Top 10 warning signs of “liberal imperialism.” By Stephen M. Walt. Foreign Policy, May 20, 2013.
Walt:
Are you
a liberal imperialist? Liberal imperialists are like kinder, gentler
neoconservatives: Like neocons, they believe it’s America’s responsibility to
right political and humanitarian wrongs around the world, and they’re
comfortable with the idea of the United States deciding who will run countries
such as Libya, Syria, or Afghanistan. Unlike neocons, liberal imperialists
embrace and support international institutions (like the United Nations), and
they are driven more by concern for human rights than they are by blind
nationalism or protecting the U.S.-Israel special relationship. Still, like the
neocons, liberal imperialists are eager proponents for using American hard
power, even in situations where it might easily do more harm than good. The
odd-bedfellow combination of their idealism with neocons’ ideology has given us
a lot of bad foreign policy over the past decade, especially the decisions to
intervene militarily in Iraq or nation-build in Afghanistan, and today’s
drumbeat to do the same in Syria.
It’s
not that the United States should never intervene in other countries or that
its military should not undertake humanitarian missions (as it did in Indonesia
following the Asian tsunami and in Haiti after a damaging earthquake). It
should do so, however, only when there are vital national interests at stake or
when sending U.S. troops or American arms is overwhelmingly likely to make
things better. In short, decisions to intervene need to clear a very high bar
and survive hardheaded questioning about what the use of force will actually
accomplish.
So
while I often sympathize with their intentions, I’m tempted to send all liberal
imperialists a sampler cross-stitched with: “The road to hell is paved with
good intentions.” At a minimum, that warning might help them be just a bit more
skeptical about the wisdom of their advice. But I’m lousy at needlepoint, so
instead today I offer my “10 Warning Signs that You Are a Liberal Imperialist.”
#1: You frequently find yourself
advocating that the United States send troops, drones, weapons, Special Forces,
or combat air patrols to some country that you have never visited, whose
language(s) you don't speak, and that you never paid much attention to until
bad things started happening there.
#2: You tend to argue that the
United States is morally obligated to “do something” rather than just stay out
of nasty internecine quarrels in faraway lands. In the global classroom that is
our digitized current world, you believe that being a bystander – even
thousands of miles away – is as bad as being the bully. So you hardly ever find
yourself saying that “we should sit this one out.”
#3: You think globally and speak,
um, globally. You are quick to condemn human rights violations by other
governments, but American abuses (e.g., torture, rendition, targeted
assassinations, Guantánamo, etc.) and those of America’s allies get a pass. You
worry privately (and correctly) that aiming your critique homeward might get in
the way of a future job.
#4: You are a strong proponent of
international law, except when it gets in the way of Doing the Right Thing.
Then you emphasize its limitations and explain why the United States doesn’t
need to be bound by it in this case.
#5: You belong to the respectful
chorus of those who publicly praise the service of anyone in the U.S. military,
but you would probably discourage your own progeny from pursuing a military
career.
#6. Even if you don’t know very
much about military history, logistics, or modern military operations, you are
still convinced that military power can achieve complex political objectives at
relatively low cost.
#7: To your credit, you have
powerful sympathies for anyone opposing a tyrant. Unfortunately, you tend not
to ask whether rebels, exiles, and other anti-regime forces are trying to
enlist your support by telling you what they think you want to hear. (Two
words: Ahmed Chalabi.)
#8. You are convinced that the
desire for freedom is hard-wired into human DNA and that Western-style liberal
democracy is the only legitimate form of government. Accordingly, you believe
that democracy can triumph anywhere – even in deeply divided societies that
have never been democratic before – if outsiders provide enough help.
#9. You respect the arguments of
those who are skeptical about intervening, but you secretly believe that they
don’t really care about saving human lives.
#10. You believe that if the United
States does not try to stop a humanitarian outrage, its credibility as an ally
will collapse and its moral authority as a defender of human rights will be
tarnished, even if there are no vital strategic interests at stake.
If you
are exhibiting some or all of these warning signs, you have two choices. Option #1: You can stick to your guns
(literally) and proudly own up to your interventionist proclivities. Option #2: You can admit that you’ve
been swept along by the interventionist tide and seek help. If you choose the
latter course, I recommend that you start by reading Alexander Downes and
Jonathan Monten’s “Forced to Be Free?: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization” (International
Security, 2013), along with Rajiv Chandrasekaran’s Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan and Peter
Van Buren’s We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People.
And if
that doesn't work, maybe we need some sort of 12-step program . . .
Forced to Be Free? Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization. By Alexander B. Downes and Jonathan Monten. International Security, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Spring 2013).
Abstract:
Is
military intervention effective in spreading democracy? Existing studies
disagree. Optimists point to successful cases, such as the transformation of
West Germany and Japan into consolidated democracies after World War II.
Pessimists view these successes as outliers from a broader pattern of failure
typified by cases such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Those in between agree that, in
general, democratic military intervention has little liberalizing effect in
target states, but contend that democracies can induce democratization when
they explicitly pursue this objective and invest substantial effort and
resources. Existing studies, however, often employ overly broad definitions of
intervention, fail to grapple with possible selection effects in countries
where democracies choose to intervene, and stress interveners’ actions while
neglecting conditions in targets. Astatistical examination of seventy instances
of foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC) in the twentieth century shows that
implementing prodemocratic institutional reforms, such as sponsoring elections,
is not enough to induce democratization; interveners will meet with little
success unless conditions in the target state—in the form of high levels of
economic development and societal homogeneity, and previous experience with
representative governance—are favorable to democracy. Given that prospective
regime change operations are likely to target regimes in poor, diverse
countries, policymakers should scale back their expectations that democracy
will flourish after FIRC.
