Baby Steps on Israel/Palestine. By Walter Russell Mead. Via Meadia, July 20, 2013.
Kerry merits support, and a new strategy. By Rami G. Khouri. The Daily Star (Lebanon), July 20, 2013.
PA’s hesitance to jump at Kerry deal reveals Arab League’s loss of clout. By Herb Keinon. Jerusalem Post, July 19, 2013.
Palestinian leadership displays grassroots
mindset that time and world opinion is on their side, and will eventually wear Israel
down.
Kerry’s Illusion of Momentum. By Jonathan S. Tobin. Commentary, July 17, 2013.
The High Price of Kerry’s Pyrrhic Victory. By Jonathan S. Tobin. Commentary, July 19, 2013.
Mead:
There
appears to be some movement on the Israeli-Palestinian issue due to the efforts
of Secretary of State John Kerry late this week. The New York Times is reporting that face-to-face negotiations
between the Israelis and Palestinians may resume soon pending the release of
several Palestinian prisoners by Israel’s government—a deal Kerry apparently
reached with Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu late Friday night. This
agreement, however, is far from set in stone:
But
officials who have been briefed on the negotiations, speaking on the condition
of anonymity because they were not authorized to do otherwise, said the
prisoner release — and the larger agreement to resume talks — depends on a vote
in the coming days by an Israeli leadership that has been bitterly divided over
the issue.
In
announcing Friday that Israelis and Palestinians had established “a basis” for
resuming direct peace negotiations, Mr. Kerry included a caveat. “If everything
goes as expected,” he said, chief negotiators for each side will convene in
Washington “within a week or so.”
While
some might scoff at these developments as inconsequential, it is on balance
good news as far as it goes. All things being equal, the US benefits when
Israelis and Palestinians are talking, and the collapse of the peace process
when President Clinton turned it into an “all or nothing” choice in the closing
months of his presidency was a major setback to US foreign policy. Ever since
then, we’ve been trying to recreate what Clinton—who to his credit had brought
it along for many years—threw away.
The
cold hard truth is that a final peace between the two sides remains very far
off. But that doesn’t mean that developing a political framework through
negotiations between the two sides is useless. Concessions and agreements can
improve living conditions for people in both groups, chip away at the big
problems that continue to block a final agreement, and help build the knowledge
and trust that could one day be the basis for a final agreement.
But to
get to that elusive final agreement, two things have to happen. First, there
needs to be a framework that gets the two sides sitting down at the table at
all. And then there needs to be a way to keep that framework viable even as it
becomes impossible to ignore the reality that the two sides aren’t ready for a
final deal. Kerry is getting close to the first, but is still far from the
second. We’re glad it’s happening and we applaud the skill that is at work.
The
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is far from the biggest problem the Middle East
currently faces: the metastasizing Sunni-Shiite war, the failure of political
and economic development in much of the Arab world, the Iranian nuclear
challenge are all bigger issues. But this is still a good step and very much in
US interests. It’s also a sign of how much both Netanyahu and President Obama
have learned about working with each other since the tumultuous beginning of
the administration. The two leaders need each other and both have gotten better
at managing the relationship.
Tobin (Pyrrhic Victory):
After
weeks of looking silly chasing his tail in what appeared to be a futile attempt
to revive Middle East peace talks, Secretary of State John Kerry is looking
like a winner this afternoon as he was able to announce that he had been able
to “establish a basis” for a new round of negotiations of between Israel and
the Palestinian Authority. Assuming the Palestinians actually show up next week
in Washington as Kerry thinks they will, this will be something of a victory
for a secretary who has gone from humiliation to humiliation during his brief
term in office. Even if all it amounts to is a photo op, Kerry can claim it is
evidence of the diplomatic prowess he thinks he possesses. But before he starts
writing his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech (if it isn’t already composed
at least in his head), we need to understand that it is highly unlikely that
anything good may come of this initiative. Even worse, the price the United
States has paid for getting even this far may be far higher than any possible
good that could come from this event.
It
should be understood that the tentative and highly conditioned agreement to
return to negotiations was only won by an American agreement to accept
Palestinian preconditions that President Obama had already rejected and that
would, in no small part, tilt the diplomatic playing field against Israel:
Ahmed
Majdalani, a PLO executive committee member, told the Associated Press that
Kerry has proposed holding talks for six to nine months focusing on the key
issues of borders and security arrangements. He said Kerry would endorse the
1967 lines as the starting point of negotiations and assured the Palestinians
that Israel would free some 350 prisoners gradually in the coming months.
