The Egyptian army is making a comeback. By Zvi Mazel. Jerusalem Post, February 24, 2013.
More on Egypt and Morsi here.
Mazel:
Never
has Egypt been so close to civil war and today it seems that only the army can
prevent the worse from happening.
The
Muslim Brothers and the opposition are both doing their utmost to bring the
army to their side, with little success so far: Field Marshal Abd el-Fattah
El-Sisi, the defense minister, never loses an opportunity to state that the
army is taking no part in the political struggle and devotes its energy to
protecting the country – while adding that it will not let it plunge into
chaos. The opposition, in contrast, feels that only the army can bring back
order – the way they want. During last Friday’s demonstrations people called on
the army to “Get out of the barracks and make President Mohamed Morsi resign
and call for new presidential elections.”
That
state of affairs leaves the Brotherhood and Morsi with mixed feelings. In the
course of the past few weeks they have became painfully aware of the fact that
the army will not protect the regime should it lose its legitimacy and try to
resort to force to stay in power. Last week the rumor that Morsi intended to
fire the defense minister spread like wildfire, prompting an “unnamed military
source” to warn that it would be “political suicide” for the president since
the army – soldiers and officers alike – are angry with the regime. One of the
president’s representatives hastened to placate army commanders and the army in
turn distanced itself from the “unnamed source.”
Three
days later Morsi declared that he had full confidence in the army and “the
deepest appreciation” for the defense minister; the declaration was duly
published in the media next to a photo of El- Sisi sitting opposite Morsi in
the president’s office. The rumor may have been a trial balloon launched by the
Brothers who wanted to gauge what kind of reaction could be expected to such a
radical move. However the incident can also be seen as part of a wider series
of clashes between the army and the Brotherhood.
Morsi
first became aware of the problem last November during the violent
demonstrations led by the opposition to protest the new Islamic constitution
and the presidential declaration granting the president legislative power and
full immunity for his decisions.
The
army issued a call for dialogue between “both sides” while stressing “the
legitimacy of the people.”
Suddenly
the army was acting as an independent force distinct from the regime while
asserting that legitimacy was vested in the people and not in the rulers, even
though they had been democratically elected in free elections. There were some
hasty – and secret – talks and the army shelved its call. However the Brothers
will not forget that the army did not acknowledge the legitimacy of the elected
president.
Especially
since the Port Said riots last month between opposing demonstrators and
security forces which leaving 60 dead, El-Sisi stated that the army was ready
to intervene “to prevent the collapse of the country should no political
solution be found.” Shortly afterward El-Sisi was quoted as allegedly having
said that he would not let the Muslim Brotherhood take over the army.
There
was an angry reaction from the Brotherhood and its Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie
condemned “the widespread corruption of the army.” It was the turn of the army
to protest and Badie apologized.
Maj.-Gen.
Sedki Sobhi, commander in chief of the army, added fuel to the fire by saying
that “the army does not intervene in politics but it will take to the streets
if the people need it.” Deeds followed words.
When
Morsi declared a state of emergency in the Suez canal zone following the Port
Said clashes and imposed a curfew, the army refused to supervise it and Morsi
had no choice but to cancel the state of emergency.
El-Sisi
took Morsi by surprise and embarrassed him greatly by issuing on December 23,
2012 a ministerial decree turning the eastern border of Egypt with Israel and
the Gaza Strip into a closed military zone five km. deep, Rafah city excluded.
Selling
or renting land there was forbidden because it was a strategic area of military
importance. The decree was issued days after the Egyptian government, in an
attempt to promote better relations with Sinai Beduin and improve their lot,
had informed them that they could sell or rent land in the peninsula.
El-Sisi
had acted in order to tighten control over the border zone where the army is
trying to prevent infiltration of jihadi operatives into Egypt from Gaza, and
attacks on Israel from the Egyptian side while keeping a close watch on the
contraband tunnels. However, he had apparently “forgotten” to consult with the
president when he issued his decree – something well within his ministerial
prerogatives.
The
decree led to a renewed wave of anger from the Beduin who are threatening a
civil disobedience campaign if it is not rescinded. The army has entered into
negotiations with them with no result so far, and the situation remains
volatile in the extreme.
Then it
became known that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has been meeting from
time to time to discuss the situation in the country – without informing the
president who is officially the head of the council. The meetings were
described as “informal” which does not make them more palatable to Morsi.
Tensions
between the army and the Brotherhood are a source of deep concern for the
regime. Morsi had gotten rid of the former army commanders swiftly and
unexpectedly a few weeks after his election, naming in their stead El-Sisi and
Sobhi who were seen as devout Muslims; it was rumored that El-Sisi was a member
of the Brotherhood.
However
it soon transpired that though his wife wears the veil, El-Sisi is not a member
of the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, high-ranking elements in the Justice and
Freedom Party tried to have him fired and the official party paper ignored him
completely for weeks until Morsi himself explained to the Brotherhood that
there was no use trying to reverse the situation.
However,
Muslim Brothers are suddenly remembering that the army has always been against
their movement – from Nasser to Mubarak – and that it was Islamic terrorists
raised on their doctrine who assassinated Sadat.
There
are widespread rumors to the effect that the Brotherhood is forming a
clandestine militia while setting up listening posts to monitor the army, to be
ready to confront the army should it become necessary.
And
while the clash between the regime and the opposition shows no signs of
abating, the president has called for parliamentary elections to be held over
an unprecedented period of two months starting in late April.
Morsi
will do all he can to achieve the complete takeover of the country before the
new parliament can be convened in July. The opposition is up in arms
threatening to boycott the elections if a new national unity government is not
formed to ensure that they are free and fair, the large Coptic minority is
outraged since polling will be held on their holy Easter week – and the
country’s economy is still spiraling out of control.
What
will the army do, if anything? On the one hand, the new constitution grants it
powers beyond its wildest dreams. On the other hand, the army, for so long the
symbol of Egypt’s greatness, cannot remain indifferent to the country’s slow
degradation.
