NYT Fighting the Future of Higher Ed. By Walter Russell Mead. Via Meadia, February 19, 2013.
The Trouble With Online College. Editorial. New York Times, February 18, 2013.
Revolution Hits the Universities. By Thomas L. Friedman. New York Times, January 27, 2013.
The End of the University as We Know It. by Nathan Harden. The American Interest, January/February 2013.
Mead:
Every
new idea has problems and online ed is no exception. But the New York Times seems inordinately eager
to call the whole thing a waste of time. Yesterday’s editorial, “The Trouble
With Online College,” is oddly dismissive of what is likely to be the biggest
threat to traditional college patterns of instruction: the “hybrid” course in
which the equivalent of a TA or a tutor works with small groups of students
around a lecture course.
Training
people to teach these classes may work, warns the Times, but is expensive: “Hybrid courses are rare, and teaching
professors how to manage them is costly and time-consuming.”
Perhaps—but
it’s much, much less expensive than the current method of having virtually all
classes everywhere taught by full PhDs. A college or institute that trains
tutors and assistants to teach one particular course could really save a ton of
money by replacing PhDs (many of whom are not particularly good teachers, and most
of whom are anything but intellectual leaders in their fields) with highly
trained and focused tutors. These tutors, while not knowing a field in as great
a depth as a PhD, would be able to provide students with a better experience in
one particular course than most PhD faculty at most colleges can now provide.
Does
the Times really think it’s more
expensive to train people with BAs to be TAs in a physics course than it is to
train and hire PhDs?
The NYT editorial board seems deeply
invested in the existing model, viewing new forms of higher ed with sentiments
similar to those with which the American Blacksmiths’ Association viewed the
early cars. Those early cars did have a lot of breakdowns, and there were a lot
of problems with them. But it was pretty obvious to everyone but the Livery
Stable League that change was coming.
There
are serious questions to be asked about the future of American higher ed. We
need to make training and job qualifications much cheaper, and at the same time
we need to revive and strengthen the concept of liberal education. But until
places like the NYT accustom
themselves to thinking outside the blue box, that debate is going to be less
rich and thoughtful than it needs to be.
Tuesday, February 19, 2013
The Unlikely History of American Exceptionalism. By Walter A. McDougall.
The Unlikely History of American Exceptionalism. By Walter A. McDougall. The American Interest, March/April 2013. Also find it here.
Walter McDougall on American Exceptionalism. By Darryl Hart. Front Porch Republic, September 20, 2012.
Nightmares of an I.R. Professor. By Walter A. McDougall. Foreign Policy Research Institute, September 2012.
American Exceptionalism or a Modest Republic. By Mark T. Mitchell. Front Porch Republic, October 17, 2011.
Patriotism vs. American Exceptionalism. By Mark T. Mitchell. Front Porch Republic, March 20, 2012.
Everyone Is Special. By Nils Gilman, Michael Grosack, and Aaron Harms. The American Interest, March/April 2013.
Separated at Birth? Europe and America in the 21st Century. By Peter Baldwin. The American Interest, March/April 2013.
Walter McDougall on American Exceptionalism. By Darryl Hart. Front Porch Republic, September 20, 2012.
Nightmares of an I.R. Professor. By Walter A. McDougall. Foreign Policy Research Institute, September 2012.
American Exceptionalism or a Modest Republic. By Mark T. Mitchell. Front Porch Republic, October 17, 2011.
Patriotism vs. American Exceptionalism. By Mark T. Mitchell. Front Porch Republic, March 20, 2012.
Everyone Is Special. By Nils Gilman, Michael Grosack, and Aaron Harms. The American Interest, March/April 2013.
Separated at Birth? Europe and America in the 21st Century. By Peter Baldwin. The American Interest, March/April 2013.
On Misunderstanding Mohamed Mursi for His Mask. By Raymond Stock.
On Misunderstanding Mohamed Mursi for His Mask. By Raymond Stock. Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 2013.
More on Egypt and Morsi here.
More on Egypt and Morsi here.
The Diversity Myth: America’s Leading Export. By Benjamin Schwarz.
The Diversity Myth: America’s Leading Export. By Benjamin Schwarz. The Atlantic, May 1995. Also find it here.
Monday, February 18, 2013
Don’t Rule Out Having Children Because You Want to Have a Career. By Anne-Marie Slaughter.
Don’t Rule Out Having Children Because You Want to Have a Career. By Anne-Marie Slaughter. The Atlantic, February 14, 2013.
Why Women Still Can’t Have It All. By Anne-Marie Slaughter. By Anne-Marie Slaughter. The Atlantic, July/August 2012.
Falling birthrates: the threat and the dilemma. By Chrystia Freeland. Reuters, December 7, 2012.
The Age of Possibility. By David Brooks. New York Times, November 15, 2012.
The Rise of Post-Familialism: Humanity’s Future? By Joel Kotkin. JoelKotkin.com, October 12, 2012. Also at New Geography.
Why Women Still Can’t Have It All. By Anne-Marie Slaughter. By Anne-Marie Slaughter. The Atlantic, July/August 2012.