This
came after President Obama phoned Prime Minister Netanyahu yesterday to
pressure him to cooperate with Kerry. Israel had already agreed to talk without
preconditions, but apparently the president wanted Netanyahu’s assurance that
he would not protest the way the secretary had buckled to PA leader Mahmoud
Abbas’s conditions. But having arrived at negotiations in this manner, neither
Kerry nor Obama seems to have considered what comes next. The Palestinians have
already made it abundantly clear that they won’t actually negotiate in good
faith but will only show up expecting the U.S. to deliver Israeli concessions
to them on a silver platter. Even if he wanted to sign an accord, Abbas hasn’t
the power to speak for all Palestinians. Since that is a certain formula for
failure, it is incumbent on Washington to understand that another breakdown in
talks could serve as a new excuse for Palestinian violence.
The
reason why rational observers have been so wary of Kerry’s initiative is not
just the fact that the Palestinians had no interest in returning to
negotiations they’ve been boycotting for four and a half years. Both Israel and
the Palestinians didn’t wish to obstruct Kerry’s desire for talks. He might
have left off once the Palestinians demonstrated their lack of interest, but
since he persisted in this manner, they felt they had no choice but to show up.
But
Abbas and the PA are too weak to agree to any deal that would conclusively end
a conflict that neither Hamas nor much of Fatah actually wants to end.
Recognizing the legitimacy of a Jewish state, no matter where its borders might
be drawn, is something that no Palestinian leader can afford to do at this
point in history. The culture of Palestinian politics that has revolved around
the delegitimization of Israel and Jewish history makes it impossible. That’s
why they’ve already rejected three Israelis offers of a Palestinian state
including almost all of the West Bank and a share of Jerusalem. So even if
Netanyahu were foolish enough to agree to withdrawals that would, in effect,
recreate the independent Palestinian terror state that already exists in Gaza
in the West Bank, Abbas still can’t say yes.
But by
forcing this confrontation at a time when conditions simply don’t exist for a
resolution of the conflict, Kerry is not just occupying himself with an issue
that is clearly less pressing that the other crises in the Middle East like
Egypt, Syria or the Iranian nuclear threat. Since failure is foreordained and
the Palestinians are likely to bolt the talks at the first opportunity, what
will follow will be far worse than merely a continuation of the present
stalemate. The Palestinians will treat any outcome—even one created by their
intransigence—as an excuse for either an upsurge in violence against Israel or
an effort to use their status at the United Nations to work to further isolate
the Jewish state.
Just as
damaging, by again putting the U.S. seal of approval on the Palestinian demand
for the 1967 lines as Israel’s borders, Kerry and Obama have also worsened
Israel’s position once the talks collapse. Any outcome other than total Israeli
acquiescence to Palestinian demands would also serve as justification for more
European Union sanctions on Israel, even, as is likely, if such a surrender
were to fail to be enough to entice the Palestinians to take yes for an answer.
Netanyahu
will be criticized by many in his party for going along with what is likely to
be at best, a farce, and, at worst, a dangerous trap. But having already
rightly said that he was willing to negotiate with Abbas under any
circumstance, he must send representatives to Washington. But neither he, the
people of Israel, nor the Jewish state’s friends in this country should be
under any illusions that what will ensue from Kerry’s diplomatic experiment will
be helpful.
As much
as Israel wants and needs peace, the conflict is at a stage when the best that
can be hoped for is that it be managed in such a way as to minimize violence
and encourage Palestinian development. Though Kerry is offering the PA lots of
cash, there is little chance it will be used appropriately or get the desired
result.
Next
week’s talks may be heralded as an unprecedented opportunity for peace, but the
odds are, we will look back on this moment the way we do foolhardy efforts such
as President Clinton’s Camp David summit in 2000 that set the stage for a
bloody intifada that cost the lives of over a thousand Jews and far more
Palestinians. The agreement to talk about talking is a pyrrhic victory for
Kerry. Those who cheer this effort should think hard about who will bear the
responsibility for the bloodshed that could result from Kerry’s folly.