Egypt in Crisis.

Opponents of Egypt’s Islamist President Mohammed Morsi gather for noon prayers in Tahrir Square, the focal point of Egyptian uprising, in Cairo Sunday, June 30, 2013. Organizers of a mass protest against Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi claimed Saturday that more than 22 million people have signed their petition demanding the Islamist leader step down, asserting that the tally was a reflection of how much the public has turned against his rule. (AP Photo/Amr Nabil).

A Light Fails in Egypt. By Walter Russell Mead. Via Meadia, June 29, 2013.

Mead:

Is Egypt’s revolution falling apart? Clashes between anti-government protestors and Muslim Brotherhood supporters turned deadly yesterday, leaving at least three—including an American college student—dead. These clashes come ahead of massive country-wide demonstrations against President Morsi scheduled for Sunday. The NYT reports that on-the-ground forces are even speaking of a civil war:

The use of firearms is becoming more common on all sides. Secular activists who once chanted, “peaceful, peaceful,” now joke darkly about the inevitability of violence: “Peaceful is dead.”

…Egypt’s most respected Muslim cleric warned in a statement this weekend of potential “civil war.”

It’s hard for the American press to wrap its head around what’s happening in Egypt. The Western media instinctively wants to view the conflict as Islamists vs. secularists or liberals, with the future of democracy at stake. The reality is both darker and more complicated, but at best only a handful journalists have the intellectual chops to make sense of this picture, or the writing ability to help American readers understand a reality so different from our own experience here at home.

 

Leslie Chang gets closer than most in this piece in the New Yorker, but the problems are even deeper than the ones she puts her finger on. Based on interviews with leaders in the anti-Morsi movement, Chang correctly points out that Egypt’s opposition is neither particularly coherent nor interested in governing. The looming protests were organized by a movement known as Tamarod, or “rebellion” in Arabic—a movement founded mostly by young Egyptians whose sole goal is to drive Morsi from power.” I have yet to meet a politician with a substantive plan to overhaul a system of food and fuel subsidies that eats up almost one third of the budget, or to reform the education sector, or to stimulate foreign investment.”

 

She continues:

After two years of watching politicians on both sides of the fence squabble and prevaricate and fail to improve their lives, Egyptians appear to be rejecting representative democracy, without having had much of a chance to participate in it. In a country with an increasingly repressive regime and no democratic culture to draw on, protest has become an end in itself—more satisfying than the hard work of governance, organizing, and negotiation. This is politics as emotional catharsis, a way to register rage and frustration without getting involved in the system.

It would be a mistake to attribute the ineffectiveness of Egypt’s opposition to the purely personal failings and intellectual blind spots of the people currently prominent in its ranks. We are looking at something more deeply rooted and harder to fix. An intense rage and dissatisfaction with the status quo without any idea in the world how to make anything better: this is the typical condition of revolutionary movements in countries without a history of effective governance or successful development. It is also often typical of political movements in countries dominated by a youth bulge. The unhappiest countries are the places where this large youth bulge comes up against failed governance and curdled hope. Think Pakistan, where a comprehensive failure of civil and military leadership is turning one of the world’s most beautiful countries into one of its most miserable ones.

 

Inexperienced 18 years olds who have grown up in corrupt, poorly governed societies, and been educated in trashy schools by incompetent hacks know very well that the status quo is unacceptable. Young people who know they are being ripped off and abused are typically not very patient. Throw in healthy doses of sexual frustration and contempt for an establishment that has lost confidence in its own capacity to lead, and you have a cocktail much more explosive than anything Molotov knew.

 

Egypt’s university system is particularly destructive. Year after year it turns out people with paper credentials, high expectations, and no real skills or understanding of how the world works. Those who manage to acquire real skills often go work in the Gulf, where Egyptian expats are able to have something approaching an effective professional career. But many Egyptian secondary school and university graduates end up in the worst of all possible worlds: too well-educated to accept the grinding poverty, soul-crushing drudgery and lack of status that so many jobs there entail, but not well-educated enough to build a better future for themselves or to organize effectively to remedy the ills of a society that creates such a dismal trap for youth.

 

Countries like Egypt a critical mass of people with a vision of how to build a modern society and an ideology through which they can effectively mobilize the majority to support a project which the masses of the people may not fully understand. In much of the developing world in the twentieth century, the critical mass was made up of a small number of people with advanced western education and the ideology was one or another of the varieties of social nationalism that dominated that century in much of the world. Whether communist and totalitarian as in Russia, China or Vietnam, democratic socialist as in India, nationalist and quasi-capitalist as in Ataturk’s Turkish Republic and Peron’s Argentina, or any of the other varieties of twentieth century developmentalist ideology, these big ideas and grand visions mobilized populations for the difficult work of transformation and uplift.

 

A significant source of Egypt’s trouble today is that it has already had one ideological transformation and convulsive moderation under the charismatic leadership of President Nasser. Nasser captured the hearts and minds of the Egyptians as no one else has done, mobilized the entire energy and enthusiasm of the nation for a great project of renewal and development, and failed horribly, utterly and humiliatingly. The shocking 1967 defeat by Israel was the most dramatic sign of the failure to make Egypt a modern and effective country, but signs of Nasserite economic, social and technological failure litter Egypt even today. Egyptians grow up in the rubble of shattered dreams, in a society corrupted and degraded by the long aftermath of disillusion and despair.

Islamism in its various forms is the sole candidate in Egypt for an ideological alternative to the corpse of Nasserist nationalism; it has sold itself to the masses as the once-rejected rival to nationalism whose time has finally come. For decades, often under conditions of persecution and repression, the Muslim Brotherhood and similar movements demonstrated an idealism and a public spirit that the corrupt heirs of Nasser could not match. They operated soup kitchens for the poor; they offered young people patronage and improved educational access. Building on centuries of national tradition and religious aspiration, they developed a comprehensive, all-embracing world view that offered, or appeared to offer, answers to the three great problems of Egypt’s youthful population.

 

First, Islamist economic policy administered by an honest and competent government would address the poverty and lack of opportunity afflicting so many Egyptians. Second, Islamist ideas would help the youth make sense of a chaotic and confusing world filled with disturbing ideas and values. And last but not least, Islamist success would restore dignity to Egyptians as human beings, as Egyptian citizens, as Arabs and as Muslims by overcoming backwardness and making Egypt self-sufficient and free-standing, respected in the world.

 

That was the dream. Morsi’s biggest problem never was, and still is not today, the twittering liberals of early Tahrir; western oriented secular liberalism has a long way to go before it can become a significant ideological force among the masses in Egypt. His greatest ideological opponents are cynicism and despair and he is in such deep trouble today because the collapsing economy and the general paralysis make him look like another snake oil salesmen selling a fake route to progress. What if Islamism like Nasser’s nationalism is a failure in Egypt? What then? What next?