Falling birthrates: the threat and the dilemma. By Chrystia Freeland. Reuters, December 7, 2012.
The Age of Possibility. By David Brooks. New York Times, November 15, 2012.
The Rise of Post-Familialism: Humanity’s Future? By Joel Kotkin. JoelKotkin.com, October 12, 2012. Also at New Geography.
Egyptians in Mad Scramble for Dwindling Dollars. By Walter Russell Mead.
Egyptians in Mad Scramble for Dwindling Dollars. By Walter Russell Mead. Via Meadia, February 18, 2013.
More on Egypt and Morsi here.
More on Egypt and Morsi here.
Yair Lapid: The Southern Man and His Cosmopolitan Ghetto. By Neve Gordon.
Yair Lapid: The southern man and his cosmopolitan ghetto. By Neve Gordon. Al Jazeera English, February 12, 2013. Also find it here.
A Villa in the Jungle: The Arab Awakening through the Lens of the Israeli Media. By Neve Gordon. Middle East Law and Governance, 2011. Also find it here.
A Villa in the Jungle: The Arab Awakening through the Lens of the Israeli Media. By Neve Gordon. Middle East Law and Governance, 2011. Also find it here.
Where Have All the Real Conservatives Gone? By Scot Faulkner and Jonathan Riehl.
Where Have All the Real Conservatives Gone? By Scot Faulkner and Jonathan Riehl. History News Network, February 18, 2013.
Blues Missing the Mark on Higher Ed Reform. By Walter Russell Mead.
Blues Missing the Mark on Higher Ed Reform. By Walter Russell Mead. Via Meadia, February 18, 2013.
Equal Opportunity, Our National Myth. By Joseph Stiglitz. New York Times, February 16, 2013.
Equal Opportunity, Our National Myth. By Joseph Stiglitz. New York Times, February 16, 2013.
Push Now for Peace in the Middle East. By Daniel Freedman.
Push now for peace in the Middle East. By Daniel Freedman. New York Daily News, February 17, 2013.
Hamas has never been more willing to deal.
Hamas has never been more willing to deal.
The Grand Universal Illusion. By Michael J. Totten.
The Grand Universal Illusion. By Michael J. Totten. World Affairs, February 13, 2013.
(See Morsi and Egypt here.)
Totten:
Kristof assumes the Chinese government is at least marginally interested in opening and reforming Pyongyang because he, like plenty of Americans—myself included—wish to see reform in non-democratic countries aligned with the United States. He’s projecting our own psychology onto Beijing.
This is what Professor Richard Landes calls cognitive egocentrism. “The act of empathy,” Landes explains, “can often become an act of projecting onto another ‘what I would feel if I were in their shoes,’ rather than an attempt to understand how the person with whom one is empathizing has reacted to their situation, how they read and interpret events.”
People do this sort of thing all the time. We do it to our family, friends, colleagues, and neighbors. It’s hard not to. We also do it to foreign people, and they do it to us.
Look at the naïve early predictions about the Arab Spring. Cognitive egocentrism explains at least part of it. Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood was routinely described in the Western press as a party of mainstream religious conservatives who deeply believed in democracy and free markets, as if they were Egypt’s version of the Republicans in the United States. Likewise, the kids in Tahrir Square were seen as Egypt’s Democrats. Both assumptions were outrageously wide of reality.
Middle Easterners do the same thing to us. I couldn’t begin to count the number of times I’ve heard the American government described in hysterically phantasmagoric terms that would make even Noam Chomsky blush. A Syrian friend of mine in the United States used to describe the British and American governments as snakes (his word), not because he’s inherently anti-American but because he was raised on propaganda by the house of Assad and because for the first thirty years of his life he suffered under a regime that really was like a snake. For him, suffering under a predatory snake-like government was a perfectly normal state of affairs. He had never known anything else and assumed people everywhere were no different. (I should add that he has been here long enough now that he no longer thinks of the American government in these terms. A few months ago he even said he misses George W. Bush, something I’d sooner expect Nancy Pelosi to say.)
Plenty of the Middle East’s ridiculous anti-American conspiracy theories are produced by this sort of thinking. The Middle East is a place where real conspiracies actually happen. Military coups, palace coups, secret police, assassinations by unknown shadowy figures, election fraud, and massive official disinformation are part of the everyday scenery. Because these things are tragically normal over there, people feel helpless and paranoid. They also assume these things are normal for everyone else, that the American government (along with every other government in the world) is just as venal and corrupt and self-serving and murderous as the governments of Bashar al-Assad, Saddam Hussein, and Moammar Qaddafi. These people are projecting their own experiences of the world onto us. They assume their experiences are universal. Until recently in human history, their experiences were practically universal.
(See Morsi and Egypt here.)
Totten:
Kristof assumes the Chinese government is at least marginally interested in opening and reforming Pyongyang because he, like plenty of Americans—myself included—wish to see reform in non-democratic countries aligned with the United States. He’s projecting our own psychology onto Beijing.
This is what Professor Richard Landes calls cognitive egocentrism. “The act of empathy,” Landes explains, “can often become an act of projecting onto another ‘what I would feel if I were in their shoes,’ rather than an attempt to understand how the person with whom one is empathizing has reacted to their situation, how they read and interpret events.”
