A Post-Everything Moment in the Mideast. By Rami G. Khouri.
A post-everything moment in the Mideast. By Rami G. Khouri. The Daily Star (Lebanon), January 8, 2014.
Khouri:
With
daily car bombs, suicide bombers, assassinations, kidnappings, ethnic warfare
and collapsing government control across the Middle East, we are moving into
the post-everything moment of our modern history: post-colonial,
post-nationalist, post-statehood, post-imperial, post-Islamist,
post-revolutionary, post-developmental and post-modern. The immediate focus of
most analysts is on Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, where Salafist-takfiri militants,
some allied with Al-Qaeda, control bits of territory and have clashed with
others to expand their footholds. Constantly changing combinations of groups
work together, coexist uneasily, coalesce into greater coalitions and “fronts,”
or actively fight each other and ruling regimes. Leading examples include the
Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS), the Nusra Front, the Tawhid
Brigade, the Army of Islam, the Islamic Front, the Syrian Revolutionaries
Front, the Free Syrian Army, the Mujahedeen Army and many others.
The
chaotic situation reflects several different but simultaneous nationalist and
state dynamics, as old orders fray (the Sykes-Picot frontiers, post-World War
II secular and nationalist states, the post-1970 modern Arab security state)
and new organizations and movements emerge that reflect older nonstate
identities (religion, tribe, ethnicity).
In some
places, such as Syria, Islamists and secular nationalists battle to overthrow
the incumbent regime and establish a more pluralistic and democratic governance
system, while some also fight each other. In others, such as Iraq, Libya or
Yemen, tribal and Islamist forces challenge the government to redress
oppressive government policies or try to take over the government. In yet
others, militants such as ISIS aim to control territory and establish
“emirates” where fundamentalist Islamist rules rule, while also battling
everyone else – Arabs, Iranians, Turks, Israelis, Kurds and any available
foreigners.
As
these hard-line Islamist militants battle for control of towns in western Iraq
and northern Syria, such as Fallujah, Aleppo and Raqqa, six major groups of
main actors seem to dominate the scene: hard-line Salafists such as ISIS,
others such as Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham, Arab-backed mainstream Islamists such
as the Islamic Front, the Free Syrian Army and its mostly non-Islamist allies,
various Kurdish groups in northeastern Syria, and tribal forces across the
Syrian-Iraqi desert regions.
Syria
and Iraq are the most extreme but not the only examples of chronic conflicts in
Arab countries, as we can also see in Yemen, Somalia, Libya, and parts of
Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt and Tunisia. The ordinary citizens who pay the price
of conflict are mostly helpless to do anything in the face of tens of thousands
of armed fighters, most of whom are supported by foreign governments or
financiers. The role of regional or foreign powers that have often shaped the
political configuration of the modern Middle East is a hotly debated issue
today.
An
intriguing front page article in the New
York Times on Jan. 4, titled “Power Vacuum in Middle East Lifts Militants,”
noted: “For all its echoes, the bloodshed that has engulfed Iraq, Lebanon and
Syria in the past two weeks exposes something new and destabilizing: the
emergence of a post-American Middle East in which no broker has the power, or
the will, to contain the region’s sectarian hatreds.”
I was
startled by this presumptuous attitude that exploding sectarian hatreds would
worsen in a post-American Middle East, because my own impression from living
through the last 45 years of American involvement in the region is precisely
the opposite: that American foreign policies contributed deeply to the
injustices and distortions that led to the destabilizing emergence of regional
sectarian tensions, religious extremism and widespread citizen discontent.
These sentiments manifest themselves today in different forms, including ISIS
and similar militancy, popular revolutions to overthrow dictatorial regimes,
and the patient writing of new constitutions and civil codes in countries such
as Tunisia and Egypt.
The
deadly combination of Washington’s decades of strong support for Arab dictators
and its profound pro-Israeli bias combined with the criminal and incompetent
legacy of Arab autocrats to create a situation from the 1960s to the 1990s that
gnawed away at the foundations and integrity of modern Arab statehood. The Anglo-American
assault on Iraq and the wiping away of its state structures created an
environment that allowed the birth or spread of contemporary Islamist
extremists such as Al-Qaeda in Iraq and then ISIS. However, Washington is not
the only miscreant; for instance Russia’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979
helped spark the birth of Al-Qaeda in the first place.
Today’s
mayhem and chaos in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon result from many causes, including
the impact of criminal American and British policies in Iraq in 2003 and
beyond. These policies have persisted in the form of American drone
assassinations that have killed Islamist fighters and many civilians, but have
simultaneously led to the mobilization of many, many more militants.
It’s
bad enough to have chaos, confusion and criminality in Arab political
movements. We should try to avoid these things in serious journalistic analyses
of the facts of history.