How Big Government Erodes Quality of Life. By Seth Mandel.

How Big Government Erodes Quality of Life. By Seth Mandel. Commentary, July 10, 2013.

The Rebellion of Britain’s Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks. By Nathan Lopes Cardozo.

The rebellion of Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks. By Nathan Lopes Cardozo. Jerusalem Post, July 9, 2013.

Where rabbis feared to go, he traveled on his own to challenge not only the Jewish community but the world at large.

Reversing the Decay of London Undone. By Jonathan Sacks. NJBR, January 2, 2013.


Cardozo:

Let it be said. Jonathan Sacks has been a rebellious chief rabbi.

 

Over the years, most of us rabbis have become irrelevant on a global level. We wanted to be spiritual leaders, teachers, serve our congregants, and become heads of yeshivot. But we shunned the idea of going beyond these noble tasks and taking on the world.

 

That religious faith was challenged worldwide as never before did not bother us. It was for the goyim to deal with. We buried our heads in the sand and lived happily ever after.

 

By doing so, however, we robbed the rabbinate of one of its most powerful tasks: to challenge, disturb, rebel and send a strong, passionate message that is not always to our liking.

 

Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard once observed that religion has to function like a thunderstorm, but that over the years it invented sundry lightening-conductors and lost its purpose. The same is true about the rabbinate. It has become a pleaser, a comforter, as opposed to a biting critic of our moral failure and our spiritual and intellectual mediocrity.

 

The rabbinate was meant to be a test tube in which its own foundations could be challenged and new ideas experimented with. It was supposed to redeem Judaism to once again become a vibrant experience.

 

Instead it denied its task of being “a light unto the nations” and decided to be a dwindling night-lamp.

 

That is why Rabbi Jonathan Sacks became a rebellious man. He was bold enough to challenge the very institution he headed. Where we rabbis feared to go, he traveled on his own to challenge not only the Jewish community but the world at large.

 

His confidence in the power of Judaism and its infinite wisdom enabled him to enter the lion’s den, taking on famous philosophers, scientists, religious thinkers and sociologists and showing them that Judaism had something to teach that they couldn’t afford to miss if they wanted to be at the forefront of philosophy and science.

 

He showed us that science had to justify itself in the eyes of religious belief, and not just the other way around. His observations disturbed and put arrogant people, who spoke in the name of science and philosophy, in their place.

 

The truth is that Rabbi Sacks left the chief rabbinate years ago and went his own way, becoming a lonely chief rabbi, little appreciated by his own colleagues. While we rabbis convinced ourselves that to engage and challenge the academic world was not possible, the chief rabbi showed us that we were using this argument to cover up our own limitations.

 

We knew there were Jewish Orthodox institutions that taught how Judaism could exist in a secular world and even thrive, but to maintain that Judaism could actually challenge the scientific, philosophical and academic communities was unheard of and belonged to the sphere of wishful thinking.

 

Rabbi Sacks was able to do so only because he didn’t learn in conventional yeshivot. He had to discover Judaism on his own, guided by some great teachers. People can grow into outstanding leaders only when they encounter doubt, struggle with their own faith and are challenged to the extent that they nearly fall off the cliff. They cannot grow in an environment where religion is taken for granted and observance is obvious.

 

Of course, this is not the case for most of us, for whom a yeshiva education is crucial in order to avoid falling into the abyss; but for truly great men such institutions are only obstacles.

 

What Rabbi Sacks did and what few have done is to lead the ship of Torah, in full sail, right into the heart of some of the most gifted and influential people in the world. He took them all by storm. And along the way, he also disturbed the Jewish religious establishment, making him a rebel and often the object of suspicion.

 

When faced with the failure of the Israeli chief rabbinate, one can only admire Rabbi Sacks even more. One does not have to agree with all of his policies, decisions or philosophical insights, but nobody can doubt his contribution of many splendid theological ideas to Jewish tradition, ethics and general philosophy. The Israeli chief rabbinate, in contrast, has been silent on all these fronts since the days after chief rabbi Shlomo Goren stepped down.