 

Salafis, the ultra-Islamists who think Morsi’s problems stem from his failure to roll out the full glory of Islamist governance, hope that as the Muslim Brotherhood loses its appeal, their harder and purer faith will carry the day. It’s not impossible; the situation in Egypt is fluid and Islam is a powerful force in what remains a pious and serious society. But sooner or later the Salafis will come to the place in the road where Morsi stands; there is little reason to believe that more radical Islamist ideas and practices can heal what’s wrong with Egypt’s economy.

 

So though the Morsi government is losing its ability to govern by hope and by faith, that doesn’t mean it will fall; from an ideological and political standpoint, it has no serious opposition. A lot of people hate the government and blame it for making everything worse, but they cannot agree among themselves on an alternative course.

 

Whatever happens in the demonstrations scheduled for an increasingly tense country, it seems that as ideology and hope weaken, the role of force in Egypt’s government must rise. That means first and foremost the Army; flawed as this institution is, it has no rivals in Egypt. If (when) Islamism fades, force remains.

 

The Army, which loyally served Mubarak until, under the influence of his wife and son, the aging president sought to turn the Egyptian state into the private property of his family, knows that Egypt must have order even if it doesn’t have hope. At the height of his popularity, Morsi hoped to subordinate the Army to the Islamists; it seems clear now that the Army holds the higher cards. The Army is not necessarily opposed to having an Islamist president. It gives people something to talk about, and someone to blame other than the military.  A weak elected president with a dented mandate suits the military pretty well— and in any case many Egyptian officers are quite pious and don’t mind having a civilian government that imposes religious norms.

 

The really scary question in Egypt is whether things have decayed so far that the Army, either directly or indirectly, can no longer maintain order. Are so many Egyptians so angry, so disillusioned and so desperate that they will simply refuse to accept another stitched-up military backed state? If so, Egypt is less likely to explode than to implode: the economy would collapse further, food riots and other forms of violence would break out, minorities would face persecution and pogroms, criminal gangs would emerge. There could well be mass killings and civil chaos— though, despite the cleric’s words, we don’t see Egypt descending into a Syrian style civil war. Egypt lacks Syria’s ethnic and religious diversity; the largest minority group, the Copts, are too interspersed with the rest of the population to fight a civil war and are neither well-armed nor well-organized.

 

This would likely end in the emergence of a strong man who crushed dissent and imposed a new government, however harsh. Egypt has more than 5,000 years of continuous civilization and governance, and as a people, Egyptians have repeatedly chosen the dangers of strong government over the dangers of weakness and division. Tyranny relies on despair; combine fear of anarchy with a lack of faith in a truly bright future, and dictatorship is on its way.

 

Most revolutions fail and leave people worse off than before. The true believers of the Muslim Brotherhood want to keep their dream alive, and we can expect them to fight hard for that. Many ordinary Egyptians may have decided that Islamism is a flop, but the hard core true believers will argue that they haven’t had a chance to put in into practice yet. They will want to crush their opponents, tighten their grip on the state, and follow the Islamist path for many more miles before the true believers are ready to give up. They may well prevail in this next round of demonstrations and confrontations, but time is not on the Islamists’ side. Yet again, cynicism is winning its war against hope in Egypt, and yet again the Army is standing in the wings.

 

Nobody knows what will happen in Egypt this week, and the Muslim Brotherhood could lose the battle for public opinion but gain the power for control of the state. Sometimes revolutionary movements prevail even though they fail to satisfy the hopes that brought them to power. Revolutionaries often turn out to be failures at utopia-building, but very good at building police states.

 

That could be happening in Egypt this summer; we shall see. But the hopeful phase of the Egyptian Revolution has come to a close. It looks more and more as if the Muslim Brotherhood must either become a much harsher movement in a much bleaker world, or it must learn to watch power slip from its hands.


Egypt’s Petition Rebellion. By Leslie T. Chang. The New Yorker, June 28, 2013.

Egypt: Protesters Gather Nationwide To Demand Morsi’s Ouster. By Hamza Hendawi. AP. The Huffington Post, June 30, 2013.

Andrew Pochter, RIP. By Walter Russell Mead, Bryn Stole, and Jeremy Stern. Via Meadia, June 30, 2013.

American killed in Egypt, US warns against travel there. FoxNews.com, June 29, 2013.

U.S. Student Killed in Egypt Protest Was Drawn to a Region in Upheaval. By Ravi Somaiya and Erin Banco. New York Times, June 29, 2013.

For Egypt’s Liberals, Noise Doesn’t Equal Power. By Fouad Ajami. Real Clear Politics, June 28, 2013.

Ajami:

The Brotherhood’s stock in trade was conspiracy and a willingness to dodge mighty storms. It had waited out the protests of Tahrir Square. Those 18 magical days in 2011 that captivated outsiders and gave back Egyptians a measure of political efficacy and dignity were the work of secular liberals, Christian Copts, young men and those daring women who defied custom and tradition to come out in the public square.

 

Yet the Brotherhood had more than eight decades of political experience behind it. The military dictatorship had atomized the feeble liberals, leaving them unprepared for the contest over the new order. Like liberals elsewhere in hard, illiberal places, they were sure they embodied their country’s spirit.

 

They were trounced by the Brotherhood and the hardline Salafis in the first parliamentary elections; the judiciary, a bastion of the old order, stepped in and dissolved the parliament. The democrats didn’t own up to the truth: While Egypt has a sophisticated intellectual elite, a modernist camp, and Europe isn’t too far away, it is a poor country with a high illiteracy rate and a population that the Mubarak dictatorship had been content to leave to darkness and the rule of superstition.

 

In the best of worlds, the Brotherhood would have been willing to tread carefully and to acknowledge the narrow mandate it had secured with Mursi’s election. But a paranoid movement that ached for power wouldn’t show restraint. The Brotherhood lived by a majoritarian logic. Mursi was its frontman. It had a political bureau and a supreme guide.


Egypt Braces For a Fight. By Mike Giglio. The Daily Beast, June 28, 2013.

Be inclusive, Morsi, or you may face a second Egyptian revolution. By David A. Super. The Christian Science Monitor, June 28, 2013.

Will it take a second revolution to complete Egypt’s democratic transition? Anti-government protesters plan to turn out in massive numbers Sunday. President Mohamed Morsi should heed cries for more inclusiveness. Otherwise, he may find himself toppled like Mubarak.

