Is Israel Doomed? By Aaron David Miller.
Is Israel Doomed? By Aaron David Miller. Foreign Policy, November 7, 2013.
Why
even dangerous demographics and the receding horizon of peace won’t dim the
lights in Jerusalem.
Miller:
Israel’s
future is grim. Internal and external challenges abound. And like Scrooge in
Charles Dickens’s A Christmas Carol,
Israel has been forewarned by both its friends and enemies of a dire fate if it
doesn’t do more to change its ways.
The
latest prophet of doom and gloom is the inestimable Yuval Diskin, former head
of Israel’s Shin Bet and a man who surely knows what he’s talking about. In a
widely circulated article last July in the Jerusalem
Post and another on Ynet last week, Diskin argued that unless Israel
reached an agreement with the Palestinians, he wrote, “we will certainly cross
the point of no return, after which we will be left with one state from the
river to the sea for two peoples. The consequences of such a state for our
national identity, our security, our ability to maintain a worthy, democratic
state, our moral fiber as a society, and our place in the family of nations
will be far-reaching.”
Others
have made similar points. In the mid-1980s, author and activist Meron
Benvenisti opined that it was almost already too late – five minutes to midnight to use his notion, largely because of Israeli settlement activity. And
Secretary of State John Kerry repeatedly talks about “last chances” for a
two-state solution, a fate seemingly validated by scant progress made on his
latest Middle East trip.
And yet
the beaches of Tel Aviv are packed; the cafes and hotels full; and 2012 was the
first year in 40 that not a single Israeli was killed in a terrorist attack emanating
from the West Bank.
But don’t
be fooled, the doomsayers warn. Israel is living an illusion or existing on
borrowed time, or both. It sits atop a volcano of internal contradictions and
conflicts between religious and secular, rich and poor. It is a society that
has become increasingly less democratic. It's lost its mission, mandate, and
soul. An angry and aggrieved Arab world, a putative nuclear Iran, and a
Palestinian challenge completes the Dorian Gray-like picture. If left
unresolved, say the Chicken Littles, that latter issue will undermine what's
left of Israel’s internal cohesion, Jewish majority, and democratic character.
After
all, remember the Crusader kingdoms – powerful but short lived. Time is the
ultimate arbiter of what endures. And time will indeed have the last word
unless Israel sees the error of its ways and acts before it’s too late.
This
narrative – like the Dickens tale itself – assumes that if Israel, like
Scrooge, makes the right choices, then a conflict-ending solution to the
Palestinian issue and Israel's acceptance in the region can be assured. And
then everyone will live – more or less – happily ever after.
But
there’s another narrative too. That Israel, despite all the challenges it has
confronted and the odds arrayed against it, has managed to cope, survive, and
prosper. Political Zionism, this story goes, was always a defiance of history,
and will continue to be. This narrative suggests that it’s a cruel and
unforgiving world when it comes to Israelis and Jews – and a complex one, too.
It posits the notion that there are no truly happy endings, only imperfect
ones: That ending the conflict with the Palestinians will be hard if not
impossible to do; that at best only a temporary solution to the Iranian nuclear
issue can be found (and even that could lead to military confrontation); and
that the Arab world – far from turning into a land of functioning democracies –
will be filled with dysfunction and uncertainty for many years to come. So,
while Israel’s actions make a difference, solutions to all these problems may
well prove elusive and imperfect, regardless of what Israel does or doesn’t do.
So far
from prophesying happy endings, this line of thinking holds out the possibility
that what’s in store for Israel is a difficult path of maneuver in a harsh
world. But by no means is it a course that will lead to its ruin. Indeed, so
far, even with all its failings and imperfections, the modern Israeli state has
exceeded the expectations of its founders and managed to become one of the most
dynamic nations in the international system.
So
which narrative will prevail? Will Israel endure? That, I suppose, depends on
your time horizon. Will the State of Israel be here in 2113 or in 2213? And
what kind of state will it be?
Well,
as John Maynard Keynes maintained, in the long run we’ll all be dead. So here’s
a more realistic metric for you. Will the State of Israel celebrate its 100th
Independence Day in 2048 – a prosperous and secure state recognizable to those
who live there today?
Three
powerful factors offset the doomsayers’ warnings. And they aren’t reflective of
a momentary snapshot. The trend lines have been deepening for some time now.
They do not eliminate the bad news nor the challenges – particularly the demographic
ones – ahead. But they do provide a powerful advantage in coping with them. I’d
bet that Israel will live to see its 100th anniversary. And here’s why.
Israeli Capacity
Whether
you see Israel as a friend, enemy, or frenemy, it’s hard not to accept the
reality that what the country has done in 65 years, particularly given their
internal and external challenges, is nothing short of extraordinary. Put aside
for a nanosecond if you can Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians – and I
know it’s impossible for some to get beyond the occupation – and just focus on
Israel proper. For a tiny state, in a tough neighborhood, the accomplishments
in the fields of science, technology, agriculture, economic development, art,
literature, and music have been remarkable.