 

Not only have its rabbis made no contribution to the development of religious thought in the general world, they have not even made an impression on the intelligentsia in Israel. This should have been their first concern, because it is the intellectuals who determine Israel’s future. The rabbis probably do not even understand some of Rabbi Sacks’ writings, since they lack all background in religious and secular philosophy, have never contemplated the issues that Rabbi Sacks struggled with, and have never learned the art of thinking independently.

 

They are seemingly unacquainted with works of other important monotheistic religions, with Hinduism and Buddhism, and with the writings of people such as Avraham Joshua Heschel, Martin Buber, Mordechai Kaplan, David Hartman, David Weiss Halivni, Arthur Green, Paul Tillich or Reinold Niebuhr.

 

With the stepping down of Chief Rabbi Sacks, British Jewry’s most illustrious institution will cease to be a world player. In whatever form the chief rabbinate will continue – and we wish the new chief rabbi every success – it will lack its influence on the broader Jewish and non-Jewish world. World Jewry has bitterly failed to educate a young man who would be able to take over the task that Rabbi Sacks had laid out for himself, and move beyond him, confronting many important matters that Rabbi Sacks couldn’t or didn’t want to deal with, correctly or incorrectly.

 

There is an urgent need to address the issue of the Reform and Conservative movements, as well as to ensure that Zionist rabbinical judges will sit on London’s Beit Din. It is crucial to deal with the status of women and conversion in Jewish law, as well as to see that halacha is viewed as something exciting and ennobling, not just as a dry legal system that has stagnated, becoming irrelevant to most secular and even religious Jews.

 

But the most important pursuit is to ensure that a highly intelligent Jewish religious voice will continue to speak to the outside world – especially to the academia and to the policy makers in government and high-ranking institutions.

 

British Jewry will yet regret having let Rabbi Sacks go. Although I fully understand his decision to step down – it must have occasionally been frustrating, boring and lonely at the top – his resignation is not just a loss to British Jewry but to all Jewish and non-Jewish communities the world over.

 

We can only hope that he will become more and more challenging, disturbing and daring. He no doubt has more up his sleeve, and we pray that he will have the courage to persist and do what needs to be done. It may sometimes be painful, but the benefit will be priceless.

 

Rabbi Sacks surely believes in God, but more important is the fact that God seems to believe in him, and that’s what counts. The best is yet to come!

The Racist Romance of the Arab Village. By Seth J. Frantzman.

Terra Incognita: The racist romance of the Arab village. By Seth J. Frantzman. Jerusalem Post, July 9, 2013.

This romance of the “primeval” landscape, juxtaposed with Israeli activists and European NGOs who tell their story and save the villagers, is a classic motif.

Why Does Washington Still Think Egypt Was Its to Lose? By Aaron David Miller.

Lost. By Aaron David Miller. Foreign Policy, July 9, 2013.

Why does Washington still think it can control what happens in Egypt?

Radical Israeli Historian Ilan Pappe Supports a Binational One-State Solution. By Nigel O’Connor.

Q&A: Israeli historian Ilan Pappe. By Nigel O’Connor. Al Jazeera, July 5, 2013.

Transcript:

AJ: Do you consider yourself a supporter of the one-state solution?

 

IP: Yes I do. I believe in the one-state solution as the only just and functional settlement for the conflict. I think anyone who is more than five minutes on the ground in the West Bank realises there is no space there for an independent Palestinian state. And moreover, anyone who ponders a bit deeper about the reasons for the conflict understands that only such a political outfit could respond to all aspects of the conflict: the dispossession of the Palestinians in 1948, the discrimination against the Palestinians in Israel and the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

 

AJ: How do you assess the success of the campaign for a one-state solution?

 

IP: The main success of the campaign was to offer a new conversation about an alternative. Its strong aspects are that it relates much better to the reality that unfolded in Palestine since the late 19th century, where we have now a third generation of settlers who did not succeed in emptying the country they invaded, and both sides have to reframe their relationship on this mutual basis: you cannot get rid of the settlers or the native population.

 

Its second advantage is the total failure, after more than 65 years, of attempting to partition Palestine in various forms and junctures as the best solution. We now know it is not going to work, and an alternative would have to be found.