People do this sort of thing all the time. We do it to our family, friends, colleagues, and neighbors. It’s hard not to. We also do it to foreign people, and they do it to us.
Look at the naïve early predictions about the Arab Spring. Cognitive egocentrism explains at least part of it. Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood was routinely described in the Western press as a party of mainstream religious conservatives who deeply believed in democracy and free markets, as if they were Egypt’s version of the Republicans in the United States. Likewise, the kids in Tahrir Square were seen as Egypt’s Democrats. Both assumptions were outrageously wide of reality.
Middle Easterners do the same thing to us. I couldn’t begin to count the number of times I’ve heard the American government described in hysterically phantasmagoric terms that would make even Noam Chomsky blush. A Syrian friend of mine in the United States used to describe the British and American governments as snakes (his word), not because he’s inherently anti-American but because he was raised on propaganda by the house of Assad and because for the first thirty years of his life he suffered under a regime that really was like a snake. For him, suffering under a predatory snake-like government was a perfectly normal state of affairs. He had never known anything else and assumed people everywhere were no different. (I should add that he has been here long enough now that he no longer thinks of the American government in these terms. A few months ago he even said he misses George W. Bush, something I’d sooner expect Nancy Pelosi to say.)
Plenty of the Middle East’s ridiculous anti-American conspiracy theories are produced by this sort of thinking. The Middle East is a place where real conspiracies actually happen. Military coups, palace coups, secret police, assassinations by unknown shadowy figures, election fraud, and massive official disinformation are part of the everyday scenery. Because these things are tragically normal over there, people feel helpless and paranoid. They also assume these things are normal for everyone else, that the American government (along with every other government in the world) is just as venal and corrupt and self-serving and murderous as the governments of Bashar al-Assad, Saddam Hussein, and Moammar Qaddafi. These people are projecting their own experiences of the world onto us. They assume their experiences are universal. Until recently in human history, their experiences were practically universal.
Aftermath of Revolution. By Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo.
Aftermath of Revolution. By Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo. New York Times, February 14, 2013.
(See Morsi and Egypt here.)
Albertus and Menaldo:
Less perniciously, fits and starts may prolong the transition period and present opportunities for “spoilers” to derail progress. The infighting in Libya is an example. Lastly, the adoption of nominally democratic institutions may fail to benefit the majority of citizens and even foster one-party rule, an outcome South Africa faces today.
The more promising cases from the Arab Spring, such as Tunisia and Egypt, fall into this last category. In both countries, a mix of formerly powerful elites and ascendant new elites are scrambling to game the political structure to protect their interests, meanwhile tabling policies that could otherwise benefit the majority of citizens.
In Egypt, the military has won immunity from prosecution and autonomy over its budget, while Morsi has at times reverted to Mubarak-era emergency rule to quell popular unrest. In Tunisia, the security apparatus under former dictator Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali remains entrenched in the government, while Ennahda has selectively repressed protests as it turns a blind eye to crimes perpetrated by hard-line Islamists against Tunisia’s secular middle class.
To avoid reversion to autocracy or stalled, impartial democracy, a country in Tunisia’s or Egypt’s circumstances must steer between the Scylla of outsized influence by erstwhile autocratic incumbents and the Charybdis of unconstrained new actors who seek to lock in newfound power.
As with all revolutions, to remain on a trajectory toward democracy requires continued popular pressure on all those with the capacity to hijack democratic aspirations. This suggests that street protests in these countries are far from over. In the long term, this instability may pay off in the form of democracy.
(See Morsi and Egypt here.)
Albertus and Menaldo:
Less perniciously, fits and starts may prolong the transition period and present opportunities for “spoilers” to derail progress. The infighting in Libya is an example. Lastly, the adoption of nominally democratic institutions may fail to benefit the majority of citizens and even foster one-party rule, an outcome South Africa faces today.
The more promising cases from the Arab Spring, such as Tunisia and Egypt, fall into this last category. In both countries, a mix of formerly powerful elites and ascendant new elites are scrambling to game the political structure to protect their interests, meanwhile tabling policies that could otherwise benefit the majority of citizens.
In Egypt, the military has won immunity from prosecution and autonomy over its budget, while Morsi has at times reverted to Mubarak-era emergency rule to quell popular unrest. In Tunisia, the security apparatus under former dictator Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali remains entrenched in the government, while Ennahda has selectively repressed protests as it turns a blind eye to crimes perpetrated by hard-line Islamists against Tunisia’s secular middle class.
To avoid reversion to autocracy or stalled, impartial democracy, a country in Tunisia’s or Egypt’s circumstances must steer between the Scylla of outsized influence by erstwhile autocratic incumbents and the Charybdis of unconstrained new actors who seek to lock in newfound power.
As with all revolutions, to remain on a trajectory toward democracy requires continued popular pressure on all those with the capacity to hijack democratic aspirations. This suggests that street protests in these countries are far from over. In the long term, this instability may pay off in the form of democracy.
Sunday, February 17, 2013
The End of a Catholic Moment. By Ross Douthat.