The Egyptian State Unravels. By Mara Revkin. Foreign Affairs, June 27, 2013.

Gangs and vigilantes thrive under Morsi.

Mohamed Morsi has turned his back on Egypt’s revolution. By Sara Khorshid. The Guardian, June 27, 2013.

The president is failing to deliver on his promises, and Egyptians are growing angry with the Muslim Brotherhood.

Is a Second Revolution Really What Egypt Needs? By Shadi Hamid. The Atlantic, June 27, 2013.

President Morsi suffers from a “legitimacy deficit,” but will opposition groups gain anything from trying to oust him on Sunday?

In Egypt, Skepticism Over Religion in Politics. By Maggie Michael. Associated Press, June 27, 2013.

Egyptian Politics: Beyond the Brotherhood. By Walter Russell Mead. Via Meadia, June 26, 2013.

“You Can’t Eat Sharia.” By Mohammed ElBaradei. Foreign Policy, July/August 2013.

Egypt is on the brink – not of something better than the old Mubarak dictatorship, but of something even worse.

Egyptians must not let their country descend into chaos. By Wadah Khanfar. The Guardian, June 25, 2013.

President Morsi has made mistakes – but Egypt’s opposition, by aligning with former regime members, is sidelining democracy.

Egypt Will Erupt Again on June 30. By Eric Trager. The New Republic, June 24, 2013.

Egypt’s youth are still clinging to the 2011 revolution. By Andrew Doran. Jerusalem Post, June 22, 2013.

Palestinians: “No Jews Allowed!” By Khaled Abu Toameh.

Palestinians: “No Jews Allowed!” By Khaled Abu Toameh. Gatestone Institute, June 25, 2013.

Why She Drinks: Women and Alcohol Abuse. By Gabrielle Glaser.

Why She Drinks: Women and Alcohol Abuse. By Gabrielle Glaser. Wall Street Journal, June 21, 2013.

Motherhood Drives Well-Educated White Women to Drink White Wine. By Rush Limbaugh. RushLimbaugh.com, June 28, 2013.

Why Are So Many College Graduates Driving Taxis? By Peter Orszag,

Why Are So Many College Graduates Driving Taxis? By Peter Orszag. Bloomberg, June 25, 2013.

Winds of Economic Change Blow Away College Degree. By Peter Orszag. Bloomberg, November 8, 2011.

Is the labor market return to higher education finally falling? By Tyler Cowan. Marginal Revolution, June 27, 2013.

Will All Taxi Drivers Soon Have College Degrees? By Walter Russell Mead. Via Meadia, June 28, 2013.

Fixing the Dropout Problem. By Walter Russell Mead. Via Meadia, June 28, 2013.

Dropping Out of College, and Paying the Price. By Eduardo Porter. New York Times, June 25, 2013.

Thirteen Facts About Social Mobility and the Role of Education. By Michael Greenstone, Adam Looney, Jeremy Patashnik, and Muxin Yu. The Hamilton Project, June 2013.

The Great Reversal in the Demand for Skill and Cognitive Tasks. By Paul Beaudry, David A. Green, and Ben Sand. NBER, March 2013.

The Frontier in Israeli History. By Moshe Dann.

The frontier in Israeli history. By Moshe Dann. Canada Free Press, June 14, 2013.

Isaiah Nation. By Moshe Dann. Jerusalem Post, June 25, 2013.

Frontier Myths and Their Applications in Israel and America: A Transnational Perspective. By S. Ilan Troen. Israel Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 2000).

De-Judaizing the Homeland: Academic Politics in Rewriting the History of Palestine. S. Ilan Troen. Israel Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 4 (October 2007).

Israeli Views of the Land of Israel/Palestine. By S. Ilan Troen. Israel Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Summer 2013).

Jewish Settlement in the Land of Israel/Palestine. By. Ilan Troen. Jewish Virtual Library, July 2011.

Palestine, Peoples and Borders in the New Middle East. By Ahmad Samih Khalidi. NJBR, June 3, 2013.

Israel Lives the Joseph Story. By Thomas L. Friedman. NJBR, June 6, 2013.

Israel May Always Be in Conflict. By Shaul Rosenfeld. NJBR, June 28, 2013.


Dann (frontier):

In 1862, at the beginning of the Civil War, Congress passed and president Abraham Lincoln signed the Homestead Act, which granted unclaimed and uninhabited state land to American “settlers.”

 

This act was meant to encourage pioneer farmers, some of whom referred to their new territory with biblical names, like “Zion.”

 

To a large extent, these pioneers defined America’s national character – “rugged individualism,” boldness and courage and a deep belief in American destiny. The frontier became a symbol of American freedom, independence and ingenuity.

 

Nearly 75 years ago, an American historian, Frederick Jackson Turner, asked a fascinating question that has been the subject of professional debate ever since and that might be relevant for Israel: What was the impact of the frontier on American history? He proposed that the frontier functioned as a sort of socioeconomic safety valve and was a perennial democratizing force in American society. The loss of the frontier (around the turn of the century), he concluded, meant not only the loss of land, but the loss of an ideal – “liberty” and “freedom of opportunity” and a “creative vision of a new order of society.” Settlement of the West was, Turner believed, the essence of the American experience.

The current dilemma over Israel’s borders offers an application of Turner’s thesis. If Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) can be considered Israel’s frontier, what does it represent in terms of a national psyche and what might be the psychosocial effect of its loss? Is Jewish settlement in this territory central to the future of Israel? And are Israeli settlers today doing what their predecessors, the pioneers, did generations ago? Opponents of settlements argue that Israel’s “occupation” of territory which it conquered as a result of the Six Day War in 1967 undermines democratic values, encourages oppression and exploitation and fractures Israeli society.

For Palestinians the expansion of Israel’s frontiers (indeed Israel’s very existence) and the “occupation” are a disaster. The nakba (disaster) which is observed by Arabs inside and outside of Israel refers to the establishment of Israel in 1948; the loss of more territory in 1967 made things worse, they claim.

 

Those who support Jewish settlement present its advantages: a profound historical homecoming, cheap land, abundant resources and critical security issues. The right of Jews to live anywhere in Eretz Yisrael is the essence of the re-establishment of the state; most believe it is embedded in the meaning and purpose of the Jewish people as well. But the issues of settlements and borders did not begin in 1967. Where, then, do Israel’s frontiers lie? And to whom does Judea and Samaria belong?

BEFORE BECOMING a state, Israel’s frontier was marked by purchasing vacant land and swamps for reclamation projects. Palestine was known by Jews as The Yishuv, the settlement, because all of it was just that. Nationbuilding made everyone a pioneer. Settling the land was the essence of Zionism; the frontier was everywhere.