 

Its disadvantage is that it is not yet a popular movement, and has no inroads and power bases in the political structures on both sides. Also, the international community and the Arab world do not support this idea – although I think public opinion in the world and in the region supports it full-heartedly.

 

AJ: How can such an objective be realised if it is largely confined to intellectual circles, while seeming to hold little support among ordinary Palestinians or Israelis?

 

IP: The power of these ideas lies in two blueprints: one of an intensive work that has begun to disseminate the idea among those who are already part of representative bodies, especially among the Palestinians and external bodies. The second: there is a need to show, even theoretically at this point, how life would look like in all its aspects within one political outfit.

 

AJ: How do you characterise the Israeli political establishment’s approach to achieving its objectives in the Palestinian territories, and what do you see these as constituting?

 

IP: The objectives today are not different from those set by the Zionist movement very early on, when it had appeared in Palestine: to have as much of Palestine as possible with as few Palestinians in it as possible. The tactics keep changing. In 1948 it was achieved through ethnic cleansing; up to 1967 by imposing military rule on the Palestinian minority in Israel; after 1967 by incarcerating the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in a huge mega-prison, while annexing half of the West Bank to Israel and de-Arabising it, and by Judaising the Galilee and the Negev.

 

These goals have not been completed because of Palestinian steadfastness and struggle, and hence they will continue to be the tactics in the 21st century.

 

AJ: Have you seen the nature of Israeli society change during your lifetime and, if so, would you say these changes are presenting an obstacle to achieving a just outcome to the conflict or acting as an enabler?

 

IP: There are two aspects that always interested me about Israeli society: one is its relationship with the Palestinians - and in extension with the Arab world, and the other the internal dynamics within the Jewish society.

 

On the first account I have seen very little change in the basic attitude. The Palestinians were and are seen as alien usurpers of an ancient homeland and an obstacle for a thriving and peaceful life. The wish was not to be part of the Arab world, and this included unfortunately the Arab Jews, and this produced a mentality of a besieged Western fortress in the midst of a “hostile” region. The outcome of this mentality was an intolerant, high-strung and paranoid society that believes it can only rely on military power to survive.

 

As for the other aspect, I grew into a relatively modest society that cared at least about the other within the Jewish society, more egalitarian and secular. It has become more polarised between Americanised and hedonistic enclaves such as Tel-Aviv, and zealous theocratic spaces such as Jerusalem and the settlements.

 

AJ: Are you able to give an outline of how you see any political solution arising between the leadership of the Israelis and the Palestinians? Do you see the Arab Spring as altering the situation in the Israel-Palestine conflict?

 

IP: If there will be no change in the local, regional or international balance of powers, the relationship is not going to change in the future. Namely, the Israelis will assassinate those leaders that will resist its dictate and expect the others at least to remain quiet about it, even if they do not express support for it in public. Thus you can condemn the Israeli settlements in E-1 in greater Jerusalem, but you cannot support a Palestinian attempt to defend it.

 

If, however, public opinion in the world will continue to regard Israel as the new apartheid South Africa, as it does, this can lead, in the long run, to a change in the attitude of political elites, as the Arab Spring can one day solidify a number of new governments far more committed to the Palestine issue than they are today. Then the relationship could be between the Israeli leaders representing a settler community society seeking reconciliation with the leadership of the native population. This could be a new paradigm and a far more hopeful one.

Edmund S. Morgan, Historian Who Shed Light on Puritans, Dies at 97.

Edmund S. Morgan, Historian Who Shed Light on Puritans, Dies at 97. By William Grimes. New York Times, July 9, 2013.

“Reality Bites” Twenty Years After. By Jim Geraghty.

“Reality Bites” for Most Generations When They Enter the Real World. By Jim Geraghty. National Review Online, July 10, 2013.

Reality Bites (1994): Official Trailer. Video. thecultbox, July 29, 2011. YouTube.

Political Islam Is Dead. By Amir Fakhravar and G. William Heiser.

