Anti-Semitism and Anti-Americanism. By Josef Joffe. Pew Research, May 5, 2006.
The Axis of Envy. By Josef Joffe. Foreign Policy, No. 132 (September/October 2002).
A World Without Israel. By Josef Joffe. Foreign Policy, No. 146 (January/February 2005).
Debating a World Without Israel. Roundtable. Foreign Policy, No. 147 (March/April 2005).
European Anti-Americanism (and Anti-Semitism): Ever Present Though Always Denied. By Andrei Markovits. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, August 2005.
Academics Against Israel and the Jews. Edited by Manfred Gerstenfeld. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2007. Also here.
The Anti-American Century? By Ivan Krastev. Journal of Democracy, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April 2004).
The Myth of Israel as a Colonialist Entity: An Instrument of Political Warfare to Delegitimize the Jewish State. By Dore Gold. Jewish Political Studies Review, Vol. 23, No. 3/4 (Fall 2011).
Sunday, December 15, 2013
Among the Bourgeoisophobes. By David Brooks.
Among the Bourgeoisophobes. By David Brooks. The Weekly Standard, April 15, 2002.
Why the Europeans and Arabs, each in their own way, hate America and Israel.
Hollow Men. By Lee Smith. Tablet, July 14, 2010.
Why Israel’s enemies will always be the darlings of Western intellectuals.
The Counterrevolution in Military Affairs. By Ralph Peters. The Weekly Standard, February 6, 2006.
Why the Europeans and Arabs, each in their own way, hate America and Israel.
Hollow Men. By Lee Smith. Tablet, July 14, 2010.
Why Israel’s enemies will always be the darlings of Western intellectuals.
The Counterrevolution in Military Affairs. By Ralph Peters. The Weekly Standard, February 6, 2006.
Faith Versus Tradition in Islam. By Mustafa Akyol.
Faith versus tradition in Islam. By Mustafa Akyol. Video. TED, March 2011. YouTube. YouTube.
Islam without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty. Introduction chapter. By Mustafa Akyol. New York: W. W. Norton, 2011.
The White Path: Mustafa Akyol’s website.
Mustafa Akyol. Google Videos.
Akyol (TED Transcript):
A few weeks ago, I had a chance to go to Saudi Arabia. And the first thing I wanted to do as a Muslim was go to Mecca and visit the Kaaba, the holiest shrine of Islam. And I did that; I put on my ritualistic dress; I went to the holy mosque; I did my prayers; I observed all the rituals. And meanwhile, besides all the spirituality, there was one mundane detail in the Kaaba that was pretty interesting for me. There was no separation of sexes. In other words, men and women were worshiping all together. They were together while doing the tawaf, the circular walk around the Kaaba. They were together while praying.
And if
you wonder why this is interesting at all, you have to see the rest of Saudi
Arabia because it's a country which is strictly divided between the sexes. In
other words, as men, you are not simply supposed to be in the same physical
space with women. And I noticed this in a very funny way. I left the Kaaba to
eat something in downtown Mecca. I headed to the nearest Burger King
restaurant. And I went there – I noticed that there was a male section, which
was carefully separated from the female section. And I had to pay, order and
eat at the male section. “It’s funny,” I said to myself, “You can mingle with
the opposite sex at the holy Kaaba, but not at the Burger King.”
Quite
ironic. Ironic, and it’s also, I think, quite telling. Because the Kaaba and
the rituals around it are relics from the earliest phase of Islam, that of
prophet Muhammad. And if there was a big emphasis at the time to separate men
from women, the rituals around the Kaaba could have been designed accordingly.
But apparently that was not an issue at the time. So the rituals came that way.
This is also, I think, confirmed by the fact that the seclusion of women in
creating a divided society is something that you also do not find in the Koran,
the very core of Islam – the divine core of Islam that all Muslims, and equally
myself, believe. And I think it’s not an accident that you don't find this idea
in the very origin of Islam. Because many scholars who study the history of
Islamic thought – Muslim scholars or Westerners – think that actually the
practice of dividing men and women physically came as a later development in
Islam, as Muslims adopted some preexisting cultures and traditions of the
Middle East. Seclusion of women was actually a Byzantine and Persian practice,
and Muslims adopted that and made that a part of their religion.
