Radical Israeli Historian Ilan Pappe Supports a Binational One-State Solution. By Nigel O’Connor.

Q&A: Israeli historian Ilan Pappe. By Nigel O’Connor. Al Jazeera, July 5, 2013.

Transcript:

AJ: Do you consider yourself a supporter of the one-state solution?

 

IP: Yes I do. I believe in the one-state solution as the only just and functional settlement for the conflict. I think anyone who is more than five minutes on the ground in the West Bank realises there is no space there for an independent Palestinian state. And moreover, anyone who ponders a bit deeper about the reasons for the conflict understands that only such a political outfit could respond to all aspects of the conflict: the dispossession of the Palestinians in 1948, the discrimination against the Palestinians in Israel and the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

 

AJ: How do you assess the success of the campaign for a one-state solution?

 

IP: The main success of the campaign was to offer a new conversation about an alternative. Its strong aspects are that it relates much better to the reality that unfolded in Palestine since the late 19th century, where we have now a third generation of settlers who did not succeed in emptying the country they invaded, and both sides have to reframe their relationship on this mutual basis: you cannot get rid of the settlers or the native population.

 

Its second advantage is the total failure, after more than 65 years, of attempting to partition Palestine in various forms and junctures as the best solution. We now know it is not going to work, and an alternative would have to be found.

 

Its disadvantage is that it is not yet a popular movement, and has no inroads and power bases in the political structures on both sides. Also, the international community and the Arab world do not support this idea – although I think public opinion in the world and in the region supports it full-heartedly.

 

AJ: How can such an objective be realised if it is largely confined to intellectual circles, while seeming to hold little support among ordinary Palestinians or Israelis?

 

IP: The power of these ideas lies in two blueprints: one of an intensive work that has begun to disseminate the idea among those who are already part of representative bodies, especially among the Palestinians and external bodies. The second: there is a need to show, even theoretically at this point, how life would look like in all its aspects within one political outfit.

 

AJ: How do you characterise the Israeli political establishment’s approach to achieving its objectives in the Palestinian territories, and what do you see these as constituting?

 

IP: The objectives today are not different from those set by the Zionist movement very early on, when it had appeared in Palestine: to have as much of Palestine as possible with as few Palestinians in it as possible. The tactics keep changing. In 1948 it was achieved through ethnic cleansing; up to 1967 by imposing military rule on the Palestinian minority in Israel; after 1967 by incarcerating the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in a huge mega-prison, while annexing half of the West Bank to Israel and de-Arabising it, and by Judaising the Galilee and the Negev.

 

These goals have not been completed because of Palestinian steadfastness and struggle, and hence they will continue to be the tactics in the 21st century.

 

AJ: Have you seen the nature of Israeli society change during your lifetime and, if so, would you say these changes are presenting an obstacle to achieving a just outcome to the conflict or acting as an enabler?

 

IP: There are two aspects that always interested me about Israeli society: one is its relationship with the Palestinians - and in extension with the Arab world, and the other the internal dynamics within the Jewish society.

 

On the first account I have seen very little change in the basic attitude. The Palestinians were and are seen as alien usurpers of an ancient homeland and an obstacle for a thriving and peaceful life. The wish was not to be part of the Arab world, and this included unfortunately the Arab Jews, and this produced a mentality of a besieged Western fortress in the midst of a “hostile” region. The outcome of this mentality was an intolerant, high-strung and paranoid society that believes it can only rely on military power to survive.

 

As for the other aspect, I grew into a relatively modest society that cared at least about the other within the Jewish society, more egalitarian and secular. It has become more polarised between Americanised and hedonistic enclaves such as Tel-Aviv, and zealous theocratic spaces such as Jerusalem and the settlements.

 

AJ: Are you able to give an outline of how you see any political solution arising between the leadership of the Israelis and the Palestinians? Do you see the Arab Spring as altering the situation in the Israel-Palestine conflict?

 

IP: If there will be no change in the local, regional or international balance of powers, the relationship is not going to change in the future. Namely, the Israelis will assassinate those leaders that will resist its dictate and expect the others at least to remain quiet about it, even if they do not express support for it in public. Thus you can condemn the Israeli settlements in E-1 in greater Jerusalem, but you cannot support a Palestinian attempt to defend it.

 

If, however, public opinion in the world will continue to regard Israel as the new apartheid South Africa, as it does, this can lead, in the long run, to a change in the attitude of political elites, as the Arab Spring can one day solidify a number of new governments far more committed to the Palestine issue than they are today. Then the relationship could be between the Israeli leaders representing a settler community society seeking reconciliation with the leadership of the native population. This could be a new paradigm and a far more hopeful one.