Political Islam Is Dead. By Amir Fakhravar and G. William Heiser. Real Clear Religion, July 10, 2013.

Math, Science Popular Until Students Realize They’re Hard. By Khadeeja Safdar.

Math, Science Popular Until Students Realize They’re Hard. By Khadeeja Safdar. Wall Street Journal, July 8, 2013.

Conservatism and Pop Culture. By Sarah Palin and Mark Judge.

Sarah Palin Talks Pop Culture, Rock, and Conservatism. Interview with Sarah Palin by Mark Judge. Acculturated, July 8, 2013.

Obama’s Second Chance on Egypt. By Jonathan S. Tobin.

Obama’s Second Chance on Egypt. By Jonathan S. Tobin. Commentary, July 7, 2013.

The last thing Egypt needs. By Richard Cohen. Washington Post, July 9, 2013. Also here.

How America can best assist Egypt now. By David Ignatius. Washington Post, July 8, 2013. Also here.

Obama blew it in Egypt — again. By Marc A. Thiessen. Washington Post, July 8, 2013. Also here.

Two American Families: A Frontline Documentary. By Tom Casciato and Kathleen Hughes.

Two American Families. Video. Produced by Tom Casciato and Kathleen Hughes. Narrated by Bill Moyers. Frontline. PBS, July 9, 2013.

Watch This: Two American Families. By Greg Kaufmann. The Nation, July 9, 2013.

The Fall of the American Worker. By George Packer. NJBR, July 4, 2013.

Watch Two American Families on PBS. See more from FRONTLINE.

Andrew Jackson Still Rules. By Walter Russell Mead.

The Meaning of Massachusetts. By Walter Russell Mead. Via Meadia, January 21, 2010.

Andrew Jackson Still Rules — and Sarah Palin Knows It. By Walter Russell Mead. Via Meadia, December 4, 2009.

Egyptians: Stop Calling Our Revolution a Coup. By Kirsten Powers.

Egyptians: Stop Calling Our Revolution a Coup. By Kirsten Powers. The Daily Beast, July 10, 2013.

The military stepped in as a response to the outcry of the people, Egyptians tell Kirsten Powers.

Powers:

Egyptians have been jubilant that their autocratic and dangerously incompetent president, Mohammed Morsi, was removed from power one week ago. But they are also frustrated with lectures from American congressional leaders and some American journalists who have characterized the Egyptian people's popular uprising as an undemocratic power grab. The Obama administration has avoided the word “coup,” which would jeopardize under U.S. law the $1.3 billion in aid we provide to the Egyptian military—but expressed “deep concern” over the ousting of Morsi.

 

If there was one message I heard repeatedly in speaking to Egyptians who were active in the protests, it was this: “Stop calling our revolution a coup.”

 

Their president, the Egyptians note, was given the opportunity to meet the demands of the people but instead delivered a defiant speech making clear he would continue to rule in an undemocratic fashion. The military removed him, and Adly Mansour, the head of the Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court is now the acting president. He issued a decree Tuesday that calls for a constitutional referendum in November, followed by parliamentary elections in December and a presidential election in February.

 

Yes, this is messy. It’s not what Americans envision when they think about democracy. But the U.S. has been at this for centuries. It’s been a year for Egypt.

 

It’s important to remember that the military stepped in as a response to the outcry of the people. The legacy of Morsi’s short reign was an economy in freefall, electricity blackouts, and gas and water shortages. Morsi’s abuses were legion, but among the worst was a constitutional declaration that included the edict that “[t]he president is authorized to take any measures he sees fit in order to preserve and safeguard the revolution, national unity or national security.”

 

Twenty-two million Egyptians risked their lives to sign the “Tamarod sheet” opposing Morsi, which included their government I.D. numbers. “I was scared when I signed it,” one 30-something Egyptian mother of two told me. Egyptians have no memory of a government that doesn’t abuse human rights and repress the people with vicious impunity. This is not signing a Change.org petition. In Egypt, signing your name to a statement opposing the government is an act of immense bravery. A reported 33 million Egyptians flooded the streets to demand the ouster of Morsi, a number vastly greater than the 13 million votes that elected him.