And
actually this is just one example of a much larger phenomenon. What we call
today Islamic Law, and especially Islamic culture – and there are many Islamic cultures
actually; the one in Saudi Arabia is much different from where I come from in
Istanbul or Turkey. But still, if you’re going to speak about a Muslim culture,
this has a core, the divine message, which began the religion, but then many
traditions, perceptions, many practices were added on top of it. And these were
traditions of the Middle East – medieval traditions.
And
there are two important messages, or two lessons, to take from that reality.
First of all, Muslims – pious, conservative, believing Muslims who want to be
loyal to their religion – should not cling onto everything in their culture,
thinking that that's divinely mandated. Maybe some things are bad traditions
and they need to be changed. On the other hand, the Westerners who look at
Islamic culture and see some troubling aspects should not readily conclude that
this is what Islam ordains. Maybe it’s a Middle Eastern culture that became
confused with Islam.
There
is a practice called female circumcision. It’s something terrible, horrible. It
is basically an operation to deprive women of sexual pleasure. And Westerners,
Europeans or Americans, who didn’t know about this before faced this practice
within some of the Muslim communities who migrated from North Africa. And they’ve
thought, “Oh, what a horrible religion that is which ordains something like
that.’ But actually when you look at female circumcision, you see that it has
nothing to do with Islam, it’s just a North African practice, which predates
Islam. It was there for thousands of years. And quite tellingly, some Muslims
do practice that. The Muslims in North Africa, not in other places. But also the
non-Muslim communities of North Africa – the Animists, even some Christians and
even a Jewish tribe in North Africa is known to practice female circumcision.
So what might look like a problem within Islamic faith might turn out to be a
tradition that Muslims have subscribed to.
The
same thing can be said for honor killings, which is a recurrent theme in the
Western media – and which is, of course, a horrible tradition. And we see truly
in some Muslim communities that tradition. But in the non-Muslim communities of
the Middle East, such as some Christian communities, Eastern communities, you
see the same practice. We had a tragic case of an honor killing within Turkey’s
Armenian community just a few months ago.
Now
these are things about general culture, but I’m also very much interested in
political culture and whether liberty and democracy is appreciated, or whether
there’s an authoritarian political culture in which the state is supposed to
impose things on the citizens. And it is no secret that many Islamic movements
in the Middle East tend to be authoritarian, and some of the so-called “Islamic
regimes” such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and the worst case was the Taliban in
Afghanistan – they are pretty authoritarian. No doubt about that.
For
example, in Saudi Arabia there is a phenomenon called the religious police. And
the religious police imposes the supposed Islamic way of life on every citizen,
by force – like women are forced to cover their heads – wear the hijab, the
Islamic head cover. Now that is pretty authoritarian, and that’s something I’m
very much critical of. But when I realized that the non-Muslim, or the
non-Islamic-minded actors in the same geography, sometimes behaved similarly, I
realized that the problem maybe lies in the political culture of the whole
region, not just Islam. Let me give you an example: in Turkey where I come
from, which is a very hyper-secular republic, until very recently we used to
have what I call secularism police, which would guard the universities against
veiled students. In other words, they would force students to uncover their
heads, and I think forcing people to uncover their head is as tyrannical as
forcing them to cover it. It should be the citizen’s decision.
But
when I saw that, I said, “Maybe the problem is just an authoritarian culture in
the region, and some Muslims have been influenced by that. But the
secular-minded people can be influenced by that. Maybe it’s a problem of the
political culture, and we have to think about how to change that political
culture.” Now these are some of the questions I had in mind a few years ago
when I sat down to write a book. I said, “Well I will make a research about how
Islam actually came to be what it is today, and what roads were taken and what
roads could have been taken.” The name of the book is Islam Without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty. And as the
subtitle suggests, I looked at Islamic tradition and the history of Islamic
thought from the perspective of individual liberty, and I tried to find what
are the strengths with regard to individual liberty.
