John Kerry’s Bid for Mideast Peace Is Doomed.
John Kerry’s Bid for Mideast Peace Is Doomed. By Jeffrey Goldberg. Bloomberg, July 1, 2013.
Dead on Arrival. By Oren Kessler. Foreign Policy, July 2, 2013.
Why is John Kerry shuttling around trying to kick-start a Middle East peace process that no one wants?
Kerry Keeps Leaving the Mideast Empty-Handed. By Raphael Ahren. NJBR, July 1, 2013.
Goldberg:
It’s a
testament to U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s grit, determination and
self-assurance that he refuses to give up in his quest to bring Israelis and Palestinians
back to the negotiating table. But I wish that he would, during the long slog
toward renewed talks, ask himself one question: Why didn’t his predecessor,
Hillary Clinton, apply herself to the problem in the same manner?
Certainly,
Clinton possesses the same qualities of fortitude and indefatigability. No one
is more tenacious than Clinton when she identifies a goal worth pursuing. So
why did she resolutely avoid this issue? The answer is simple: She saw no
reasonable chance for success, even success modestly defined.
The
goal Kerry has in mind – getting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas together for direct talks about
the most divisive issues – won’t be achieved. Both the Palestinians and
Israelis know that Kerry’s proposed negotiations won’t work, but neither party
wants to upset Kerry by saying so, and neither wants to be perceived as
uninterested in compromise. So they may meet, and then maybe they will meet again
and maybe they will even meet after that. But peace, and a Palestinian state
that would be the byproduct of peace, won’t happen, not now and not in the
foreseeable future.
Kerry’s Delusions
I wish
this all weren’t true. Peace for Israel and a state for the Palestinians are
goals worth achieving. Reaching these goals won’t change the Middle East as
much as Kerry thinks it will, but I’ll address this particular delusion of the
American foreign-policy elite another time. (I already have, come to think of
it, in this column.)
The
delusion at hand is that Kerry will succeed where numerous secretaries of state
have failed, and succeed in what might be the most inauspicious moment in years
to start new negotiations: The Middle East is erupting all around Israel, which
makes even centrist and some left-leaning Israelis fear the idea of tangible
territorial concessions; the Palestinian Authority is weaker than ever; the two
territories that would make up the future state of Palestine (the West Bank and
Gaza) are divided between the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Hamas and the more
moderate Fatah; and the Israeli Cabinet is under the de facto control of the
settlement movement, which continues to expand its holdings on the West Bank.
But
maybe I’m just a cynic. I called Ari Shavit, Israel’s leading columnist and a
man who very much wants to see a Palestinian state created on the West Bank, to
ask him if my bleakness was unjustified. “I’m just this moment putting the
Champagne bottles in the fridge,” he said. “I expect to open them shortly.
We’re all going to have special permission from the Muslim Brotherhood to drink
Champagne.”
Shavit’s
withering sarcasm wasn’t matched by contempt for Kerry, though. Like many
Israelis, Shavit has a strange kind of respect for Kerry’s quixotic efforts.
“Kerry is a decent, noble American trying to bring peace to a tormented land
and a troubled region, and I salute him for his benign intentions and
commitment and energy,” Shavit said. “But that said, I think this good will and
energy and political capital is being invested in a course of action that
resembles too much the previous attempts that have failed. I think the right
approach is to learn from the failures of the past and to do something
practical that relates to the realities on the ground rather than reach for
something that is totally unrealistic. There is no serious Israeli or
Palestinian who thinks that the Kerry approach would work.”
Modest Ideas
So if
the idea of bringing Netanyahu and Abbas together to talk about the largest
issues is a bad idea, what constitutes a good idea? “Modest ideas,” Shavit
said, modest ideas that may lead to less modest ideas.
That
means a different approach, undertaking one set of negotiations between the
U.S. and Israel, and another between the U.S. and the Palestinian Authority.
Each side could take a few steps separately that would lay the groundwork for
eventually having direct talks about the actual issues separating them: the
future of Jerusalem, the future of the Jewish settlements, a solution for
Palestinian refugees and borders for the future state of Palestine. Shavit
argues that this strategy would shift the discussion away from the dangerous
binary of all or nothing at all.
To the
Israelis, Kerry should be asking for a freeze in the expansion of settlements
beyond Israel’s security barrier. These far-flung communities are home to a
small minority of settlers, but their growth signals to Palestinians like
nothing else that Israel means to continue occupying the whole of the West
Bank. A majority of Israelis would agree to a freeze, and Palestinians would
interpret it as a sign that Israel might be considering territorial compromise.
And Kerry would have a powerful argument behind him, one most Israelis
understand: Continued expansion outside the main settlement blocs, and on the
far side of the security barrier, threatens Israel’s democracy and its Jewish
character. The settlements entangle Israel to a dangerous degree in the lives
of Palestinians.
To the
Palestinians, Kerry should be arguing for a return to “Fayyadism,” the
technocratic approach to state-building championed by former Prime Minister
Salam Fayyad. Israelis would interpret a return to Fayyadism as a sign the
Palestinians were serious about building a state with legitimate and organized
institutions, rather than the sort of Palestinian state Israelis fear: corrupt,
dysfunctional and a launching pad for attacks.
If
Israel were to make a limited gesture on settlements to the Palestinians, and
if the Palestinian Authority would make a sincere effort to return to
technocracy, then it might be worth trying to bring Netanyahu and Abbas
together.
Right
now, though, there’s no point. One day soon, Kerry will understand why.