Hussein Ibish on the Fantasy World of the One-Staters. By Jeffrey Goldberg.
Hussein Ibish on the Fantasy World of the One-Staters. By Jeffrey Goldberg. The Atlantic, November 3, 2009.
Goldberg and Ibish:
JG: But
the one-staters are a very marginal group. I think one of the interesting
things you do in your book is show very coolly, calmly, the essential
ridiculousness of one-state advocacy based on the simple fact that in order to
have a successful one-state plan, you need Israeli Jews to want it, and today,
not even one percent of Israeli Jews want it.
HI: You
could put all of them in a small auditorium.
JG: I
don’t think you need an auditorium. Talk about these guys, the Tony Judts –
HI: I
don’t want to be too hard on Judt. Judt put out this argument and then he
immediately admitted that it was utopian, that it wasn’t serious and he was
just doing a thought experiment. And since then, he basically has more or less
withdrawn from the conversation Judt has not been a person who suggests that
this is a realistic plan and a serious proposal for the future.
There
are two fundamental flaws with pro-Palestinian strategic thinking that focuses
on the idea of abandoning two states and going for a single state. The first is
the question of feasibility, and it’s hard to argue with that. Obviously anyone
who is familiar with this sees the difficulty, and I would be the first to say
that success is not assured by any means. Even a two-state agreement looks, at
the moment, like something of a long shot. The difference between the two-state
solution and everything else is that yes, it’s a long shot, but it would work.
And if we could conceivably get it, if we did get it, it would solve the
conflict.
The
fundamental argument that the one-staters seem to be making, which is that we
can’t possibly get Israel to end the occupation and relinquish their control of
the 22 percent of Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza) but we will inevitably
succeed in getting them to relinquish one hundred percent of the territory
under their control. This is a problem of logic. The second thing is that once
you’ve realized this, obviously what you’ve done is set yourself the task of
convincing Jewish Israelis to voluntarily do this. The idea of coercing the Israelis into this
through military force is absurd, and it could only really be done through
voluntary persuasion. What the one-staters argue, actually, is that they don’t
have to do that. What they’re going to do, they say, is bring the Israelis to
their knees.
JG:
South Africa style?
HI:
Well, South Africa style, except we don’t have a South Africa equation here.
JG: But
they believe they do.
HI:
They believe that through the application of what they call BDS – Boycott,
Divestment, Sanctions – globally that they can crush the will of the Israelis
and break the Zionist movement. To me, even if you believe that boycotts were
plausible, which I don’t, certainly I don’t think the American government and
institutions and corporations would participate.
JG: You
have to move from the American consensus that supports supplying Israel with
the best weaponry to not just a military cutoff but a complete cutoff and
boycott. It’s very hard to picture.
HI:
Anyone who thinks that is plausible in the foreseeable future doesn’t
understand the nature of the American relationship with Israel. The commitment
of the U.S., not just the government but American society, is to the survival
and security of the Israeli state. And then there’s another aspect, which is
the extent to which Israeli institutions, organizations and corporations are
interwoven at a very fundamental level with many of those in the U.S.
JG:
Right, Intel and Google –
HI: I’m
talking about corporate, governmental, intelligence, military, industrial,
scientific ties. The point is that you can only take talk of boycott and
sanctions seriously if you really don’t understand any of this. And if you don’t
understand any of this, then you’re living in a fantasy world. So here’s the
thing: Obviously the only real task for one-staters is to convince Jewish
Israelis to agree to their solution. But instead of trying to do that, they
engage in the most hyperbolic discourse about the badness of Zionism, the
badness of Jewish Israelis, the rightness and primacy of not just a Palestinian
narrative, but the most strident traditional Palestinian narrative, and the
most tendentious Palestinian narrative, the one that places blame for the
conflict entirely on the side of the Israelis, that casts Israel as the usurper
and what they call in one-state circles now the “temporary racist usurping
entity.” These are the ones, by the way,
who won’t talk about my book. There’s a refusal to acknowledge or read my book.
I’ve nicknamed my book “the temporary racist usurping book.”
These
people are trapped in the language of the Fifties and Sixties. You’re talking
about a worldview is anachronistic in the most fundamental sense. It doesn’t
recognize any of the changes that have taken place since then. For example, the
strategic situation that’s emerged in the Middle East, where the Arab states
and the Arabs generally have a lot of other things to worry about other than
Israel. This is a world in which a lot of Gulf states are extremely concerned
about Iraq, and where there are Arab states – Jordan and Egypt – that have
treaties with Israel, where Syria has a motive to be civil with Israel that is
unpleasant but completely stable, and where it’s a very different environment
than simply the Arabs and Israelis are enemies. The other thing that they’ve
missed completely, and this is sort of the amazing thing, is the total
transformation in American official policy toward the Palestinians over the
past 20 years. Twenty-one years ago, there was no contact ever between the U.S.
and the PLO. No contact, zero, and now Palestinian statehood is the consensus
American foreign policy and it is a national security priority under Obama.
People in the House, key positions like the chair of the Foreign Affairs
Committee, Howard Berman, chair of the Subcommittee on the Middle East, Gary
Ackerman, Nita Lowey on Appropriations – all of them Jewish American members of
Congress, stalwart supporters of Israel, and all of them committed to peace
based on two states. And all of them, by the way, who were on the host
committee of the American Task Force on Palestine gala last week.