The End of a Catholic Moment. By Ross Douthat. New York Times, February 16, 2013.
Douthat:
Perhaps not coincidentally, the mid-2000s were the last time the Catholic vision of the good society — more egalitarian than American conservatism and more moralistic than American liberalism — enjoyed real influence in U.S. politics. At the time of John Paul’s death, the Republican Party’s agenda was still stamped by George W. Bush’s “compassionate conservatism,” which offered a right-of-center approach to Catholic ideas about social justice. The Democratic Party, meanwhile, was looking for ways to woo the “values voters” (many of them Catholic) who had just helped Bush win re-election, and prominent Democrats were calling for a friendlier attitude toward religion and a bigger tent on social issues.
. . . . . . . . . .
The collapse in the church’s reputation has coincided with a substantial loss of Catholic influence in American political debates. Whereas eight years ago, a Catholic view of economics and culture represented a center that both parties hoped to claim, today’s Republicans are more likely to channel Ayn Rand than Thomas Aquinas, and a strident social liberalism holds the whip hand in the Democratic Party.
Indeed, between Mitt Romney’s comments about the mooching 47 percent and the White House’s cynical decision to energize its base by picking fights over abortion and contraception, both parties spent 2012 effectively running against Catholic ideas about the common good.
This transformation suggests that we may have reached the end of a distinctive “Catholic moment” (to repurpose a phrase from the late Catholic priest-intellectual Richard John Neuhaus) in American politics, one that began in the 1980s after John Paul’s ascension to the papacy and the migration of many Catholic “Reagan Democrats” into the Republican Party.
. . . . . . . . . .
The recent turn away from Catholic ideas has also been furthered by a political class that never particularly cared for them in the first place. Even in a more unchurched America, a synthesis of social conservatism and more egalitarian-minded economic policies could have a great deal of mass appeal. But our elites seem mostly relieved to stop paying lip service to the Catholic synthesis: professional Republicans are more libertarian than their constituents, professional Democrats are more secular than their party’s rank-and-file, and professional centrists get their encyclicals from Michael Bloomberg rather than the Vatican.
Douthat:
Perhaps not coincidentally, the mid-2000s were the last time the Catholic vision of the good society — more egalitarian than American conservatism and more moralistic than American liberalism — enjoyed real influence in U.S. politics. At the time of John Paul’s death, the Republican Party’s agenda was still stamped by George W. Bush’s “compassionate conservatism,” which offered a right-of-center approach to Catholic ideas about social justice. The Democratic Party, meanwhile, was looking for ways to woo the “values voters” (many of them Catholic) who had just helped Bush win re-election, and prominent Democrats were calling for a friendlier attitude toward religion and a bigger tent on social issues.
. . . . . . . . . .
The collapse in the church’s reputation has coincided with a substantial loss of Catholic influence in American political debates. Whereas eight years ago, a Catholic view of economics and culture represented a center that both parties hoped to claim, today’s Republicans are more likely to channel Ayn Rand than Thomas Aquinas, and a strident social liberalism holds the whip hand in the Democratic Party.
Indeed, between Mitt Romney’s comments about the mooching 47 percent and the White House’s cynical decision to energize its base by picking fights over abortion and contraception, both parties spent 2012 effectively running against Catholic ideas about the common good.
This transformation suggests that we may have reached the end of a distinctive “Catholic moment” (to repurpose a phrase from the late Catholic priest-intellectual Richard John Neuhaus) in American politics, one that began in the 1980s after John Paul’s ascension to the papacy and the migration of many Catholic “Reagan Democrats” into the Republican Party.
. . . . . . . . . .
The recent turn away from Catholic ideas has also been furthered by a political class that never particularly cared for them in the first place. Even in a more unchurched America, a synthesis of social conservatism and more egalitarian-minded economic policies could have a great deal of mass appeal. But our elites seem mostly relieved to stop paying lip service to the Catholic synthesis: professional Republicans are more libertarian than their constituents, professional Democrats are more secular than their party’s rank-and-file, and professional centrists get their encyclicals from Michael Bloomberg rather than the Vatican.
Equal Opportunity, Our National Myth. By Joseph Stiglitz.
Equal Opportunity, Our National Myth. By Joseph Stiglitz. New York Times, February 16, 2013.
Stiglitz:
Unless current trends in education are reversed, the situation is likely to get even worse. In some cases it seems as if policy has actually been designed to reduce opportunity: government support for many state schools has been steadily gutted over the last few decades — and especially in the last few years. Meanwhile, students are crushed by giant student loan debts that are almost impossible to discharge, even in bankruptcy. This is happening at the same time that a college education is more important than ever for getting a good job.
Young people from families of modest means face a Catch-22: without a college education, they are condemned to a life of poor prospects; with a college education, they may be condemned to a lifetime of living at the brink. And increasingly even a college degree isn’t enough; one needs either a graduate degree or a series of (often unpaid) internships. Those at the top have the connections and social capital to get those opportunities. Those in the middle and bottom don’t. The point is that no one makes it on his or her own. And those at the top get more help from their families than do those lower down on the ladder. Government should help to level the playing field.