 

Despite Arab gangs attacking whenever and wherever they could, Jews bought land and built settlements.

 

In 1948, the newly established State of Israel was attacked by five Arab countries, led, supported and supplied by England and France. Armistice lines of 1949 never became borders; Egypt occupied the Gaza Strip and Jordan occupied Judea and Samaria – both supported terrorist raids against Israel.

 

Following Israel’s War of Independence the Negev desert became a frontier.

 

David Ben-Gurion envisioned its settlement as critical to the future of the state and to set an example retired to an isolated desert kibbutz, Sde Boker. The harsh conditions of the Negev, however, did not attract the masses, even with the establishment of Ben-Gurion University in Beersheba in 1969. The desert towns around it held on; some even expanded.

 

Beduin villages and towns, on the other hand, flourished.

 

The Galilee also offered many opportunities for settlement, but even today, Jews are barely a majority there. Jews needed cities, hi-tech and industrial parks; Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa were more attractive than the countryside, the desert and farms.

 

The Six Day War in 1967 was a watershed.

 

It opened many possibilities as well as problems, all rooted in the controversy of Israel’s birth. While the War of Independence solidified Israelis around armistice lines, this demarcation was never accepted by any Arab country; the 1967 war created a geographic separation between new settlers and older ones. A connection was always there, the difference was in location.

 

Except for the Sinai and Golan, these areas were accessible to major cities and industries. Rich in natural resources and agricultural potential, they were (except for the Sinai) historically more relevant than most of what had comprised Israel previously.

 

Settlement in the areas acquired after 1967 began largely for ideological reasons, inspired by a renewed vision of Zionism – reclaiming much of what was, throughout history, Eretz Yisrael, the biblical Land of Israel. There were also important economic reasons: cheaper land and housing, farming opportunities and ample water resources.

 

In addition there were critical security considerations – control of the mountain ranges which overlook major Israeli population centers. This new settlement movement had deep spiritual implications for religious as well as secular Jews and had direct economic and strategic advantages.

 

Returning to ancient Jewish sites and rebuilding Jewish towns near archeological ruins named for Shiloh, Beit El, Kiryat Arba/Mamre, Hebron, Sussiya, Gamla and Katzrin and many others, inspired an entire generation. Moving back into Jerusalem’s Old City and building new neighborhoods in the surrounding hills was the realization of a dream for Jews everywhere. It was, in a sense, fulfilling Jewish history.

 

Jews were able to pray freely at the Western Wall for the first time in 2,000 years. Archeological excavations brought thrilling dimensions to Jewish history. The problem was that Israel’s new frontier was not empty. Nearly a million Arabs lived there, mostly in towns, villages and UNRWA-sponsored refugee camps.

 

Israel’s expansion relieved a security problem and created another. Prior to the war in 1967, Israel was vulnerable along its 15-kilometer-wide border between Tel Aviv and Haifa, its northern border with Syria and Lebanon, and the Gaza strip, from which terrorists launched raids. The new borders that followed Israel’s victory in 1967 and the sense of overwhelming military superiority gave Israelis a new level of comfort and expectations. This did not last long.

 

The Yom Kippur War of 1973 shattered Israeli illusions of invincibility.

 

Infused by renewed idealism, practical realities, and a more receptive government, settlement activity increased.

 

But the disappointing outcome of the First Lebanon War (1982) and rampant inflation sparked new fires whipped by winds of internal strife.

 

Expansion also created a security problem. In the late 1980s, violent Arab riots – the intifada – erupted throughout the West Bank, spoiling what most people hoped might become a “new Israel,” and destroying domestic complacency and a spirit of cooperation. The Oslo Agreements in the early 1990s enabled the establishment of a Palestinian Authority (which governed 95 percent of Arabs living in the West Bank) and brought economic prosperity and renewed hopes for peace. But these were dashed as Yasser Arafat and Hamas opened a terrorist war against Israel in 2000.

 

Attacks on Jews traveling to and from their homes in the West Bank became an almost daily occurrence.

 

Israeli shops, hotels, buses and cafes were targeted. Mobile killing squads of Arab terrorists traveled the roads, attacking Jews. The intensity of these attacks increased after the Oslo Agreements, encouraged by what the Arabs perceived as willingness by Israel to abandon the West Bank and halt settlement activity. Terrorist bombings became a regular occurrence, encouraged as part of a holy war (jihad). The idea of a pioneer frontier also deteriorated from within.

 

Israeli society became consumer hungry, a barbecue of Western commercialism wrapped in a pita. Seduced by movies, malls and mass culture Israelis gave in. Becoming part of the modern technological world, a spinoff of American culture, meant there was a price to pay: loss of Jewish and Zionist identity and values.

 

The split in Israeli society between religious and secular communities and those who supported settlements or opposed them deepened. The issue of settlements was an indication of what had been achieved and, as well, where one stood on the political, religious and even the social spectrum.

 

The ideology of Religious Zionism was a threat to the secular elites who controlled the media, and the political/ economic life of the country. Settlers were portrayed negatively and became anathema, the “West Bank,” a burden to left-wing governments. Not only was a PLO state agreed to officially, but those Jews who lived in the territories that would be surrendered would pay the price. Moreover, the issue of Jerusalem, considered by nearly all Jews as a symbol of national unity and purpose, became negotiable.

 

UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL from the Gaza Strip and the destruction of 21 Jewish communities there (as well as four in Northern Samaria) in the summer of 2005 not only set a precedent – it emboldened Hamas, a terrorist organization, and led to its takeover of the area. For the first time in history, a country controlling an area over which it claimed historic rights was prepared to relinquish it without any rewards or security benefits. Israel’s frontier was suddenly abandoned.

 

“Why then,” some ask, “could not the idea of the frontier in Israel be within its pre-1967 borders? Isn’t there enough land in the Negev and the Galilee? Would it not be better to be satisfied with less if that is the price for peace? Is the fabric of Israeli society being destroyed by suppressing Arab/Palestinian nationalism? Why not agree to a PLO state with Jerusalem as its capital, a complete withdrawal from the Golan Heights and be done with it?” But if settlement was wrong after 1967, what made it right before? What makes a frontier? Frontiers are more than measures of land, or a struggle for space; they are expressions of national identity. As physical boundaries, Turner suggests, frontiers can be translated into selfperceptions and behavior – a state of mind. The erosion of an external frontier erodes the psychological borders of emotional security and well-being.

 

Withdrawal from Judea, Samaria and Gaza threatens the legitimacy of all Jewish settlement and sovereignty and – with a terror-based state as a neighbor – leaves Israel even more vulnerable than it was before.