JG: You’ve
reached the Promised Land.
HI:
Except that we haven’t achieved the results.
JG:
Yes, there’s that. But you’re on the road.
HI:
Exactly. The transformation in American attitudes is almost mind-boggling, an
official American attitude on ending the occupation, which has been the
traditional goal of the Palestinians. And at this very moment, a group of
Palestinians turns around and says, “Sorry, not good enough, we want it all.
Not only is a single Palestinian state not achievable, it’s not desirable, it’s
not acceptable, it’s not enough, we want it all.”
JG: Who
are the leaders of the movement?
HI:
People like Ali Abunimah, Joseph Massad, Ghada Karmi, Omar Barghouti.
JG: And
you think they’re succumbing to fantastic dreams. This is the traditional
criticism of Palestinian politics over the past sixty years, that it's very
hard to separate out the dreams from—
HI: It
goes back further than sixty years. It’s an article of Palestinian nationalist
faith that is almost one hundred years old, which is that demography is
destiny, demography is power. This notion that if we just sit here, on the
land, have children, are steadfast and don’t agree to anything, then political
power ultimately will flow to us. In the twenties, they believed if we do that,
then, just by virtue of our presence in the land, our numbers, our demography,
Israel will never be established. After Israel was established, it was just, “Well
if we’re steadfast and we don’t agree, then Israel will be reversed.” Then it
was, “Well if we just do this, then independence will come in the occupied
territories.” Now the latest version is if we’re just steadfast, we can create
a South Africa-like model and we will reverse the war of 1948 at the ballot.
JG: But
I have to tell you that for people like me, this is a real worry. This goes
with the argument that the settlements are the vanguard of one-statism.
HI: Now
there is some truth to this. I think it’s useful for people like (Ehud) Olmert
or people like yourself to point out that with the occupation going the way it
is, there won’t be a Palestinian state, and then Israel will be in a situation
where it is neither meaningfully Jewish nor meaningfully democratic. I think
you could claim that already, if you talk about the de facto Israeli state
rather than Israel in its normally perceived borders, that is already the case
and it will be increasingly so. Now here's the thing: The alternative, though,
is not going to be a single state in the foreseeable future. It's possible we
could get there, but it won’t be a solution, it will be an outcome. There’s a
big difference. An outcome of a horrible, brutal, bloody civil conflict that
drags on for generations, because even though this demographic issue and the
legitimacy issues are crises for Israel, I don’t think they result in the
dissolution of the Israeli state.
JG: In
other words, most Israeli Jews would rather have a Jewish state than a
democratic state.
HI:
Yes, it’s obvious. And I think that what you would get is a protracted civil
war that is essentially an intensification of the civil war we've had. So I do
say the single state is a potential eventuality, but it would be the outcome of
a horrible scenario. Look, the idea that if the current round of talks breaks
down and Obama gives up and the U.S. gives up and we all give up, then the
alternative is a Gandhian non-violent struggle of sanctions and boycotts that
will somehow bring Israel to its knees, that is not the way it’s going to go.
We know the way it’s going to go.
JG:
Each intifada is more violent than the last.
HI: And
more religious. You’ll end up with two sets of bearded fanatics on both sides
fighting over holy places and God. It will be a complete disaster. And I think
the Israelis will end up ultimately dealing with forces not only beyond its
borders, but beyond its comprehension in the long run. This has the possibility
of turning into not an ethno-national war but a religious war between the
Muslims and the Jews over the holy places with the whole concept of Palestine
gone and the Jewish population of Israel in a very unenviable situation,
protected in the end only by its nuclear weapons. It’s a nightmare.
JG: So
you have three scenarios. One, the one-state solution: Somehow the Jews and the
Arabs decide, even though their narratives completely contradict each other,
that we’ll be like Belgium, where we don’t have to really like each other but
we’ll be fine. The second alternative is the one you described of basically
endless war. The third is the two-state solution. But, sorry to say it, we
don't seem that close right now. You have an Israeli government who seems
extremely hesitant to pull down any settlements, you have a Hamas government in
Gaza, just for starters.
HI:
What you do with Hamas, in my view, is you make the situation such that Hamas
has to choose, and you do this by creating progress and by creating momentum –
and there are two ways of creating momentum. One is diplomatically, which right
now, seems difficult. The other is through the Fayyad plan, which is state
building in the occupied territories. That would have a very powerful effect.
It is extremely important that we use that idea as a means of gaining momentum,
that the Israelis do not block it, that the U.S. protect it politically, and
that the Arabs, Europeans and the Israelis support it technically and
financially. This is a way of really moving forward in a manner that is
complimentary and not contradictory to the diplomatic process, and I think
people who suggest that this is some kind of capitulation or some kind of
collaboration are dead wrong. This is a very powerful way of effectively
resisting the occupation without doing anything violent. Israelis may fool
themselves into thinking that this is just economic peace, but it's not; it’s
Palestinians preparing for independence.
Now with
regard to Hamas, I definitely don’t think it would be wise for the West to open
up dialogue with Hamas under the present circumstances. I think that would
simply reward them and it would benefit them in their competition with the PLO
and there's a stark choice that Palestinians are facing between two strategies:
an Islamist violent strategy and a secular nationalist negotiation strategy. I
think I’'s very important to bolster the second and to make the first appear
what it actually is: Non-functional.