George S. Patton, Jr. Library of Congress. |
George Patton’s Summer of 1944. By Victor Davis Hanson. National Review Online, July 24, 2014. Also at Real Clear Politics.
Hanson:
Nearly
70 years ago, on Aug. 1, 1944, Lieutenant General George S. Patton took command
of the American Third Army in France. For the next 30 days they rolled straight
toward the German border.
Patton
almost did not get a chance at his summer of glory. After brilliant service in
North Africa and Sicily, fellow officers — and his German enemies — considered
him the most gifted American field general of his generation. But near the
conclusion of his illustrious Sicilian campaign, the volatile Patton slapped
two sick GIs in field hospitals, raving that they were shirkers. In truth, both
were ill and at least one was suffering from malaria.
Public
outrage eventually followed the shameful incidents. As a result, General Dwight
D. Eisenhower was forced to put Patton on ice for eleven key months.
Tragically,
Patton’s irreplaceable talents would be lost to the Allies in the
soon-to-be-stagnant Italian campaign. He also played no real role in the
planning of the Normandy campaign. Instead, his former subordinate, the more
stable but far less gifted Omar Bradley, assumed direct command under
Eisenhower of American armies in France.
In
early 1944, a mythical Patton army was used as a deception to fool the Germans
into thinking that “Army Group Patton” might still make another major landing
at Calais. The Germans apparently found it incomprehensible that the Americans
would bench their most audacious general at the very moment when his audacity
was most needed.
When
Patton’s Third Army finally became operational seven weeks after D-Day, it was
supposed to play only a secondary role — guarding the southern flank of the
armies of General Bradley and British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery while
securing the Atlantic ports.
Despite
having the longest route to the German border, Patton headed east. The Third
Army took off in a type of American blitzkrieg not seen since Union General
William Tecumseh Sherman’s rapid marches through Georgia and the Carolinas
during the Civil War.
Throughout
August 1944, Patton won back over the press. He was foul-mouthed, loud, and
uncouth, and he led from the front in flamboyant style with a polished helmet
and ivory-handled pistols.
In
fact, his theatrics masked a deeply learned and analytical military mind.
Patton sought to avoid casualties by encircling German armies. In innovative
fashion, he partnered with American tactical air forces to cover his flanks as
his armored columns raced around static German formations.
Naturally
rambunctious American GIs fought best, Patton insisted, when “rolling” forward,
especially in summertime. Only then, for a brief moment, might the clear skies
facilitate overwhelming American air support. In August his soldiers could camp
outside, while his speeding tanks still had dry roads.
In just
30 days, Patton finished his sweep across France and neared Germany. The Third
Army had exhausted its fuel supplies and ground to a halt near the border in
early September.
Allied
supplies had been redirected northward for the normally cautious General
Montgomery’s reckless Market Garden gambit. That proved a harebrained scheme to
leapfrog over the bridges of the Rhine River; it devoured Allied blood and
treasure, and accomplished almost nothing in return.
Meanwhile,
the cutoff of Patton’s supplies would prove disastrous. Scattered and fleeing
German forces regrouped. Their resistance stiffened as the weather grew worse
and as shortened supply lines began to favor the defense.
Historians
still argue over Patton’s August miracle. Could a racing Third Army really have
burst into Germany so far ahead of Allied lines? Could the Allies ever have
adequately supplied Patton’s charging columns given the growing distance from
the Normandy ports? How could a supreme commander like Eisenhower handle
Patton, who at any given moment could — and would — let loose with politically
incorrect bombast?
We do
not know the answers to all those questions. Nor will we ever quite know the
full price that America paid for having a profane Patton stewing in exile for
nearly a year rather than exercising his leadership in Italy or Normandy.
We only
know that 70 years ago, an authentic American genius thought he could win the
war in Europe — and almost did. When his Third Army stalled, so did the Allied
effort.
What
lay ahead in winter were the Battle of the Bulge and the nightmare fighting of
the Hürtgen Forest — followed by a half-year slog into Germany.
Patton
would die tragically from injuries sustained in a freak car accident not long
after the German surrender. He soon became the stuff of legend but was too
often remembered for his theatrics rather than his authentic genius that saved
thousands of American lives.
Seventy
years ago this August, George S. Patton showed America how a democracy’s
conscripted soldiers could arise out of nowhere to beat the deadly
professionals of an authoritarian regime at their own game.