And
there are strengths in Islamic tradition. Islam actually, as a monotheistic
religion, which defined man as a responsible agent by itself, created the idea
of the individual in the Middle East and saved it from the communitarianism,
the collectivism of the tribe. You can derive many ideas from that. But besides
that, I also saw problems within Islamic tradition. But one thing was curious:
most of those problems turn out to be problems that emerged later, not from the
very divine core of Islam, the Koran, but from, again, traditions and
mentalities, or the interpretations of the Koran that Muslims made in the
Middle Ages. The Koran, for example, doesn’t condone stoning. There is no
punishment on apostasy. There is no punishment on personal things like
drinking. These things which make Islamic Law, the troubling aspects of Islamic
Law, were later developed into later interpretations of Islam. Which means that
Muslims can, today, look at those things and say, “Well, the core of our
religion is here to stay with us. It's our faith, and we will be loyal to it.
But we can change how it was interpreted, because it was interpreted according
to the time and milieu in the Middle Ages. Now we are living in a different
world with different values and different political systems.” That
interpretation is quite possible and feasible.
Now if
I were the only person thinking that way, we would be in trouble. But that’s
not the case at all. Actually, from the 19th century on, there’s a whole
revisionist, reformist – whatever you call it – tradition, a trend in Islamic
thinking. And these were intellectuals or statesmen of the 19th century, and
later, 20th century, which looked at Europe basically and saw that Europe has
many things to admire, like science and technology. But not just that; also
democracy, parliament, the idea of representation, the idea of equal
citizenship. These Muslim thinkers and intellectuals and statesmen of the 19th
century looked at Europe, saw these things. They said, “Why don’t we have these
things?” And they looked back at Islamic tradition, they saw that there are
problematic aspects, but they're not the core of the religion, so maybe they
can be re-understood, and the Koran can be reread in the modern world.
That
trend is generally called Islamic modernism, and it was advanced by
intellectuals and statesmen, not just as an intellectual idea though, but also
as a political program. And that’s why actually in the 19th century the Ottoman
Empire, which then covered the whole Middle East, made very important reforms –
reforms like giving Christians and Jews an equal citizenship status, accepting
a constitution, accepting a representative parliament, advancing the idea of
freedom of religion. And that’s why the Ottoman Empire in its last decades
turned into a proto-democracy, a constitutional monarchy, and freedom was a
very important political value at the time.
Similarly,
in the Arab world, there was what the great Arab historian Albert Hourani
defines as the Liberal Age. He has a book, “Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age,”
and the Liberal Age, he defines as 19th century and early 20th century. Quite
notably, this was the dominant trend in the early 20th century among Islamic
thinkers and statesmen and theologians. But there is a very curious pattern in
the rest of the 20th century, because we see a sharp decline in this Islamic
modernist line. And in place of that, what happens is that Islamism grows as an
ideology which is authoritarian, which is quite strident, which is quite
anti-Western, and which wants to shape society based on a utopian vision.
So
Islamism is the problematic idea that really created a lot of problems in the
20th century Islamic world. And even the very extreme forms of Islamism led to
terrorism in the name of Islam – which is actually a practice that I think is
against Islam, but some, obviously, extremists did not think that way. But
there is a curious question: If Islamic modernism was so popular in the 19th
and early 20th centuries, why did Islamism become so popular in the rest of the
20th century? And this is a question, I think, which needs to be discussed
carefully. And in my book, I went into that question as well. And actually you
don’t need to be a rocket scientist to understand that. You just look at the
political history of the 20th century, and you see things have changed a lot.
The context has changed.
In the
19th century, when Muslims were looking at Europe as an example, they were
independent; they were more self-confident. In the early 20th century, with the
fall of the Ottoman Empire, the whole Middle East was colonized. And when you
have colonization what do you have? You have anti-colonization. So Europe is
not just an example now to emulate; it’s an enemy to fight and to resist. So
there’s a very sharp decline in liberal ideas in the Muslim world, and what you
see is more of a defensive, rigid, reactionary strain, which led to Arab
socialism, Arab nationalism and ultimately to the Islamist ideology. And when
the colonial period ended, what you had in place of that was, generally,
secular dictators, which say they’re a country, but did not bring democracy to
the country, and established their own dictatorship. And I think the West, at
least some powers in the West, particularly the United States, made the mistake
of supporting those secular dictators, thinking that they were more helpful for
their interests. But the fact that those dictators suppressed democracy in
their country and suppressed Islamic groups in their country actually made the
Islamists much more strident.
