Remember, Remember, the Third of July. By Avi Isaacharoff.
Remember, remember, the third of July. By Avi Isaacharoff. The Times of Israel, July 3, 2013.
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood was the
spearhead of a series of Islamist victories in the “Arab Spring.” As of
Wednesday, that’s over.
A Steep Fall for the Muslim Brotherhood. By David D. Kirkpatrick and Kareem Fahim. New York Times, July 2, 2013.
Egypt’s Crisis Signals the Unraveling of Yet Another Arab Nation-State. By Karl Vick. Time, July 2, 2013.
The Irony of Tahrir Square. By Ashraf Khalil. Foreign Affairs, July 2, 2013.
Female Foreign Journalist Gang-Raped in Horrific Tahrir Square Attack. By Callie Beusman. Jezebel, July 1, 2013.
Just How Bad Is It for Women in Egypt? Very. By Erin Gloria Ryan. Jezebel, June 28, 2012.
The myth of political Islam has been exposed in Egypt. By Bessma Momani. The Globe and Mail, July 3, 2013.
Momani:
What to
make of huge turnout for protests against President Mohammed Morsi in Egypt –
the most populous Arab country and bedrock of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence? The
myth of Islamist political ideology as a solution to all political and economic
woes has been broken.
Political
Islamists throughout the Arab world had been forced into the background of
political life – or the underground – in the years when most Arab governments
discredited their right to participate in political life. But these Arab
regimes were often corrupt and based their support on crony capitalism and sham
elections. This helped Islamists, ironically, to be the champions of virtue,
clean government, social welfare, and justice. With the single slogan “Islam is
the solution,” they effectively captured the imagination and hope of millions
in the Arab world, making people believe that they had an alternative to
tyranny.
This
first year under the Morsi government in Egypt – by far the largest pilot
project ever staged for Islamists’ political ideology – has exposed the myth
that Islamists have a real alternative.
Under
Mr. Morsi, no new economic or political ideas were brought to the political
table. Yes, the Egyptian “deep state” of Hosni Mubarak-era cronies prevented
change, particularly in the judiciary and elements of the public sector. But
Islamists had no real solution to the everyday problems of Egyptians such as
traffic, garbage, insecurity, unemployment and the sheer chaos that
characterizes the mundane life people lead. Like his predecessors, Mr. Morsi
tried to court foreign capital, international donors, and international
creditors such as the International Monetary Fund. In essence, Mr. Morsi's
economic policies were business as usual.
Undoubtedly
Mr. Morsi inherited an economic mess and a corrupted system that would take
more than a year to weed out. Also, one could argue that like all countries,
Egypt must play by the international economic rules, and has taken an economic
beating with a depreciating exchange rate and rising debt burdens. The
Islamists are also capitalists themselves, albeit small- to medium-sized
businesses and not national oligarchs. So Islamists are not likely to shake the
economic system underpinning Egypt.
But the
point here is that Islamists never claimed governing was hard; in essence they
simplified good governance to a single and effective slogan: “Islam is the
solution!” To many Egyptians this is now an empty slogan and there is a demand
for real policy ideas. This is a good thing as it sets the stage for political
parties to mature beyond rhetoric into developing policy platforms.
Islamists
will retain the respect of having cleaner hands than the Mubarak regime, but
Egyptians and perhaps Arab electorates in other transition countries will also
demand more. In a devout region, religious credentials will matter less than
offering specific solutions to life's mundane problems.