularly
popular, especially among the young. In our society, where widespread access to
birth control and the long interval between the onset of puberty and the
security of economic adulthood make traditional chastity look unthinkable to a
lot of young people, it’s less popular than ever.