Americans are coming to realize that their cherished narrative of social and economic mobility is a myth. Grand deceptions of this magnitude are hard to maintain for long — and the country has already been through a couple of decades of self-deception.
Without substantial policy changes, our self-image, and the image we project to the world, will diminish — and so will our economic standing and stability. Inequality of outcomes and inequality of opportunity reinforce each other — and contribute to economic weakness, as Alan B. Krueger, a Princeton economist and the chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers, has emphasized. We have an economic, and not only moral, interest in saving the American dream.
Stiglitz:
Unless current trends in education are reversed, the situation is likely to get even worse. In some cases it seems as if policy has actually been designed to reduce opportunity: government support for many state schools has been steadily gutted over the last few decades — and especially in the last few years. Meanwhile, students are crushed by giant student loan debts that are almost impossible to discharge, even in bankruptcy. This is happening at the same time that a college education is more important than ever for getting a good job.
Young people from families of modest means face a Catch-22: without a college education, they are condemned to a life of poor prospects; with a college education, they may be condemned to a lifetime of living at the brink. And increasingly even a college degree isn’t enough; one needs either a graduate degree or a series of (often unpaid) internships. Those at the top have the connections and social capital to get those opportunities. Those in the middle and bottom don’t. The point is that no one makes it on his or her own. And those at the top get more help from their families than do those lower down on the ladder. Government should help to level the playing field.
Americans are coming to realize that their cherished narrative of social and economic mobility is a myth. Grand deceptions of this magnitude are hard to maintain for long — and the country has already been through a couple of decades of self-deception.
Without substantial policy changes, our self-image, and the image we project to the world, will diminish — and so will our economic standing and stability. Inequality of outcomes and inequality of opportunity reinforce each other — and contribute to economic weakness, as Alan B. Krueger, a Princeton economist and the chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers, has emphasized. We have an economic, and not only moral, interest in saving the American dream.
Why is Academic Writing So Bad? By Stephen M. Walt.
On writing well. By Stephen M. Walt. Foreign Policy, February 15, 2013.
In Egypt, the Kids Are Not All Right. By David Ignatius.
In Egypt, the kids are not all right. By David Ignatius. Washington Post, February 15, 2013.
Rowdies with a Cause. By Sulome Anderson. Foreign Policy, February 5, 2013.
Post-revolt Arab Transitions: Driven by Distrust and Inexperience. By James M. Dorsey. RSIS Commentaries, February 13, 2013.
The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer. Blog by James M. Dorsey.
More on Egypt and Morsi here.
Ignatius:
If you’re trying to understand the rampaging soccer fans who have become a political force in the new Egypt, you might consult Anthony Burgess’s 1962 novel “A Clockwork Orange.”
The book is about a chaotic future shaped by roving gangs of “droogs” (Burgess’s imaginary word for young male toughs). Led by Alex, the droogs get stoned on milk-and-drug cocktails and then commit brutal acts of what Burgess called “ultra-violence.”
“You got shook and shook till there was nothing left. You lost your name and your body and your self and you just didn’t care,” Alex says in describing his violent binges.
Burgess’s novel — popularized in a 1971 film by Stanley Kubrick, starring Malcolm McDowell as the malevolent Alex — is worth a new look. It’s an eerily prescient guide to the youth gangs that are wild in the streets of Egypt and other countries.
What are these hooligans telling us about the future — not just in Egypt but also in other nations where authoritarian leaders have lost their power to repress dissent by angry young men? The teenage marauders seem to have lost respect for the world of their fathers — and for the forces of social control that were woven through traditional societies such as Egypt.
The old social fabric has ripped. The young gangs who own the streets are contemptuous of police and most other authority figures. If the Egyptian government orders a curfew, the soccer thugs make a point of staying out all night. They seem to disrespect their fathers’ generation for having sacrificed their dignity by submitting to President Hosni Mubarak’s soulless, repressive regime.
The Egyptian soccer thugs are known as “ultras,” a term Burgess would have liked, and they play a growing political role. They helped overthrow Mubarak two years ago in Tahrir Square. Now, styling themselves as the “Black Bloc,” they are challenging Mubarak’s successor, President Mohamed Morsi, and his Muslim Brotherhood government.
Analysts theorize that the soccer thugs were allowed to take root under Mubarak because they offered a nonpolitical way for young men to vent their anger — outside the mosque and outside opposition politics. But the gangs of violent youths became shock troops of the uprising that toppled Mubarak’s regime. They helped prevent the security forces from sweeping the square in the revolution’s fragile early days.
James Dorsey, a journalist and academic who writes a blog called “The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer,” explains the rise of the ultras. After years of battling Egyptian police in the soccer stadiums, “they were fearless, they had nothing to lose, and they became battle-hardened,” he told Foreign Policy.
Egypt’s post-revolutionary challenge has been getting these angry youths to join in building a new democratic system. This same problem is evident in other Arab Spring hot spots, such as Tunisia and Libya, which are proving fractious and difficult to govern. In Egypt (a society with a deep love of order), the instability has been acute: A year ago, a soccer riot in Port Said killed 74 people. Last month, more than 30 were killed as soccer riots erupted in Suez, Alexandria, Cairo and Port Said. Morsi seemed close to losing control until the military sent in troops to protect key facilities.