So in
the 20th century, you had this vicious cycle in the Arab world where you have a
dictatorship suppressing its own people including the Islamic-pious, and they’re
reacting in reactionary ways. There was one country, though, which was able to
escape or stay away from that vicious cycle. And that’s the country where I
come from; that’s Turkey. Turkey has never been colonized, so it remained as an
independent nation after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. That’s one thing to
remember. They did not share the same anti-colonial hype that you can find in
some other countries in the region. Secondly, and most importantly, Turkey
became a democracy earlier than any of the countries we are talking about. In
1950, Turkey had the first free and fair elections, which ended the more
autocratic secular regime, which was the beginning of Turkey. And the pious
Muslims in Turkey saw that they can change the political system by voting. And
they realize that democracy is something that is compatible with Islam,
compatible with their values, and they’ve been supportive of democracy. That’s
an experience that not every other Muslim nation in the Middle East had until
very recently.
Secondly,
in the past two decades, thanks to globalization, thanks to the market economy,
thanks to the rise of a middle-class, we in Turkey see what I define as a
rebirth of Islamic modernism. Now there’s the more urban middle-class pious
Muslims who, again, look at their tradition and see that there are some
problems in the tradition, and they understand that they need to be changed and
questioned and reformed. And they look at Europe, and they see an example,
again, to follow. They see an example, at least, to take some inspiration from.
That’s why the E.U. process, Turkey’s effort to join the E.U., has been
supported inside Turkey by the Islamic-pious, while some secular nations were
against that. Well that process has been a little bit blurred by the fact that
not all Europeans are that welcoming – but that’s another discussion. But the
pro-E.U. sentiment in Turkey in the past decade has become almost an Islamic
cause and supported by the Islamic liberals and the secular liberals as well,
of course.
And
thanks to that, Turkey has been able to reasonably create a success story in
which Islam and the most pious understandings of Islam have become part of the
democratic game, and even contributes to the democratic and economic advance of
the country. And this has been an inspiring example right now for some of the
Islamic movements or some of the countries in the Arab world.
You
must have all seen the Arab Spring, which began in Tunis and in Egypt. And Arab
masses just revolted against their dictators. They were asking for democracy;
they were asking for freedom. And they did not turn out to be the Islamist
boogyman that the dictators were always using to justify their regime. They
said that “we want freedom; we want democracy. We are Muslim believers, but we
want to be living as free people in free societies.” Of course, this is a long
road. Democracy is not an overnight achievement; it’s a process. But this is a
promising era in the Muslim world.
And I
believe that the Islamic modernism which began in the 19th century, but which
had a setback in the 20th century because of the political troubles of the
Muslim world, is having a rebirth. And I think the getaway message from that
would be that Islam, despite some of the skeptics in the West, has the
potential in itself to create its own way to democracy, create its own way to
liberalism, create its own way to freedom. They just should be allowed to work
for that.
Thanks
so much.
Mustafa Akyol on Islam without Extremes. Interviewed by Fareed Zakaria. GPS. CNN, December 15, 2013. Video at the Internet Archive. Akyol interview begins at clip 46:30.
Transcript:
ZAKARIA: Modern Islamists full of contrasts, conflicts and contradictions. Some of the fateful seem stuck in the 15th century or even earlier while others are racing into the 21st. One of the sharpest takes on modern Islam that I’ve read in a long time is a new book by Turkey’s finest political analyst, Mustafa Akyol. It is called “Islam Without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty.” It’s a past GPS book of the week. Akyol joined me recently to discuss the futures of Islam.
Mustafa
Akyol, pleasure to have you on.
MUSTAFA
AKYOL, AUTHOR, “ISLAM WITHOUT EXTREMES”: It’s a pleasure to be on the show,
Fareed, thank you.
ZAKARIA:
Why do you think Islam has such a kind of brutal image? You know, even
well-meaning people, even tolerant people basically believe that at the end of
the day, there’s something in the religion that seems to breed fanaticism or
intolerance or violence? And that if you look at, you know, an event around the
world, a terrorist event, something like that, there is a tendency to assume
that it must be those Muslims out there somewhere, Nigeria, Indonesia. Why do
you think that is?
