Ariel Sharon’s Masterstroke: The Gaza Withdrawal. By Fabio Rafael Fiallo. Real Clear World, January 12, 2014.
Fiallo:
Much to
the dismay of his detractors – and he had many – Ariel Sharon secured a
distinct place in history when he made the watershed decision in 2005 to
unilaterally withdraw Israeli forces and settlers from the Gaza Strip.
The
move aroused apprehension and criticism within Sharon's own political camp.
Why, it was said, disengage unilaterally – i.e., without securing reciprocal
concessions – from a territory that would for sure be utilized to launch
terrorist attacks against Israel?
The
malaise created by that initiative was so deep that today’s prime minister,
Benjamin Netanyahu, resigned from his cabinet position in protest. Sharon, for
his part, had to create a new political party, Kadima, so as to be able to
pursue the course of action he had chosen.
And
yet, history has clearly vindicated Ariel Sharon's decision.
True,
terrorist attacks launched from the Gaza Strip since the pullout did expose
Israel to periods of insecurity on more than one occasion, though no more or less than what most Israelis had already grown accustomed to. Gusts of rocket
fire reached a peak in 2008 and again in 2012, triggering Israel’s self-defense
operations Cast Lead and Pillar of Defense.
Be that
as it may, Hamas, which seized control of Gaza in 2007, is bitterly learning
that any terrorist attack against Israel carries a heavy price – in the form of
Israel’s reaction – that badly impairs its ability to administer the Strip and
meet the needs of the Gazans.
Gone
are the pre-withdrawal days when Hamas drew its popularity by playing the
underdog. Now, Palestinians living in Gaza can, and actually do, hold Hamas
accountable for their vicissitudes and suffering.
Thus,
to avoid widening its disconnect with the concerns of Palestinians living in
Gaza, Hamas is obliged to think twice before giving free rein to its terrorist
fixations – or those of other terrorist organizations in the territory.
Furthermore,
with Israel’s pullout and the ensuing takeover of Gaza by Hamas, the protracted
internecine war between Hamas and the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority has taken
the form of fratricidal turf warfare. Fatah’s members have a tough life in
Gaza, as do Hamas’ activists in the Fatah-controlled West Bank. Retaliatory
imprisonments and cross-assassinations are commonplace.
Fatah
and Hamas have given priority to their factional war, and often at the expense
of the needs and expectations of Palestinians under their administration.
No
wonder that, since the “Arab Spring” erupted in 2011, both Hamas and Fatah have
fretted about public uprisings in their respective territories. More often than
not, they have severely repressed not only street demonstrations but criticisms
posted to the web, as well.
By
giving rise to a turf war between Hamas and Fatah, the Sharon pullout laid bare
the many grievances and contestations in the territory, as well as the scant
regard for democratic values among the two leading factions of the Palestinian
leadership.
To
fully understand the effect of Sharon’s decision, consider this counterfactual:
what would have happened if Israeli troops had still been in Gaza at the time
of the “Arab Spring” in 2011?
A safe
bet is that Hamas and Fatah would have tried to replicate the unrest in the
disputed territories, possibly sparking a new intifada. Under the present
circumstances, however, Hamas and Fatah are guided by a radically different
preoccupation: to prevent a Palestinian intifada against them.
Moreover,
had Israeli troops remained in Gaza, Arab rulers likely would have attempted to
divert international attention away from the discontent of their own citizens
by fostering protests in Gaza against the “Zionist occupier.” Hamas would have
been more than delighted to receive financial and logistical support to fulfill
that deed. The Palestinian Authority, in turn, would have promoted similar
protests in the West Bank, if only to prevent Hamas from exploiting regional
unrest first.
That
scenario was preempted by Sharon’s pullback.
There
remains the mother of all questions: Did the pullout serve to advance the cause
of peace? And the answer is yes. By exposing to the world the futility of
negotiating with a double-headed and disorganized Palestinian leadership, the
pullout from Gaza has exposed the need for an aggiornamento of the Palestinian
leadership as a prerequisite for a real, durable solution to the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
For all
these reasons, Ariel Sharon’s handover of the Gaza Strip can retrospectively be
regarded as a masterpiece of political vision and strategic cleverness.