The problem, Dorsey told Foreign Policy, is “how to make the transition from street to system.” This hasn’t happened in Egypt or Libya and has only begun in Tunisia.
The revolt of alienated soccer youths is hardly confined to North Africa. In Israel, a soccer team called Beitar Jerusalem is supported by racist young fans who chant “Death to the Arabs” and recently unfurled a banner that proclaimed “Beitar Pure Forever” to express their opposition to recruiting Muslim players. “When talking about Beitar, it’s actually showing a mirror for Israeli society,” Nidal Othman, director of the Coalition Against Racism in Israel, told the New York Times.
Soccer hooliganism is endemic, as well, in Britain and many other European nations. Racist chants can be heard on soccer pitches across the continent.
In his 2004 book “How Soccer Explains the World,” Franklin Foer notes the paradox that hooligans and their violent tribalism continue even as soccer becomes globalized and interconnected. Soccer teams provide an intense bonding experience in societies where other connections have broken down.
We can see this theme playing out in Egypt, as the kids who made the revolution refuse to settle down and take their seats. Like the Jacobins of revolutionary France, these “ultras” rule the streets, almost daring some future general to crack down.
Rowdies with a Cause. By Sulome Anderson. Foreign Policy, February 5, 2013.
Post-revolt Arab Transitions: Driven by Distrust and Inexperience. By James M. Dorsey. RSIS Commentaries, February 13, 2013.
The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer. Blog by James M. Dorsey.
More on Egypt and Morsi here.
Ignatius:
If you’re trying to understand the rampaging soccer fans who have become a political force in the new Egypt, you might consult Anthony Burgess’s 1962 novel “A Clockwork Orange.”
The book is about a chaotic future shaped by roving gangs of “droogs” (Burgess’s imaginary word for young male toughs). Led by Alex, the droogs get stoned on milk-and-drug cocktails and then commit brutal acts of what Burgess called “ultra-violence.”
“You got shook and shook till there was nothing left. You lost your name and your body and your self and you just didn’t care,” Alex says in describing his violent binges.
Burgess’s novel — popularized in a 1971 film by Stanley Kubrick, starring Malcolm McDowell as the malevolent Alex — is worth a new look. It’s an eerily prescient guide to the youth gangs that are wild in the streets of Egypt and other countries.
What are these hooligans telling us about the future — not just in Egypt but also in other nations where authoritarian leaders have lost their power to repress dissent by angry young men? The teenage marauders seem to have lost respect for the world of their fathers — and for the forces of social control that were woven through traditional societies such as Egypt.
The old social fabric has ripped. The young gangs who own the streets are contemptuous of police and most other authority figures. If the Egyptian government orders a curfew, the soccer thugs make a point of staying out all night. They seem to disrespect their fathers’ generation for having sacrificed their dignity by submitting to President Hosni Mubarak’s soulless, repressive regime.
The Egyptian soccer thugs are known as “ultras,” a term Burgess would have liked, and they play a growing political role. They helped overthrow Mubarak two years ago in Tahrir Square. Now, styling themselves as the “Black Bloc,” they are challenging Mubarak’s successor, President Mohamed Morsi, and his Muslim Brotherhood government.
Analysts theorize that the soccer thugs were allowed to take root under Mubarak because they offered a nonpolitical way for young men to vent their anger — outside the mosque and outside opposition politics. But the gangs of violent youths became shock troops of the uprising that toppled Mubarak’s regime. They helped prevent the security forces from sweeping the square in the revolution’s fragile early days.
James Dorsey, a journalist and academic who writes a blog called “The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer,” explains the rise of the ultras. After years of battling Egyptian police in the soccer stadiums, “they were fearless, they had nothing to lose, and they became battle-hardened,” he told Foreign Policy.
Egypt’s post-revolutionary challenge has been getting these angry youths to join in building a new democratic system. This same problem is evident in other Arab Spring hot spots, such as Tunisia and Libya, which are proving fractious and difficult to govern. In Egypt (a society with a deep love of order), the instability has been acute: A year ago, a soccer riot in Port Said killed 74 people. Last month, more than 30 were killed as soccer riots erupted in Suez, Alexandria, Cairo and Port Said. Morsi seemed close to losing control until the military sent in troops to protect key facilities.
The problem, Dorsey told Foreign Policy, is “how to make the transition from street to system.” This hasn’t happened in Egypt or Libya and has only begun in Tunisia.
The revolt of alienated soccer youths is hardly confined to North Africa. In Israel, a soccer team called Beitar Jerusalem is supported by racist young fans who chant “Death to the Arabs” and recently unfurled a banner that proclaimed “Beitar Pure Forever” to express their opposition to recruiting Muslim players. “When talking about Beitar, it’s actually showing a mirror for Israeli society,” Nidal Othman, director of the Coalition Against Racism in Israel, told the New York Times.
Soccer hooliganism is endemic, as well, in Britain and many other European nations. Racist chants can be heard on soccer pitches across the continent.