 

Israeli facts of life – the constant, daily struggle against terrorism and threats of annihilation – destroy any sense of security and increase general anxiety. The more vulnerable and unprotected one feels, the less flexible, more irrational and defensive they become. This condition contributes to an Israeli personality that is arrogant, brash, rude and confrontational.

 

Survival of the fittest, in Israel is not simply a way of life, it is a raison d’etre.

 

The threatened loss of more than 150 Jewish communities and relocation of hundreds of thousands of people has exacerbated deep schisms in Israeli society – a kulturkampf. Characterized as “obstacles to peace” by opponents of Jews who live in the “occupied territories,” settlers and their supporters are vilified by the Left and a hostile media. The late prime minister Yitzhak Rabin even went so far as to exclude them from the body politic of Israeli society, although most of the settlers are religious Zionists, the backbone of Israel.

 

If settlement is inherent to Zionism, the notion of a frontier lies at its roots.

 

Abandoning the frontier in Judea and Samaria would certainly diminish the notion of Zionism and would create a chasm, a deep sense of loss and alienation within the Jewish people. It is not coincidental that today Zionism itself is under attack. “Post-Zionists” argue that separating from Israel’s founding ideology might be healthy.

 

Zionism, especially religious Zionism, runs directly counter to supranational (and, of course, Arab) interests because it is, by its very nature (the prophetic Ingathering of Exiles) irrational and subjective – even romantic.

 

That may explain why Jewish settlers are castigated as messianic. Appeals to biblical and prophetic sources are considered irrelevant, at best; at worst, they are a threat to the idea of a multinational, secular, democratic state.

 

The loss of Israel’s frontier and the vilification of Jewish “settlers” bring into question the fundamental premises of Zionism, and in the wake of Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Northern Samaria, a self-induced tragedy. And it’s not over.

 

Although temporarily postponed, the threat to remove hundreds of thousands of Israelis from their homes is constant – insisted upon by most of the international community.

 

The result seems to be a psychic loss of identity (what does it mean to be a Zionist, an Israeli, a Jew?), a sense of national betrayal (reflected in widespread government corruption), hopelessness and despair (a political system without accountability). Withdrawal may result in massive economic disruptions as well as physical and psychological dislocation. On a practical level, withdrawal would mean the loss of critical water sources and strategic position, threatening Israel’s existence.

 

Turner’s insight was not his description of what the frontier actually was, or how it functioned, but the image that it served in nation-building. The loss of a major part of what now constitutes Israel, and the creation of a hostile state in that area, as well as the Second Lebanon War, drive the debate over Israel’s frontiers into a head-on collision with the threat of extinction.

 

Jews who have settled in Judea and Samaria and their supporters argue that the essence of Israel is the right of Jews to live anywhere in Eretz Yisrael.

 

Their opponents assert that this policy will undermine the state and lead to its demise. The crucial debate is not over territory, but about nationality, the nature of Israeli society itself.

 

WHAT MUST emerge from this struggle is not simply a new set of borders, no matter what they are, but a new concept of Zionism and of the State of Israel. Ultimately, the question is not whether Israelis can face the Arabs, but whether they can face themselves.

 

Frontiers, by nature, offer challenges and demand conquest. They are, by definition, to be discovered, explored, and tamed. But as we learn from the story in the Book of Numbers, when scouts came back from searching the Land of Israel, they reported that conquering was impossible for it was a land that appeared to be full of giants.

 

“Moreover the land eats up its inhabitants . . .

 

We were in our own eyes as grasshoppers, and so we were in theirs.” In despair, they lost their perspective and vision.

 

The internal debate over Israeli borders reflects a self-perception: are Jews the legitimate inhabitants of the Land of Israel, responsible for its use and maintenance, or illegitimate occupiers? The return of the Jewish people to Eretz Yisrael after 2,000 years of exile and in the shadow of the Holocaust is not about land, but meaning and purpose; it offers the opportunity to fulfill a Divine mission.

 

The concept of the frontier, in Jewish terms, is not merely economic, political or geographical. It is essentially a vision that has been at the core of Jewish existence since the time of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob 4,000 years ago. Conquering Eretz Yisrael was a historic and theological definition of the Jewish People’s mission – building a Torah-based society. Creating a political, economic and social structure in which the ideals and values of Judaism are realized, is what real Zionism is all about.

Why Black People Understand Rachel Jeantel. By Christina Coleman.

Rachel Jeantel, the witness that was on the phone with Trayvon Martin just before he died, gives her testimony to the prosecution during George Zimmerman’s trial in Seminole circuit court in Sanford, Fla. Wednesday, June 26, 2013. Zimmerman has been charged with second-degree murder for the 2012 shooting death of Trayvon Martin.(AP Photo/Orlando Sentinel, Jacob Langston, Pool) (Credit: AP).

Why Black People Understand Rachel Jeantel. By Christina Coleman. Global Grind, June 27, 2013.

What White People Don’t Understand About Rachel Jeantel. By Rachel Samara. Global Grind, June 26, 2013.

Why Crackers don’t understand Rachel Jeantel. By Albert N. Milliron. Politisite, June 28, 2013.

Defenders of Rachel Jeantel Channel John C. Calhoun. By J. Christian Adams. PJ Media, June 28, 2013.

Rachel Jeantel Portrayed as Victim of Bullying by Zimmerman’s Defense. By Rush Limbaugh. RushLimbaugh.com, June 28, 2013.

Institutional racism against Rachel Jeantel. C.R. Gucci Little Piggy, June 27, 2013.

Rachel Jeantel Explained, Linguistically. By John McWhorter. Time, June 28, 2013.

Dark-skinned and plus-sized: The real Rachel Jeantel story. By Brittney Cooper. Salon, June 28, 2013.

The smearing of Rachel Jeantel. By Mary Elizabeth Williams. Salon, June 27, 2013.

Racial tension and the Trayvon Martin trial. By Laura Ingraham. Video. The O’Reilly Factor. Fox News, June 28, 2013.

Cracker (pejorative). Wikipedia.

Florida Crackers. Cracker Country.

The Crackers of Georgia. By Delma E. Presley. The Georgia Historical Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Summer 1976).

The Florida Cracker Before the Civil War as Seen Through Travelers’ Accounts. By James M. Denham. The Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 72, No. 4 (April 1994).

Israel May Always Be in Conflict. By Shaul Rosenfeld.

Time to Face Reality. By Shaul Rosenfeld. Ynet News, June 26, 2013.

Rosenfeld:

State of Israel must come to terms with the fact that conflict with Arabs may be irresolvable.