Consider
these impressive accomplishments:
1.
Israeli GDP per capita is $32,800, 44th in the world, and 29th overall if you
exclude countries with populations below 100,000 (and count the European Union
as separate states). Israel ranks just ahead of Saudi Arabia and New Zealand
and behind South Korea and France.
2.
Israel is the world leader in startups per capita (1 per 1,800 Israelis).
3. It’s
No. 3 in companies traded on NASDAQ after the United States and Canada (65
companies).
4. It’s
17th in total number of Nobel laureates (with the 96th largest population).
5.
Israel holds more patents per capita than any other country in the world.
6.
Israel has the third-highest rate of entrepreneurship and highest rate among
women and people over 55 in the world.
7. It
is the only country that entered the 21st century with a net gain in the number of trees. (my personal favorite).
8.
Israel leads the world in the number of scientists and technicians in the
workforce, with 145 per 10,000 as opposed to 85 in the United States.
The
point is not to trumpet Israel’s accomplishments or to suggest they will cancel
out the challenges Israel faces in the future. It’s to drive home the obvious:
this is a serious country both in relative and absolute terms. It’s not going
away. Indeed, as the Arab Spring threatens to redefine or at least decentralize
the Sykes-Picot territorial map, an Arab state or two may well go the way of
the dodo well before the Israelis do.
Arab Incapacity
An Arab
friend once argued that Israel was a mirror for their region. And every time
the Arabs looked into that mirror, they saw their own incapacity and weakness
reflected in Israel’s strength in military, economic, and technological power.
As
Israel has chalked up accomplishments, the nations that surround it seem to
grow weaker and more dysfunctional. And that’s the case now more than ever in
the wake of the Arab Spring. The so-called confrontation states that share
contiguous borders with Israel have either made their peace with Israel (Egypt
and Jordan) or grown fundamentally weaker (Syria). It’s stunningly ironic that
the threats to Israel today come from national movements lodged within the
non-states – Hamas and Hezbollah, or from a non-Arab state: Iran. Simply put,
the Arab world has diminished in consequence as a serious military or
technological threat to the Israeli state.
At the
same time, the gap between Israel and Arabs on issues of trade, economy,
innovation, and technology continues to grow. Read any U.N. Human Development
Report on the Arab region to get a sense of the staggering asymmetries. Just
consider these unhappy realities:
1.
Middle Eastern companies are globally uncompetitive. The region as a whole
makes up less than 1 percent of global non-fuel exports, versus 4 percent from
Latin America, which has a similar population.
2. Red tape, poor infrastructure, and other
non-tarriff barriers, add 10 percent to the value of shipped goods in the
region. Shipping goods from the Middle East to America is cheaper and quicker
than shipping between two Middle Eastern ports.
3.
Foreign direct investment into 20 of the Arab League states (excluding Comoros
and Syria) in 2012 totaled $47.1 billion. Israel alone attracted around $10
billion in 2012.
4. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index – which measures how much citizens perceive their leaders to
be abusing power – gave Israel a score of 60 (the best score was 90) in 2012.
By comparison, the average score of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and
Iran was 30.3.
5. A
UNDP statistic that assesses the amount and duration of education citizens of
given countries are expected to receive gave Arab states a .5 versus .7 for
Latin American and Caribbean states. That’s roughly the difference between
expected education in Cambodia and Russia.
6. Reporters Without Borders’ Press Freedom Index gives the Middle East and North Africa the worst rating of any region in
the world. The regional average is equivalent to Pakistan, where 7 journalists
have been killed for their reporting in 2013 alone.
7. The
Middle East/North Africa region has a greater gap in employment by gender than
any other region in the world. Employment is also unequal between age groups –
with youth unemployment above 25 percent.
8. The
adult literacy rate in Arab states in 2009 was 73.4 percent, compared to 93.3 percent in developing Latin American and Caribbean states.
None of
this is to say the Arab Middle East cannot become more competitive or more
integrated into the world economy. Or that its citizens cannot become more
productive too. It’s just that the trend lines, particularly in the wake of the
turbulence sweeping the region, don’t look good. And the gap with Israel in
just about every field is widening. If the hope and dream of Arab nationalists
50 years ago was to close that gap, to bring the formidable power of the Arab
world to bear in the struggle with Israel with the goal of enhancing Arab state
capacity and weakening Israel’s, that project lies in ruins.
U.S. Support
That
brings us to the third reason why the gloom-and-doom story or the “settle with
the Palestinians or else” narrative loses some of its punch. With the possible
exception of the 1973 war, at no point could you make the argument that
American support was vital to Israel’s immediate survival.