 

The idea that because Morsi was democratically elected Egyptians should wait until the next election is simplistic and shortsighted. Lucy Shafik, who protested daily in Cairo with her entire family, said via email, “If we…waited out [Morsi’s] presidency for another three years, there wouldn’t have been a country to rule anymore.” Moreover, those who turned out to call for Morsi’s ouster didn’t believe there would be any more elections if he stayed in power. “One election, one time” is something this region has seen too many times.

 

In a May 2013 interview, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Anne Patterson was asked to explain how the U.S. was helping to address human rights violations, which the Egyptian interviewer pointed out had “risen considerably since Mubarak’s ouster.” Patterson replied that, “We do not agree with claims that human rights violations are worse than ever under the new regime. It cannot be ignored that freedom of expression has improved in a number of ways under the new regime, exemplified by the media and the freedom to talk openly and publicly chastise political figures. Look at the press, or any of the political talk shows on TV: Egyptians did not have such freedoms under Mubarak.”

 

Two months prior to Patterson’s statement, Bassem Youssef, a popular Egyptian TV comedian sometimes called the Jon Stewart of Egypt, was charged with defaming Morsi. The LA Times reported that “more of these complaints were brought in the first few months of Morsi's rule than in all of Mubarak's 30-year reign.” The same month as Patterson’s interview, prominent Egyptian youth leader Ahmed Maher was arrested for leading protests against the Morsi government.

 

The U.S. has had a real knack for getting on the wrong side of history in Egypt. Maybe it's time to change that.

Our Rhetorical President’s Unserious Speeches. By Walter Russell Mead.

Our Rhetorical President’s Unserious Speeches. By Walter Russell Mead. Wall Street Journal, July 9, 2013.

Obama seems to think that eloquent words are a replacement for deeds.

Interview with Ayaan Hirsi Ali. By Dror Eydar.

“Even if you give up all the land, it won’t solve the problems in the Mideast.” Interview with Ayaan Hirsi Ali. By Dror Eydar. Israel Hayom, June 28, 2013.

Transcript:

ISRAEL HAYOM: In your lectures you made numerous references to the situation in the Middle East. You claim that people in the West do not understand that what is taking place in the Middle East is not a dialogue.

 

AYAAN HIRSI ALI: More than one issue is at stake here. Regarding the Israeli-Palestinian context, the main problem is that you may speak of a peace process, but what you get is a process, not peace. And why is this process so prolonged? Because for the Israelis this issue is a territorial problem. For the Palestinian negotiators, on the other hand, it is not a territorial problem but a religious and ethnic one, It is not only about Palestinians but about all Arabs. Most of all, it is a religious problem.

 

From the perspective of the Arab leaders, reaching a two-state solution is to betray God, the Koran, the hadith and the tradition of Islam.

 

ISRAEL HAYOM: Even though they are portrayed as secular?

 

AYAAN HIRSI ALI: The presumption that the Palestinian negotiators are secular is not supported by facts. Were they secular, there would already be a settled territorial agreement of some kind. But there is no agreement as of today, because on one side it has become religious jihad of all or nothing, while on the other side it is still a territorial issue. Of course I know that there are Israelis who also perceive this as a religious problem; but their numbers pale in comparison to the Muslim side. Reaching a settlement that brings about two states is a religious betrayal – not only for the leadership but for most Muslims today. The West does not understand this.

 

ISRAEL HAYOM: Why? After the many years you have lived in the West, how can you explain this?

 

AYAAN HIRSI ALI: The conception of religion in the West in the 20th and 21st century differs from that of Middle Eastern Muslims. The West successfully separated religion and politics, but even in places in the West where there is no distinct separation, still the concept of God and religion, even in the 13th or 15th century, differs to the current reality in the Middle East.

 

Islam is an Orthopraxy, Islam has a goal. So if you are a true Muslim, you must fight for that goal. You can achieve a temporary peace or truce, but it is not ultimate, not everlasting. It is not just about the territory. Because the territory does not belong to the people; it belongs to God. So for a Palestinian leader – even if he is secular, even an atheist – to leave the negotiating room with the announcement of a two-state solution would mean that he would be killed the minute he walks out.