 

Even if [Naftali] Bennett’s “shrapnel in the rear end” analogy was a bit below the belt, the spirit of his words was right, and it’s a shame that the option of a non-solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has never really been placed on the table of public discussion.

 

When the risk involved in the establishment of a Palestinian state is significantly greater than the chance for true peace, and when the price Israel would have to pay is unbearable – particularly when the Palestinian partner has never proven it is really willing to accept a Jewish state even within the 1967 borders – it is safe to say that what Bennett meant was that the conflict, in its current state, is irresolvable.

 

At the heart of the majority of the public’s political viewpoint lies the belief that the Israeli-Arab conflict can be resolved, and even if untying this Gordian knot is difficult and complex, it is not impossible. Bennett is the only key political figure – from the Left or Right – to ever raise the possibility of not resolving the conflict as a viable option.

 

There is nothing wrong with wishing for something, so long as these hopes do not become an alternative for understanding the reality. Those who say “there is a solution to every problem, you just have to really want to find it” and “we cannot live by the sword forever” are putting their wishes ahead of a proper examination of the reality and all the options it offers.

 

The world has given us many problems – in physics, math, philosophy and biology – which cannot be solved. And what is true for science is just as true for political conflicts. Some conflicts lasted hundreds of years, others ended when one or both of the sides disappeared; there were empires which collapsed, just as there were countries and nations that are mere footnotes in the pages of history. It is safe to assume that most of those who were involved in these conflicts believed wholeheartedly that there was a solution to their problems and suffering.

 

As far as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is concerned, most of the concessions we are willing to make are far less than the minimum the other side would be willing to accept, even as part of an interim agreement (as is stated in the “doctrine of phases” from 1974). The Arab world still views Israel as a foreign element, a thorn (or piece of shrapnel) in the rear end of the region, which they consider to be Arab-Islamic or Palestinian in essence (“All of Palestine, from the river to the sea, is occupied” – Jibril Rajoub).

 

The Arab world’s relative and temporary acceptance of Israel stems from its doubts regarding the possibility of getting rid of Israel, as well as from the Jewish state’s close relations with Washington and the monetary benefits some Arab countries receive from the US. But most of the historic, cultural, religious and ethnic material that feeds the Arab ethos with regards to Israel does not indicate a true acceptance of the Jewish in state in the region. The opposite is true.

 

All we can do is manage the conflict rationally and refrain from falling into traps such as the Oslo Accords and the Arab peace initiative. We must carefully try to solve that which is solvable and accept that which is unsolvable while seeking creative interim solutions. Just as people live with chronic diseases for their entire lives, there is no reason we should not be able to exist for many years with the chronic Mideast conflict, although statements such as those made by Olmert (“If the day comes when the two-state solution collapses, the State of Israel is finished”) and Lapid (“The Palestinians must have their own country”) do not help the cause.

Why American Jews Matter. By Roger Cohen.

Why American Jews Matter. By Roger Cohen. New York Times, June 20, 2013.

What’s Really Wrong with the Middle East?

What’s Really Wrong with the Middle East? By Aaron David Miller. Foreign Policy, June 25, 2013.

Miller:

The Middle East really doesn’t need any more bad news.

 

Still, it’s official. The region now has its own disease: a dangerous virus called MERS, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome – perhaps related to the SARS virus, but apparently deadlier.

 

This sad news started me thinking (again) about the sad state of the region. There are some bright spots – or at least some spots that are not as dark. Tunisia seems to be making a relatively stable transition without paralytic violence and incompetent governance. And there’s a younger generation of Arabs and Muslims who seem bent on freeing themselves from the old ways, demanding not only personal freedom but dignity, too. I’m reminded of Howard Beale’s famous rant in Network: They’re mad as hell, and they’re not going to take it anymore.

 

Nevertheless, much of the region looks bad: violence in Iraq; civil war in Syria and violent spillover into Lebanon; growing popular despair in Egypt; repression in Bahrain; lack of central authority in Libya; and an impasse in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Even in Turkey, the wonder state, things have become unhinged.

 

What’s going on here? Why, when much of the world seems to be moving forward, is the Middle East being left behind? And why has its big transformative moment – the Arab Awakening – seemingly been lost amid a jumble of violence, sectarianism, and incompetence? There may be many reasons for this sorry state of affairs. But here are my top five.

 

Mistreating Women

 

The status of women – what they can and cannot do – in theory and in practice varies widely in the region. But there’s far too much inequality and discrimination. Countries that systematically discriminate against half their population, intentionally or otherwise and for whatever reason (culture, religion, tradition, inertia) try to hold women back, keep them down, or just plain ignore them aren't going to be as moral, productive, creative, or competitive as those that empower women – whether in the Middle East or anywhere else. And their futures won't be nearly as bright. Period.

 

No Separation of Religion and State

 

I know it’s politically incorrect to point out, but show me one truly healthy and successful society run according to divinely mandated religious rules based on the idea that its god is better than any other – or where extremist religious groups intimidate and wage war against fellow citizens, sometimes using terror and violence. I thought Turkey might be an exception. But Prime Minister Erdogan’s recent my-way-or-the-highway behavior makes me wonder.

 

The societies that have proven the most durable and successful over time (all of which are outside the Arab world) are those where the realms of god and man/woman remain separate, where institutions are inclusive, and where freedom of religion, but perhaps even more important freedom of conscience, prevails. Indeed, freedom of expression is a critically important element in realizing human potential, inventiveness, and creativity. And it must be respected and safeguarded by the state, not restricted by it. Go into Times Square and, unless you’re threatening public order, you can say just about anything you’d like about Judaism, Christianity, or Islam without fear of arrest or worse. Don’t try that in Tahrir Square.

 

Too Much Conspiracy

 

Too many people in the Middle East refuse to look in the mirror. They’d rather come up with excuses and justifications as to why others, particularly forces outside their neighborhood, are responsible for their misfortunes. I know all about colonialism, Zionism, imperialism, communism, secularism, Islamism, and every other -ism that’s been marshaled to show why outsiders and not locals deserve the blame for what goes on in the Arab world.

 

But let’s get real. At some point, as every person knows, there’s an expiration date for blaming your parents for the way you turned out. And in the case of the Arab world, the warranty on coverage for blaming the Mossad, the CIA, America, the Jews, or Bozo the Clown for the absence of democracy, the lack of respect for human rights, and gender inequality has long expired.

 

To be sure, outsiders still influence the Middle East in very negative ways. But that’s no excuse for believing its people can’t shape their own destiny. After all, that is what the Arab Awakening was supposed to be about. And wouldn’t you know it: the Arab Awakening got hijacked not by Western bogeymen, but by forces within Arab society itself, including Muslim fundamentalists, secular and liberal elements that couldn’t organize effectively, and remnants of the old regimes who hung on to power after the dictators were gone.