But it
is critical to the long-term health, well-being, security, and prosperity of
the Israeli state. From America’s efforts to maintain Israel’s qualitative
military edge; to the billions in military and economic aid; to the latitude
and support the United States gives Israel on protecting its security; to
Washington’s willingness to shield and defend Israel from political isolation,
sanctions, and criticism; America’s support is indeed vital.
And
despite the tensions in that relationship it’s only gotten stronger on an
institutional level and in terms of public support. I’ve explored those reasons elsewhere but essentially they come down to a perception of common values and
identity – endorsed or acquiesced to by millions of non- Jewish Americans and a
pro-active, affluent, and highly influential Jewish community that lobbies
effectively on Israel’s behalf.
And
Israel’s neighborhood validates that bond. From Hamas to Hezbollah, from al
Qaeda to the Muslim Brotherhood, from Assad’s regime using Scuds and chemical
weapons against his own people to the U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan,
there’s a perception that the entire region is inherently undemocratic and
violent. This not only diminishes Israel’s own bad behavior, it validates a
pro-Israeli narrative. Indeed, there’s a case to be made that the U.S.-Israeli
bond will weaken when – and only when – the image of Israel fundamentally
changes in the minds of Americans. The violent and extreme behavior of states
and groups in the Middle East have delayed or even prevented that from
happening. Still, even without Arabs behaving badly as perhaps Israel’s best
talking points in Washington, it’s hard to imagine any U.S. administration trying
to force Jerusalem to accept a peace deal and or imposing severe consequences
if it did not.
But
what about the demographic argument? Surely that spells disaster for Israel, a
fate that cannot be avoided. Under the pressure of having to manage or control –
with or without the Palestinian Authority – millions of unhappy, angry, and
potentially violent Palestinians, Israel’s image in the United States will only
deteriorate as the democratic Jewish state is undermined. Demographics might
mean that, absent some sort of Israeli-Palestinian agreement, Israel could
reach such a state sometime in the next 20-30 years, right around its 100
birthday. It’s a powerful argument that cannot be ignored.
Still
even the demographics aren’t necessarily determinative. Nobody can rule out an
Israeli-Palestinian agreement to defuse the problem. And even if one fails to
materialize, life is not necessarily that stark or binary in terms of the
choices and decisions offered up. Nor is it easy to determine when the point of
no return is crossed or the moment of truth and reckoning appears.
More to
the point, a smart Israeli leadership could try to defuse the demographic
challenge by breaking it into pieces. With regard to the 1.7 million
Palestinians who are citizens of Israel, the government could make a concerted
effort to eliminate discrimination and ensure that they are treated equally as
citizens with their fair share of jobs, access to housing, and educational
benefits. As for Gaza’s 1.6 million Palestinians, as long as Hamas rules there,
Israel will likely treat the problem as a security issue; and there will be
little pressure from many other quarters to take Hamas's side and do otherwise.
Jerusalem’s 300,000 Palestinians seem to be in no great hurry to join up with
the Palestinian Authority, and the vast majority have no interest in claiming
Israeli citizenship or fighting. With greater attention to improving services
and eliminating the barrier, Israeli could go quite a way in defusing tensions
there too.
That
leaves the 2.3 million Palestinians in the West Bank either living under some
form of Palestinian Authority jurisdiction or under Israel’s control. And that
is a huge problem, particularly should the PA collapse or a third intifada
erupt. Indeed, it would create a situation in which more than two million
Palestinians would exist without hope, increasingly angry and radicalized. If
the past is any guide, the most likely outcome of this unhappy situation wouldn’t
be a Martin Luther King-like non-violent movement to demand citizenship in an
Israeli state; but an uprising marked by violence and terror. And we know where
the last Intifada lead. Let’s be clear. Israel has bad options on the
demographic front. But Palestinian options(and their future) look much worse.
All
these factors have afforded Israelis and their leaders the time and space to
survive tough years, to strengthen their state, and to prosper. Some believe
these assets have also permitted Israel not to make choices, to abdicate
responsibility, particularly when it comes to settling up the Palestinians. But
the asset triad also provides flexibility for Israeli leaders to make wise and
intelligent choices. Some have; others have not.
The
choices at hand, however, aren’t only Israel's to make – a if only Israel would
do A, B, and C everything would simply fall into place. Israel has missed many
opportunities and so have its neighbors. Neat and definitive solutions are
hardly the norm. In the end, what is more likely to emerge isn’t rebirth and
renaissance of the dreamers nor the catastrophe foretold by the pessimists, but
the muddle-through envisioned by realists. At least in the years ahead, the
Israelis will keep their state and even prosper. But their neighbors will most
assuredly never let them completely enjoy it.