The Middle East, Where Happiness Goes to Die. By Jeffrey Goldberg.
The Middle East, Where Happiness Goes to Die. By Jeffrey Goldberg. Bloomberg, July 18, 2013.
Goldberg:
OK,
here’s today’s geopolitical challenge: Go find one scrap of positive news out
of the Middle East. Just one. Good luck.
Yes, I’ve
heard the reports that Secretary of State John Kerry may manage to restart
peace negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis, but since I give those
talks a near-zero chance of succeeding, I don’t count this as positive news,
especially because failed peace talks have often led to increased violence in
the past.
I put
this challenge to a couple of my regular Egyptian interlocutors – people on the
non-misogynistic, anti-anti-Semitic, non-Christian-hating, pro-modernity side
of the political ledger, which is to say, people who are provisionally happy
with the recent turn of events in Cairo.
They
just saw their enemy, the hapless Mohamed Mursi of the Muslim Brotherhood,
removed from office by millions of demonstrators (and quite a few tanks), and
they cast this coup – and yes, it was a coup, though a popular one – as an
unalloyed victory for freedom and progress. The Middle East only has four
things in abundance: oil, sand, hummus and totalitarian leadership cults, and
it’s never a bad thing to see the fascists on the run.
Except:
They’re probably coming back. Even my liberal friends in Egypt admit that the
Muslim Brotherhood has a wide base of support, and some of the stalwarts look
to fulfill the promise of the group’s motto: “Jihad is our way, and death for
the sake of Allah is our highest aspiration.” Many Egyptian soldiers, too,
would like to help the Brothers reach their celestial goal. My friends couldn't
quite convince me that the coup was unalloyed good news.
It’s
hard to imagine a happy short- or medium-term outcome for Egypt. The army will
continue to make and break governments, the liberals will continue to be
disorganized and the Brotherhood will find someone cleverer than Mursi to serve
as its public face.
Things
are so bad in Egypt that even William J. Burns, the deputy secretary of state
who visited Cairo earlier this week, issued what was for him – the most
soft-spoken and decorous of U.S. diplomats – an apocalyptic warning: “It is
hard to picture how Egypt will be able to emerge from this crisis unless its
people come together to find a nonviolent and inclusive path forward.”
Burns
is a Middle East expert (he is, among other things, a former ambassador to
Jordan). He knows that “inclusive paths” aren’t a prominent feature of regional
politics.
Neither,
of course, is nonviolence. There have been many violent incidents over the past
week or two that I could cite, but here is maybe the most consequential: The
fight, last weekend, between rebels of the Free Syrian Army and the
al-Qaeda-linked Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant for control over a key
checkpoint in Aleppo. It was only a matter of time before different members of
the fractious coalition – if that is even the word anymore – of forces arrayed
against the Syrian dictator, Bashar al-Assad, began to kill each other. The
rebellion is now being driven in large measure by al-Qaeda sympathizers and
affiliates, not by the more moderate Free Syrians.
The
rebels haven’t been effective in battling Assad, his Iranian sponsors and his
Hezbollah foot soldiers. Don’t expect this to change. I’ve been critical of
President Barack Obama for not providing the rebels with adequate weapons fast
enough, but this weekend’s news makes the administration’s hesitancy more
understandable.
And
finally – I could go on, but I’m trying to keep these posts digestible – there
was this Twitter message (of all things) from the Israeli prime minister,
Benjamin Netanyahu, a few days ago: “The will to win and the ability to break
the opponent and instill in him a fear of death at the decisive moment – this
is how battles are won.”
There
are at least four ways to interpret this statement. The first is that it’s a
brush-back pitch aimed at Assad, who has suffered through several mysterious
explosions recently that the world thinks were caused by the Israelis. The second
is that Netanyahu has decided to forgo striking Iran’s nuclear facilities, and
instead plans to wage war against the ayatollahs via social media. The third is
that he’s telling the Israeli public, and the Obama administration, that he’s
ready to strike, should Iran cross the red line on uranium-enrichment he
described last fall. And the fourth is that he’s upset that the concurrent
chaos in Egypt and Syria is drawing attention away from the matter he thinks is
most urgent: a nuclear Iran.
In
addition to taking to Twitter (which is really an undignified way to start a
preventive war against a near-nuclear regime that has threatened the
annihilation of your country), Netanyahu told Bob Schieffer on CBS News’s “Face
the Nation” that he “won’t wait until it’s too late” to act, adding, “We have
our eyes fixed on Iran. They have to know that we’re serious.”
This
last statement suggests that his Twitter message was directed as much at Obama
as it was the Iranian supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Netanyahu is
worried that the White House has lost focus, and he is even more worried that
the newly elected president of Iran, Hassan Rohani, who has been touted as a “moderate,”
will convince the West that there is no cause to worry. Rohani isn’t in charge
of the nuclear portfolio – that is the preserve of the supreme leader – nor has
he expressed a pronounced desire to see Iran move off the path of
nuclearization.
It’s
hard to blame the Obama administration for putting some distance between the
U.S. and the Syrian rebellion. It’s somewhat easier to blame the administration
for creating conditions in Egypt that have led both the Islamists and liberals
to share a profound mistrust of the U.S. It will be much easier still to blame
the administration if, in a fit of fatalism or inattention, it allows Iran to
cross the nuclear threshold.
Because
if it does, well, then the Middle East will be an exponentially unhappier
place, as hard as that is to imagine at the moment.