 

ISRAEL HAYOM: Many wise people come here advising us Israelis to act rationally. Do you think this dispute has anything to do with rationalism?

 

AYAAN HIRSI ALI: Europeans and Americans – and I do not refer merely to the leadership, but to people in general – when they have a problem, they think there must be some kind of compromise on the table. What they cannot accept is that one party would say “the only rational outcome is our complete victory.” If you put aside the Israeli-Palestinian situation, you see components of this culture in the events in Syria, in Lebanon. You’ve seen it with Mubarak. There is a winner and there is a loser. But there cannot be two winners.

 

ISRAEL HAYOM: So the proposal of compromise stems from naivety?

 

AYAAN HIRSI ALI: You can give it any label you like. I have listened to someone like Tony Blair, I was in two or three conferences where he spoke, and he is not naïve anymore, he is not the same man he was ten years ago in regards to this conflict. More and more leaders see that this conflict is not going to be resolved Western-style, namely that all conflicts are resolvable and no-one leaves the table empty-handed.

 

In a culture dictated by honor and shame – in addition to the religious issue – defeat of any kind, accepting a compromise, is to leave the room empty-handed. Compromise is loss in this culture. It is very hard to explain this to contemporary Westerners.

ISRAEL HAYOM: Many liberals around the world, who support the compromise solution, also tend to blame Israel.

 

AYAAN HIRSI ALI: Many liberals perceive Israel to be one of their kind; another liberal, white, rational state, etc. Therefore they expect you to approach matters the way they would. But then they approach the subject in the context of the U.S. or Europe, or some other Western system, where there is rule of law, arbiters, an ability to go to court in case of disagreement. There is a district court, a court of appeals, a supreme court, and once the judges have spoken their decision is final. You lose face, but you have to accept defeat.

 

What these liberals do not understand is that we are speaking of a fundamentally different context, where such a judicial infrastructure does not exist, and those who aspire for it are a persecuted minority.

 

And yet I am optimistic, after the Arab Spring. I see people, albeit few in number and very disorganized, but who do want that infrastructure where religion is put aside and where compromise becomes central. They just don’t know how to go about it. They lack the resources and the institutions to make that happen. But it is possible.

 

ISRAEL HAYOM: Your views are not prevalent within the liberal media or liberal intellectual elite. Have you encountered difficulties in delivering such ideas?

 

AYAAN HIRSI ALI: Among Western liberal elites there are those who have actual experience and those who have not. Those who have actual experience with any aspect of Islamic culture or religion, who have really given it their all to achieve some kind of compromise, come out – after years of endless abortive attempts – with a completely different perspective. Them I do not need to persuade.

 

I mentioned earlier Tony Blair, the most-renowned liberal to change his perspective. He once believed that the ability to always find a compromise for whoever was in the negotiations room was an art. He no longer thinks this way. As we are dealing with a wholly different phenomenon, we need voices like his to educate liberal Westerners on why this is different.

 

I think that whoever acts on the presumption that we are all the same and that we are able to solve this – is uninterested, indifferent, and inexperienced.

 

ISRAEL HAYOM: There is also a certain measure of idealism . . .

 

AYAAN HIRSI ALI: Idealism is a good thing. But when idealism encounters reality, you must not try to manipulate it to fit your utopia. You have to take in the reality. 93,000 people have died in Syria because the fighting forces could not, cannot, and will not compromise. This toll is higher than all the fatalities on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict!

 

So, to go on and on about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in my view is to take a tranquilizer or smoke pot. You do it just to feel better. You cannot face reality, so you just keep on harping about something that can make you feel better. One can also mention the number of people who died in Libya because Kaddafi and the opposition would not find the way to the negotiating table. This phenomenon is repeated throughout the region, not only today but throughout history. Reaching compromise is to lose face.

 

ISRAEL HAYOM: So do you think that talk about negotiations brought up by the Arab counterparts is a game, with no real intentions behind it? We know that right after the Oslo accords, Arafat spoke in a mosque in South Africa, comparing the Oslo accords to the hudaiba treaty by Muhammad with his enemies. In Israel, there were those who accepted this, as they said that Arafat had to resort to speaking two different languages, one for his people and one for us.

