Year Four of the Arab Awakening. By Marwan Muasher.
Year Four of the Arab Awakening. By Marwan Muasher. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 12, 2013.
Muasher:
How
will history judge the uprisings that started in many parts of the Arab world
in 2011? The label “Arab Spring” proved too simplistic from the beginning.
Transformational processes defy black-and-white expectations, but in the end,
will the awakenings be more reminiscent of what happened in Europe in 1848,
when several uprisings took place within a few weeks only to be followed by
counterrevolutions and renewed authoritarian rule? Or will they more closely
resemble the 1989 collapse of the Soviet Union, after which some countries
swiftly democratized while others remained in thrall to dictatorship?
Whatever
the case, it is clear that the process of Arab transformation will need decades
to mature and that its success is by no means guaranteed. The movements driving
it are more unanimous about what they are against than about what they are for.
But the debate to define this awakening has begun.
Transforming
the movements sweeping the Middle East into coherent and effective forces of
change will take time. In all of history, no such process has taken only two or
three years to mature, evolve, and stabilize. The question over the long term
is whether the present changes, however uncertain and difficult, will lead to
democratic societies. The coming year will offer signs that indicate whether
countries of the Arab world are heading toward democracy and pluralism or away
from them.
2014
will see the countries of the Middle East moving in different directions, with
some making strides toward genuine democratic transitions while other
governments perpetuate timeworn policies that allow them to avoid addressing
the very real social, political, and economic challenges they face.
Dynamics at Play
There
are three key dynamics shaping the evolution of the Arab Awakening. The first
and perhaps most important consequence of the Arab uprisings is the
transformation of Islamist movements—mostly offshoots of the Muslim
Brotherhood—from opposition groups into major political forces in most
countries undergoing transitions. This shift is most evident in Tunisia,
Morocco, and, to a lesser extent, Libya and Yemen. It was also true of Egypt
until the military overthrew the elected Islamist government last summer.
And
political Islam will continue to be a driving factor during the next year of
the Arab Awakening, albeit in a different way. There has been a significant
drop in public support for Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia. This development has
seriously challenged the notion of the “Islamist threat”—the idea, widely held
in some circles and often used by secular parties to discourage the election of
Islamists, that political Islamist forces would never leave power once they
acquired it. The same Egyptians who voted Islamists in demonstrated in
unprecedented numbers against them in the short course of one year, confirming
what many polls have already suggested: no matter how conservative or religious
the Arab street is, it judges the forces in power by their performance, not
their ideology.
In
Egypt, the fact that then president Mohamed Morsi was removed by the military
rather than by voters may well negate any lesson that might have been learned
about the consequences for leaders who fail to deliver results. But in Tunisia,
the ruling Islamist party, Ennahda, has been steadily losing support to a
coalition of secular forces. And unlike in Egypt, the Tunisian army has not
mitigated this process by intervening. Meanwhile, the largest Salafi political
force in Egypt has aligned itself not with the Muslim Brotherhood’s Islamist
Freedom and Justice Party but with the military. These developments suggest
that Islamists, even radical Islamists, are open to compromise once they become
part of the political process.
Over
the past few years, Islamists have lost their “holiness” in the Arab world.
Their once-popular slogan, “Islam is the solution,” is no longer attractive to
wide sectors of the population. Three years after the Arab uprisings, youthful
and pragmatic populations are starting to embrace the triumph of performance
over ideology in the region. Faced with such pressure, Islamists will have to
reinvent themselves, offering practical solutions to economic challenges facing
Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and other countries if they are to retain what once
appeared to be their invincible popularity.
The
second factor influencing the Arab transitions arises from the two internal
battles political Islam appears to be fighting—one between the offshoot
movements of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi groups and the other between
Sunni and Shia Muslims. The first might determine to a great extent the future
course of political Islam—whether it will be inclusionary or fundamentalist,
peaceful or radical, reactionary or modern, or less clearly delineated.
The
second fight is especially worrisome. The tension between Sunnis and Shia is
rising to an alarming degree in countries like Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
Lebanon, and most horrifically in Syria. And political demands in all these
countries are turning sectarian. In many cases, particularly in the Gulf, this
“sectarianization” of politics is being aggravated by government policies of
exclusion and discrimination.
The
Sunni-Shia divide underscores the region’s lack of respect for diversity in any
form—religious, political, or cultural. This division is not only religious but
also often political and cultural. It is true that the Sykes-Picot Agreement
between the United Kingdom and France created artificial entities when it
divided up the Ottoman Empire and drew the boundaries of the modern Middle
Eastern nations in 1916. But it is also true that most Arab governments have
not developed in their countries a sense of true citizenship in which national
identity trumps any other allegiances to religious, ethnic, or tribal
identities. This is particularly evident in the Mashreq region, where it is
clearly manifested in countries such as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. The
grievances of the Shia in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait are more political
than religious and largely stem from being treated as less than full citizens.
The problem is less severe in the Maghreb, where Egyptians and Tunisians, for
example, thought of themselves as such long before the modern states of Egypt
and Tunisia were created.
The
last factor shaping the Arab Awakening is the secular forces, which have not
easily accepted the rise of political Islam. These forces have behaved in a way
that seems to suggest that they are fine with democracy only as long as it
brings them to power. In other words, secular forces are engaging in the very
antidemocratic practices they accuse the Islamists of following, as
demonstrated by their support for the Egyptian military’s removal of Morsi
(granted, that action was a result of millions of Egyptians taking to the
street to oppose the president).