AKYOL: Well,
that is because honestly, there are fanatic intolerant Muslims who, of, course
have been making the news because they’re doing or saying horrible things, but
my argument as a fellow Muslim is that, well, Christianity had such expressions
in the past. There was a time Catholicism was not very liberal, the Middle
Ages, the inquisition. But it has changed. But Islam can change as well.
ZAKARIA:
Now, you grew up in Turkey, which is a secular country, you grew up as a
believing Muslim, but liberal. What was
your experience of growing up with regard to this issue? Or did you watch
extremism grow?
AKYOL: While
I was growing up I saw signs of authoritarianism in the name of Islam, which
disturbed me, but on the other hand I loved Islam as a faith. In my book,
actually, I explain how I found the book in my grandfather’s library at the age
of nine, which had beautiful quotes from the Koran, then a quote not from the
Koran, but a medieval Islamic text, which said if your children do not start to
pray at the age of ten, then beat them up. Well, at the age of nine, when I
read that, I got a little worried. And I had a question in my mind. I said
like, would it be a good thing if I prayed because I wanted to away the slap in
my face? Would it be much better?
ZAKARIA:
If the only reason you’re praying is to avoid getting . . .
AKYOL: Avoid.
Yeah. And would it be much better if I prayed genuinely to worship God? And I
think that’s the question that is very relevant for some Muslim societies
today.
ZAKARIA: But
you found that a lot of the things that youths, that people think of as part of
Islam are actually not in the book.
AKYOL: Not
in the Koran. I mean there’s no stoning in the Koran. The idea that you should
execute someone for apostatizing from Islam doesn't exist in the Koran. The
idea that women are not smart enough to advise men, that’s not in the Koran. A
lot of troubling issues that we find in the Muslim world today are actually –
do not come from the core of the religion, which is scripture. They come from
historical interpretations, and they sometimes reflect just medieval, Middle
Eastern culture rather than the religion itself, which makes it easier to make
a case for reform of these.
ZAKARIA:
If you look at the issue that most people think of as the central part of
Islam, the women in black veils, head to toe, the line in the Koran as I
understand it, simply says women should dress modestly, as should men.
AKYOL:
Exactly.
ZAKARIA:
From that has been interpreted . . .
AKYOL:
Exactly. I mean when you look at the Koran, there is – yes, women should stress
modestly and some medieval scholars describe this modesty in the tenth century
that nothing should be visible other than their eyes. And when we freeze Islam
in these medieval norms we are actually making – creating this big gap between
the modern world and evolving modern world and some traditions. And I think
that also harms Islam because it makes people to choose between their fate and
a more open liberal attitude.
ZAKARIA:
You noticed something very interesting when you went to Mecca, you know, where
you did the hajj actually, what's called the Umrah, the offseason hajj.
AKYOL:
Yeah.
ZAKARIA:
And you noticed something about the difference between being in the heart of
Mecca, following the rules that have been in place since the seventh century,
and Saudi Arabia today.
AKYOL: Very
interesting. Indeed, when I went to the Kaaba, I did my prayers and the
rituals. What I noticed was that around the Kaaba, there is no segregation. Men
and women are together. There is no physical barrier between a man and a woman
in the very holy shrine of Islam.
ZAKARIA:
And the Kaaba is the holiest shrine.
AKYOL: The
holiest shrine in the city of Mecca in Saudi Arabia, the birth place of Islam.
But the interesting thing is, and you leave the Kaaba and you go to Burger King
or Starbucks, which is next to the shrine, you have to be separated. Men and
women go two different ways because the Saudi Kingdom physically separates men
and women in every public space. Thinking that that’s the pious thing to do. But
if there was – except in Kaaba. So, if
you want to talk to a lady in Saudi Arabia freely, that is the only way that
you can – the only way you can do this, the only place you can do this, is the
Kaaba.
ZAKARIA:
What do you say to people who said fine, Christianity was intolerant 500 years
ago. Right now what we’re dealing with is that Islam is going through a very
intolerant phase and it is, therefore, the problem?
