The Peace Process After the Election. By Shlomo Avineri. Foreign Affairs, January 25, 2013.
Avineri:
Even
so, the peace process still matters, because the current stalemate is
untenable. The question, however, is how to move forward. There is no doubt
that the policies of the Netanyahu government have contributed to the gridlock,
but so have Palestinian attempts to raise preconditions for the resumption of
negotiations. The divide between the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza,
meanwhile, has hurt the Palestinian Authority’s claim to legitimacy and made
negotiations even more difficult. All this helped to explain why Israelis in
this election were less focused than usual on the Palestinian issue.
But the
experiences of the more dovish Israeli governments that preceded Netanyahu’s
illustrate even deeper obstacles to peace. In the late 2000s, under Ehud Olmert’s
center-left government, Israel negotiated with the Palestinian Authority for
more than two years. Both sides entered talks with an honest interest in
reaching a two-state solution. Had they been successful, Olmert might still be
prime minister and Mahmoud Abbas, the president of the Palestinian Authority,
would have a trump card to play against the more radical and fundamentalist
Hamas. But as soon as negotiators moved from their ritualistic opening
positions to the core issues of the conflict – borders, the fate of the Jewish
settlers in the West Bank, Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugee problem, and
Israel’s security concerns – it became clear that the gaps between the most
moderate Israeli positions and the most moderate Palestinian positions were too
wide to be easily bridged.
That
has not changed. In fact, there are now more Jewish settlers in the West Bank
than there were four years ago, which makes coming to an agreement thornier
than it was during Olmert’s time. And Hamas’ continued control of the Gaza
Strip means that even an agreement reached between Israel and the Palestinian
Authority would not mean an end to the conflict. The current turmoil in the
Arab world bodes ill for the peace process, as an Egypt ruled by the Muslim
Brotherhood and a Syria embroiled in a bloody civil war do not encourage even
moderate Israelis to take risks with the Palestinians.
All
this means that Israel’s next government should take a fresh look at what is
feasible, with an eye toward the lessons from similar conflicts such as those
in Cyprus, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Kashmir. Like the Palestinian-Israeli conflict,
these disputes are multifaceted: They are not only about territory but also
about sovereignty, legitimacy, and national self-determination; they have been
exacerbated by religious differences; and they entail occupation, resistance to
that occupation, and terrorism. None of these conflicts has been fully settled
because the contending parties were not willing to give up their basic claims,
but they have been gradually tempered. In each case, a complex set of partial
agreements, conflict-management measures, unilateral decisions, and
confidence-building strategies has generally kept bloodshed at bay. In Cyprus,
Turkey’s decision to open crossings in Nicosia, for example, helped to
stabilize the situation, as did internationally supervised border agreements
between Serbia and Kosovo. Similar partial agreements have achieved the same
end in Bosnia and Kashmir, although the deeper issues have still not been
resolved.
In none
of these cases was the United States able to move the parties toward a final-status
agreement against their will, but it could help coax them to accept halfway
measures that do not entail giving up fundamental claims. Such proactive
conflict management may be the only realistic prospect for peace between the
Israelis and Palestinians. And it could be acceptable to a new Netanyahu
government that will, in all probability, include centrist parties. Such an
approach would mean moving ahead slowly, step by step, which would make it
easier for both sides to sell such piecemeal progress to their constituencies,
since they would not have to cross any of their fundamental and ideological
redlines. Such a strategy would be based on what has already been achieved
between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, including the much-overlooked
fact that security cooperation between the two sides has improved in the last
few years, despite the lack of progress on negotiations. Such an approach would
entail Israel’s tacit acceptance to refrain from expanding its settlement
project (a step Israel agreed to in the past, even under the hawkish government
of Ariel Sharon), easing life conditions for the Palestinians through economic
concessions and the further dismantling of checkpoints in the area, and
encouraging Palestinian institution building. On the Palestinian side, the
agreement would require moderating its public diplomacy and improving its
educational system, both of which are geared to be confrontational. This may
also encourage strengthening the implicit cease-fire between Israel and Hamas,
and although not much more could be achieved in Gaza given Hamas’ rejection of
Israel’s very existence, it could encourage more moderate elements there if
they see that cooperation pays off.
A key
figure in this scheme would be Israel’s next minister of defense, who, taking
into account Netanyahu’s weak position, will not likely be someone from Likud.
Netanyahu will be under public pressure to appoint a person who could play the
role of the responsible adult. This means that the current minister of defense,
Ehud Barak, will likely remain in his position. If Barak retains his seat, his
presence will greatly reassure both Israelis and the international community
that pragmatism and not ideology will prevail in Israel’s new government.
The
conventional wisdom in the international community is that one can return to
the Oslo process of 20 years ago. But up until now, that has not achieved its
stated aim – a two-state solution – and will not be very helpful in moving the
two sides toward more accommodation. The recent Israeli elections have not
changed this, and more modest aims are the only realistic way to push
Israeli-Palestinian relations away from the dangers of confrontation and toward
some modicum of reconciliation. Everything else has already failed.