In his 2004 book “How Soccer Explains the World,” Franklin Foer notes the paradox that hooligans and their violent tribalism continue even as soccer becomes globalized and interconnected. Soccer teams provide an intense bonding experience in societies where other connections have broken down.
We can see this theme playing out in Egypt, as the kids who made the revolution refuse to settle down and take their seats. Like the Jacobins of revolutionary France, these “ultras” rule the streets, almost daring some future general to crack down.
Andrew Jackson Invents American Populism. By Dick Morris.
Andrew Jackson Invents Populism. By Dick Morris. Video. DickMorris.com, February 16, 2013. Also on YouTube.
More by Morris on Jackson, here, here, and here.
More by Morris on Jackson, here, here, and here.
91-Year-Old Widow Elsie Smith Sells Everything She Owns to Bury Late Husband.
Elderly woman to sell everything she owns to keep a promise. By Eric Johnson. KOMO News, February 15, 2013.
Widow Elsie Smith Sells Everything She Owns to Bury Late Husband. By Alexis Shaw. ABC News. Daily Finance, February 16, 2013.
Elsie Smith willing to sell everything to keep her promise to bury husband. By Rachael Monaco. Examiner.com, February 16, 2013.
Widow Elsie Smith Sells Everything She Owns to Bury Late Husband. By Alexis Shaw. ABC News. Daily Finance, February 16, 2013.
Elsie Smith willing to sell everything to keep her promise to bury husband. By Rachael Monaco. Examiner.com, February 16, 2013.
Obama’s No-Growth State of the Union. By Larry Kudlow.
Obama’s No-Growth State of the Union. By Larry Kudlow. Real Clear Politics, February 16, 2013. Also find it here.
Kudlow:
Rubio delivered an economic primer on the quest for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. President Obama outlined his scheme for government collective action to transform the country into his liberal progressive vision. It’s a wonderment that a freshman senator can get the story so right, while a second-term president can get it all wrong.
Kudlow:
Rubio delivered an economic primer on the quest for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. President Obama outlined his scheme for government collective action to transform the country into his liberal progressive vision. It’s a wonderment that a freshman senator can get the story so right, while a second-term president can get it all wrong.
The Palestinian Demographic Weapon. By Robert Fattal
An inconvenient truth. By Robert Fattal. Ynet News, February 16, 2013.
Palestinians at the end of 2012. Press Release. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), December 31, 2012.
Palestinians at the end of 2012. Press Release. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), December 31, 2012.
Saturday, February 16, 2013
USDA Sensitivity Training Chant Outrage.
USDA chant outrage. Video. The Five. Fox News, February 15, 2013.
Megyn Kelly Discusses Government’s Taxpayer-Funded Cultural Sensitivity Training. Video. Fox News Insider, February 15, 2013.
USDA Cultural Sensitivity Training Program Redefines “Minorities” as “Emerging Majorities.” By Daniel Greenfield. FrontPageMagazine, February 15, 2013.
JW Releases Confidential USDA Videos Revealing “Cultural Sensitivity Training” Program. Judicial Watch, February 14, 2013.
USDA Staffers Chanting “The Pilgrims Were Illegal Aliens.” Complete Video. Andrew Sheets, February 15, 2013. YouTube.
Megyn Kelly Discusses Government’s Taxpayer-Funded Cultural Sensitivity Training. Video. Fox News Insider, February 15, 2013.
USDA Cultural Sensitivity Training Program Redefines “Minorities” as “Emerging Majorities.” By Daniel Greenfield. FrontPageMagazine, February 15, 2013.
JW Releases Confidential USDA Videos Revealing “Cultural Sensitivity Training” Program. Judicial Watch, February 14, 2013.
USDA Staffers Chanting “The Pilgrims Were Illegal Aliens.” Complete Video. Andrew Sheets, February 15, 2013. YouTube.
Did the Left Create Chris Dorner? By Ben Shapiro.
Did the Left Create Chris Dorner? By Ben Shapiro. Townhall.com, February 15, 2013.
Understanding Christopher Dorner. By Matthew Cunningham-Cook. Salon, February 14, 2013.
Don’t Mythologize Christopher Dorner. By Charles M. Blow. New York Times, February 15, 2013.
The hero cult of Christopher Dorner, the ex-L.A. cop turned cop killer. By Joe O’Connor. National Post, February 14, 2013.
Marc Lamont Hill: Dorner’s “Exciting” Rampage Like “Watching Django Unchained In Real Life.” By Tim Hains. Real Clear Politics, February 13, 2013.
Crazy to Everyone but the New York Times. By Heather MacDonald. City Journal, February 12, 2013.
Heather MacDonald can’t justify Dorner’s rampage. Audio. LauraIngraham.com, February 14, 2013. Also find it here.
Shapiro:
When Adam Lanza murdered 20 children at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Conn., the media jumped to the position that the NRA’s “gun culture” was responsible. They suggested that violent video games and movies had to be curbed.
But when it came to Dorner, the media suggested that his manifesto meant nothing – nothing! Piers Morgan blamed Dorner’s “deranged criminality,” although he said nothing of the sort about Loughner or Lanza.