 

Narcissism

 

I know it comes as a shocker, but the Middle East really isn’t the center of the world any more. Today, Asia, Europe, America, and even Africa are where free market economies, pluralism, and human enterprise are innovating, inventing, producing, and creating stuff – leaving the Middle East in the rear-view mirror. Read any of the U.N. Human Development Reports, which chronicle the sad tale. But too many Middle Easterners still think they're at the epicenter of it all – or somehow deserve to be.

 

Many Arabs and too many Israelis still believe that the world sits on the edge of its collective seat 24/7 wondering what's going to happen next in their region and devising new ways to rescue them. I’m really tired of Israeli peaceniks hammering the United States for not rescuing the peace process and of Arabs waiting for us to punish Israel, which too many ridiculously dismiss as either America’s master or its unruly child. Meanwhile, talk to any Lebanese and you’d think what happens in Beirut is on the minds of U.S. policymakers from morning till night. And, despite America’s loss and lack of credibility, there’s still this misplaced hope that the United States will save Syria.

 

Here’s a news flash: the cavalry isn’t coming. Maybe if this sinks in, the locals will do more for themselves. But I doubt it.

 

Leadership

 

There really isn’t any. It’s ironic – particularly against the backdrop of the Arab Awakening’s democratic impulses – that the most durable leaders have turned out to be the authoritarian monarchs. The King Abdullahs (Jordan and Saudi Arabia) look like statesmen compared to Egypt’s Mohamed Morsy or Iraq’s Nouri al-Maliki.

 

But even here there’s a problem. Middle Eastern leaders have become masters at acquiring power, but they're not all that interested in sharing it. Marry that to the absence of legitimate and inclusive institutions – and to politicians more interested in furthering the interests of their tribe, family, or religious sect than the nation as a whole – and the future of good, accountable governance in the Arab world doesn’t look all that bright.

 

MERS is still a mystery. But I'm pretty confident the epidemiologists will eventually figure it out. And I know we must give this region a couple more generations to sort things out. Still, I'm not nearly as confident they will, even though what ails this region is an open, if inconvenient, truth.

Hate, Not Time, Is the Enemy of Peace. By Jonathan S. Tobin.

Hate, Not Time, Is the Enemy of Peace. By Jonathan S. Tobin. Commentary, June 26, 2013.

Why Won’t the Palestinians Accept a State? By Jonathan S. Tobin. Commentary, June 27, 2013.

Time Is Enemy in Mideast Peace Push, Kerry Says. By Michael R. Gordon and Jodi Rudoren. New York Times, June 26, 2013.

Abbas libels Israel: “[Israel’s] evil and dangerous plot to destroy Al-Aqsa [Mosque] and build the alleged Temple.” By Itamar Marcus and Nan Jacques Zilberdik. Palestine Media Watch, June 26, 2013.

Israel Faces a Culture of Hatred and Violence. By Mortimer B. Zuckerman. U.S. News and World Report, March 21, 2011.


Tobin (Hate, Not Time):

Secretary of State John Kerry is playing with fire. Having embarked on a high-profile effort to revive the moribund Middle East peace process, Kerry has acted as if there is no downside to ratcheting up pressure on the parties with little apparent chance of actually achieving progress. Palestinian Authority head Mahmoud Abbas is eager to avoid blame for Kerry’s inevitable failure but rather than picking up on the mixed signals coming from Ramallah, the secretary continued with this line of argument today in a news conference in which he sought to create a deadline for starting talks:

“Long before September we need to be showing some kind of progress in some way because I don’t think we have the luxury of that kind of time,” he said in a joint news conference with his Kuwaiti counterpart.

“Time is the enemy of a peace process,” Mr. Kerry said. “The passage of time allows a vacuum to be filled by people who don’t want things to happen.”

That sounds wise, but the mention of September—a reference to the meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations where the Palestinians are likely to make mischief—is ominous. As much as Kerry likes to think he is the consummate diplomat who is orchestrating a momentous move toward peace, with his decision to try to rush the parties into a negotiation with no evidence of common ground or an opening for an agreement what he is actually doing is setting the region up for a blowup that could have been avoided. Instead of listening to the parties and seeing that the Palestinians are not ready to make the sort of sacrifices needed for peace, Kerry is blundering along, blind to the fact that the real enemy of peace is the hate that fuels the conflict, not an artificial deadline.

 

The entire premise of Kerry’s initiative is the notion that rushing to peace is necessary since the status quo is untenable and likely to lead to trouble. But what he fails to see is that as unpalatable as the present situation might be for both sides, it is infinitely preferable to one where the Palestinians think they can gain from outrageous behavior or violence. Since Abbas can’t even bring himself to talk without preconditions that would require Israel to accede to all of his demands in advance of negotiations, even if Kerry can drag him to the table, everyone on both sides knows there’s little chance he will stay there. A failure to negotiate is bad enough, as we have seen for the last four and a half years since Abbas last fled talks with Israel in order to avoid giving an answer to an Israeli peace offer. But negotiations that are doomed to failure are even worse. That’s something American diplomats should remember from the last time they tried to muscle Israel and the Palestinians into an agreement at Camp David in the summer of 2000. That led to the second intifada and over a thousand slaughtered Jews and even more dead Palestinians.

 

Kerry thinks by ignoring Abbas’s prevarications he can somehow get both parties to yes. But he would do better to pay attention to what Abbas is saying to his own people and fellow Arabs rather than the contradictory statements about talks coming from Ramallah aimed at Western audiences.

 

As Palestine Media Watch reports, Abbas continues to spread libels about Israel and Jews in the Arab media. He recently said the following to the Saudi paper Al Watan earlier this month:

All these [Israeli] actions indicate an evil and dangerous plot to destroy Al-Aqsa [Mosque] and build the alleged Temple. Unfortunately, these dangers, which are clear for everyone to see, have yet to receive proper Arab, Islamic and international responses.”

Abbas’s reference to the “alleged” Temple is of piece with the PA campaign that has long alleged that Jews have no historical connection to Jerusalem. As PMW recalls:

In a speech at the Arab Summit in 2010, Abbas told Arab leaders that taking Jerusalem away from Israel is a religious Islamic obligation of the highest level, a “fard ayn” – a personal Islamic commandment incumbent on every Muslim:

Abbas: “I say to the leaders of our Arab nation and to its peoples: Jerusalem and its environs are a trust that Allah entrusted to us. Saving it [Jerusalem] from the settlement monster and the danger of Judaization and confiscation is a personal [Islamic] commandment [Arabic: fard ayn] incumbent on all of us. Therefore, I call all of you to serious and urgent action to save [Jerusalem] and to make available all possibilities in order to strengthen our resolve and to maintain its historical, cultural and religious character.”