AKYOL: Well,
I would agree with that, unfortunately. Not about all Islam. But we have
Islamic groups, movements that are really intolerant and sometimes even
violent. My argument – I’m not someone who says there’s no problem with the
Muslim world. I accept that there are
big problems especially from a liberal point of view, but I think they can be
changed and reformed as Catholicism has changed immensely over the centuries as
other religions have changed.
ZAKARIA:
And how do you do that reform? Is there something that the West can do, that
America can do or is this essentially an internal debate within Islam?
AKYOL: This
is essentially an internal debate within Islam. But in my book I argued that
the West can help indirectly, first by supporting principles of democracy, and
not supporting militant or autocratic regimes in the Middle East like it
happened for a long time. Secondly, support the market economy because one
thing that transformed minds is the economy. In Turkey, for example, one of the
reasons that Turkey is a successful country, democracy, with some flaws, you
know, that we are discussing these days, is that Turkey has a market economy,
which raised the middle class, which made people more rational, more pragmatic
about their attitude to world and also in religious matters as well. In the
Arab world you have sometimes – you have oil money, which, really, is a curse
as you also wonderfully explained in your book, so we need to have education
and West can help in that regard. We need to have cultural exchanges. These are
all very helpful, but violent confrontations do not help. Like occupying a
country to liberate it, it does not really that help that much.
ZAKARIA:
Mustafa, pleasure to have you on.
AKYOL: Pleasure
to be on the show. Thank you, Fareed.
Mustafa Akyol: Islam Without Extremes. Video. warwicklibertarians, November 23, 2011. YouTube.
Mustafa Akyol: The Commercial Heritage and Contribution of Islam. Video. misesmedia, March 12, 2011. YouTube.
Does Islam Need Reformation? Debate at SOAS: Mustafa Akyol vs. Abdullah al Andalusi. Video. Muslim Debate Initiative, April 3, 2012. YouTube.
Islam without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty. Introduction chapter. By Mustafa Akyol. New York: W. W. Norton, 2011.
The White Path: Mustafa Akyol’s website.
Mustafa Akyol. Google Videos.
Akyol (TED Transcript):
A few weeks ago, I had a chance to go to Saudi Arabia. And the first thing I wanted to do as a Muslim was go to Mecca and visit the Kaaba, the holiest shrine of Islam. And I did that; I put on my ritualistic dress; I went to the holy mosque; I did my prayers; I observed all the rituals. And meanwhile, besides all the spirituality, there was one mundane detail in the Kaaba that was pretty interesting for me. There was no separation of sexes. In other words, men and women were worshiping all together. They were together while doing the tawaf, the circular walk around the Kaaba. They were together while praying.
Mustafa Akyol on Islam without Extremes. Interviewed by Fareed Zakaria. GPS. CNN, December 15, 2013. Video at the Internet Archive. Akyol interview begins at clip 46:30.
Transcript:
ZAKARIA: Modern Islamists full of contrasts, conflicts and contradictions. Some of the fateful seem stuck in the 15th century or even earlier while others are racing into the 21st. One of the sharpest takes on modern Islam that I’ve read in a long time is a new book by Turkey’s finest political analyst, Mustafa Akyol. It is called “Islam Without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty.” It’s a past GPS book of the week. Akyol joined me recently to discuss the futures of Islam.
Mustafa Akyol: Islam Without Extremes. Video. warwicklibertarians, November 23, 2011. YouTube.
Mustafa Akyol: The Commercial Heritage and Contribution of Islam. Video. misesmedia, March 12, 2011. YouTube.
Does Islam Need Reformation? Debate at SOAS: Mustafa Akyol vs. Abdullah al Andalusi. Video. Muslim Debate Initiative, April 3, 2012. YouTube.
Why Do Intellectuals Oppose Capitalism? By Robert Nozick.
Why Do Intellectuals Oppose Capitalism? By Robert Nozick. Libertarianism.org. Originally published in Cato Policy Report, January/February 1998.
“Remember Who the Real Enemy Is.” By Peter Blair.
“Remember Who the Real Enemy Is.” By Peter Blair. The American Interest, December 13, 2013.
Kerry’s Peace Framework Versus Reality. By Jonathan S. Tobin.
Kerry’s Peace Framework Versus Reality. By Jonathan S. Tobin. Commentary, December 12, 2013.
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