If the manifesto did mean something, the media said, it was that Dorner was essentially right about the LAPD. CNN reported, “LA cops stalked by suspect – and a brutal past.” The New York Times reported, “The killings and Mr. Dorner’s online manifesto have reopened old wounds for some black residents here, even as they condemned the violence.”
The media never once stopped to consider that it was their coverage of the LAPD that may have created the cultural background noise for Dorner’s belief system. Liberal Hollywood and the media regularly portray law enforcement as a bastion of bigotry and nastiness. Every depiction of LAPD in the last 20 years has focused on their supposed hatred for minorities, their corruption, their violence. If we are going to suppose that culture creates criminals, then leftist culture is responsible for Dorner.
In truth, we are all responsible for our own actions. But the double standard of the media is truly stunning. Next time they try to claim that Constitutional conservatism is responsible for mass shootings, the media ought to be reminded of Christopher Dorner.
Cunningham-Cook:
Dorner’s reaction is partly rooted in a corrosive version of American masculinity — his response to institutional corruption is uniquely Jack Bauer and John Wayne. Gratuitous violence included. Dorner is a wholesale product of a society gone mad on racism and war, of a state that aggressively punishes dissent, of an intellectual milieu where telling the truth has become a dangerous act. There was no internal institutional outlet for him to address injustices against him: the blue line prevented that.
Understanding Christopher Dorner. By Matthew Cunningham-Cook. Salon, February 14, 2013.
Don’t Mythologize Christopher Dorner. By Charles M. Blow. New York Times, February 15, 2013.
The hero cult of Christopher Dorner, the ex-L.A. cop turned cop killer. By Joe O’Connor. National Post, February 14, 2013.
Marc Lamont Hill: Dorner’s “Exciting” Rampage Like “Watching Django Unchained In Real Life.” By Tim Hains. Real Clear Politics, February 13, 2013.
Crazy to Everyone but the New York Times. By Heather MacDonald. City Journal, February 12, 2013.
Heather MacDonald can’t justify Dorner’s rampage. Audio. LauraIngraham.com, February 14, 2013. Also find it here.
Shapiro:
When Adam Lanza murdered 20 children at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Conn., the media jumped to the position that the NRA’s “gun culture” was responsible. They suggested that violent video games and movies had to be curbed.
But when it came to Dorner, the media suggested that his manifesto meant nothing – nothing! Piers Morgan blamed Dorner’s “deranged criminality,” although he said nothing of the sort about Loughner or Lanza.
If the manifesto did mean something, the media said, it was that Dorner was essentially right about the LAPD. CNN reported, “LA cops stalked by suspect – and a brutal past.” The New York Times reported, “The killings and Mr. Dorner’s online manifesto have reopened old wounds for some black residents here, even as they condemned the violence.”
The media never once stopped to consider that it was their coverage of the LAPD that may have created the cultural background noise for Dorner’s belief system. Liberal Hollywood and the media regularly portray law enforcement as a bastion of bigotry and nastiness. Every depiction of LAPD in the last 20 years has focused on their supposed hatred for minorities, their corruption, their violence. If we are going to suppose that culture creates criminals, then leftist culture is responsible for Dorner.
In truth, we are all responsible for our own actions. But the double standard of the media is truly stunning. Next time they try to claim that Constitutional conservatism is responsible for mass shootings, the media ought to be reminded of Christopher Dorner.
Cunningham-Cook:
Dorner’s reaction is partly rooted in a corrosive version of American masculinity — his response to institutional corruption is uniquely Jack Bauer and John Wayne. Gratuitous violence included. Dorner is a wholesale product of a society gone mad on racism and war, of a state that aggressively punishes dissent, of an intellectual milieu where telling the truth has become a dangerous act. There was no internal institutional outlet for him to address injustices against him: the blue line prevented that.
Larry Summers Says We Need to Get Used to the Idea of Bigger Government. By Jordan Weissmann.
Larry Summers Says We Need to Get Used to the Idea of Bigger Government. By Jordan Weissmann. The Atlantic, November 14, 2012.
Larry Summers on Fiscal Cliff, Taxes, Health Care. Video. Washington Ideas Forum. Bloomberg TV, November 14, 2012.
Larry Summers on Fiscal Cliff, Taxes, Health Care. Video. Washington Ideas Forum. Bloomberg TV, November 14, 2012.
Is the U.S. Ready to Fight Syrian Rebels? By Michael Rubin.
Is the U.S. Ready to Fight Syrian Rebels? By Michael Rubin. Commentary, February 14, 2013.
Lincoln Screenwriter Sees Obama as Revolutionary Messiah Reversing Reagan and Bush. By Rush Limbaugh.
Tony Kushner Proves My Point – Lincoln Screenwriter Sees Obama as Revolutionary Messiah Reversing Reagan and Bush. By Rush Limbaugh. RushLimbaugh.com, February 15, 2013. Audio at DailyRushbo.
Tony Kushner discusses writing the Oscar nominated screenplay for Steven Spielberg’s Lincoln. Video. Charlie Rose. PBS, February 14, 2013.
Tony Kushner discusses writing the Oscar nominated screenplay for Steven Spielberg’s Lincoln. Video. Charlie Rose. PBS, February 14, 2013.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)