It is these attitudes that are the obstacle to peace, not settlements or Israeli skepticism about peace or even time. The artificial deadline Kerry is setting won’t create an accord so long as Abbas continues to believe that any acceptance of Israel’s legitimacy will be seen as a betrayal of Palestinian nationalism. What the region needs is actually more time for the Palestinians to come to grips with the need to alter this culture of hate, not a rush to talks with no solution in sight.

 

The End of the American Dream? By Niall Ferguson.

The End of the American Dream? By Niall Ferguson. Newsweek. The Daily Beast, June 26, 2013.

Obama’s War on Prosperity. By William Tucker.

Obama’s War on Prosperity. By William Tucker. The American Spectator, June 27, 2013.

Tucker:

So what is going on here? Why is President Obama so utterly unconcerned about economics, so blasé about unemployment, so absorbed with tales about the coming environment apocalypse? Well, here’s my analysis.

President Obama has managed to win election by assembling two major constituencies: 1) a lumpen proletariat that has no idea how the economy works, is dependent on the government, and votes for him because he promises more handouts; and 2) an upper-crust constituency that thinks “we already have enough,” isn’t interested in any further economic development, and believes, if anything, that we already have too much of material possessions and it’s time to start cutting back on things. This has been the theme of environmentalism for 40 years. The rationale changes — we’re undergoing a “population bomb,” we’re drowning in pollution, we’re running out of oil and other resources — but the message is always the same. We’ve got enough. Time to call off all this progress. Let’s go back to spinning our own yarn, growing our own vegetables, and putting up windmills.

Together these two groups form a perfect vice to smother the ambitions of people who are interested in furthering the advance of progress and technology — the ones you might call “average Americans.”

All this was perfectly illustrated two weeks ago when filmmaker Robert Stone, who has just released the pro-nuclear documentary Pandora’s Promise, took on Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., that perfect embodiment of the environmental ethos. (Nuclear energy, by the way, the only technology that could possibly forestall global warming, received barely a passing mention in Obama’s speech. His main contributions have been to appoint a chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission who is opposed to nuclear power and try to shut down the fuel reprocessing plant in South Carolina.)

A scion of wealth who lives in a retreat in the Hudson River Highlands, Robert Kennedy plays the upper-crust aristocrat who has turned against technology, just as Veblen outlined in The Theory of the Leisure Class. He wants to close Indian Point, he’s against fracking, he objects to natural gas pipelines, he opposed offshore windmills both off Cape Cod and in Long Island Sound, he’s opposed to genetically modified food, he’s even crusading against vaccines these days. But he has invested his money in a couple of huge, useless solar plants in the California desert.

So when Kennedy kicked off the Pandora debate by calling the film “an elaborate hoax” and accusing Stone of being on the payroll of the nuclear industry, Andrew Revkin, the New York Times environmental blogger who moderated the debate, threw him a challenge. “You’re invested in solar energy,” he said. “Doesn’t that mean you have your own interests? Why should we believe you?”

Kennedy pulled up short. You could almost see the wheels turning in his head. “Don’t you know who I am?” he seemed to exude. “I’m a Kennedy! We Kennedys don’t invest to make money. We already have money.” His investment, he finally explained, was for the good of mankind.

Environmentalism is the philosophy of an aristocracy. It works perfectly for people who already have what they want and aren’t terribly concerned with getting more. Much more important is that lots of other people don’t get what they already have. That would mean crowding into their restrictively zoned neighborhoods, discovering their vacation hideaways, and generally engulfing them in the common herd.

And of course all this plays extremely well in the faculty lounges across America, where tenure keeps things comfortable, where aristocratic mannerisms are forever in fashion, and where Obama imbibed most of his knowledge of the world before becoming President.

Citi Simplicity® Commercial: Erica vs. The Rough Day.

Citi Simplicity®: Erica vs. The Rough Day. Video. CITI, May 15, 2013. YouTube. Also here.

“Erica” is portrayed by 29-year old Puerto Rican actress and model Melissa Marty, who won Univision’s Nuestra Belleza Latina (Our Latin Beauty) reality show contest in 2008. Marty has been promoted by Glaudi fashion as “the modern Latina of today.”

“Erica” in the Citibank commercial shows the take charge Jacksonian side of Melissa Marty.

The Bane of Palestinian Infighting. By Kimberly Marten.

The Bane of Palestinian Infighting. By Kimberly Marten. New York Times, June 26, 2013.

Super-Scientific Chinese Study Says Bloggers Are Losers. By Adam Minter.

Super-Scientific Chinese Study Says Bloggers Are Losers. By Adam Minter. Bloomberg, June 27, 2013.

Michael Eric Dyson: Clarence Thomas Is a “Symbolic Jew Who Sided With Hitler” to “Commit Genocide.”

MSNBC’s Michael Eric Dyson On Clarence Thomas: “Symbolic Jew Who Sided With Hitler” To “Commit Genocide.” By Andrew Kirell. Mediaite, June 27, 2013. YouTube.

MSNBC’s Dyson on Thomas: “Symbolic Jew Invited Metaphoric Hitler to Commit Holocaust Upon His Own People.” By Noel Sheppard. NewsBusters, June 25, 2013.





Full segment with Michael Eric Dyson from Martin Bashir show. Video. MSNBC, June 25, 2013.

Visit NBCNews.com for breaking news, world news, and news about the economy

Is Hamas Losing Power? By Khaled Abu Toameh.

Is Hamas Losing Power? By Khaled Abu Toameh. Real Clear World, June 27, 2013. Also at Gatestone Institute.

Abu Toameh:

Hamas’s failure to improve the living conditions of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip has also driven away an increased number of Palestinians – in addition to reports about fierce internal squabbling among Hamas’s top brass and the absence of a unified policy toward many controversial issues plaguing the Palestinians and the Arab world.

In a move reflecting Hamas’s growing predicament, the movement was forced this week to welcome Palestinian singer Mohamed Assaf, who won the popular Arab Idol contest held by Saudi Arabia’s MBC TV station.

Although Hamas leaders have condemned the contest as “anti-Islamic” and “morally corrupt,” they were forced to voice their support for the 23-year-old Assaf in the wake of the overwhelming and unprecedented support he received from Palestinians.

When Hamas leaders begin to “sweat,” it should be seen as a positive development in the Palestinian arena. It now remains to be seen whether Palestinians will take advantage of the situation and turn against Hamas.