 

AYAAN HIRSI ALI: I hear this argument constantly, also in relation to the Turkey’s Erdogan and in regards to the Saudis. Do you know what is wrong with this argument? If you want peace and not merely a process, you must make peace with the people. The negotiators themselves are of no importance. They are a few individuals who may tomorrow be out of power or dead. You have to have peace with the people you are in conflict with, and as long as they do not want to hear a different tune, you will not have peace. Until the people at large are ready for that compromise, there is no compromise.

 

This is true of the domestic politics of any nation or the external politics with foreign nations, for whom the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is seen symbolically as the biggest icon of all foreign affairs relations with the Arab Islamic world.

 

There has to be a change of attitude and a change in attitude within the culture and of culture, and I hope that we can see this.

 

I believe that true emancipation cannot exist without the freedom of the individual, without the individual’s space and voice. The fact that individualism is not given a chance in the Arab Muslim world is related to belonging and the collective. If you want to belong and be part of the collective you have to be a winner. If you are not, then you are a source of shame.

 

So you have to ask yourself why the Syrian regime and its likes are incapable of putting an end to the bloodshed after killing ten, or 1,000, or 10,000 people. Why not? It is not caused by Israel, the Americans or any outsiders; it is part of the culture. And for the culture to grow out of such phenomena, change has to come from within.

 

ISRAEL HAYOM: If so, do negotiations have any meaning when we talk about peace while the Palestinian Authority use anti-Israeli school books, which do not even mention Israel by name in their geographical maps?

 

AYAAN HIRSI ALI: Not now. Not as long as a majority of the people do not want peace. An Arab leader who genuinely wants peace has to convince the Arab people first, must get their endorsement and then go and get peace. That is why the first thing that needs to be worked out is not so much the relationship with Israel but changing the culture, Islamic and Arab. This process does not depend on you, though you can help it, facilitate it, be a catalyst; but it does not depend on you, on America or the rest of the world.

. . . .

 

ISRAEL HAYOM: And you think that it will be a huge mistake to give away territory before a cultural change occurs?

 

AYAAN HIRSI ALI: I will just say that Israel is not the problem nor is it the solution. Even if you give up all the land, it will not solve any of the problems in the Middle East. It will not obliterate despotism, it will not liberate women, it will not help religious minorities. It won’t bring peace to anyone. Even if Israel does not give up an inch of land – the result will be the same.

 

If you want a process, continue the way you are. If you want real, lasting peace, then things have to change first within the Arab Muslim individual, family, school, streets, education, and politics. It is not an Israeli problem.

 

You must learn to take advantage of opportunities. Due to technology, things can develop quickly. Look at the Iranians; what took the Iranians thirty years could take the Egyptians five or ten.

 

ISRAEL HAYOM: To become secular?

 

AYAAN HIRSI ALI: No, just for the majority of the people to stand up to Shariah. This is what I want to say about Muslims in general: Muslims want Shariah until they have it . . .

 

For cultural change to transpire we need one hundred years and more to pass.

 

You can pick any number you want. I am speaking of a lengthy, bloody period. But it is going to change.

George W. Bush Was Right: Jihadists Do Hate Us for Our Freedom. By Kevin D. Williamson.

Boko Haram: Burning Books and Children. By Kevin D. Williamson. National Review Online, July 8, 2013.

Williamson:

President George W. Bush had a peculiar way with words. He was relentlessly mocked for saying of al-Qaeda et al., “They hate our freedoms — our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other,” which was soon reduced to “They hate us for our freedoms” and held up for scorn. “No, dummy,” said both the antiwar Right and antiwar Left (Remember the antiwar Left? Whatever happened to those guys?), “they don’t hate us for our freedoms, they hate us for our bombs, for our support of strongman governments, for our alliance with Israel, etc.” As was so often the case, President Bush’s critics, left and right, got it wrong. They should have listened to his actual words and not relied upon the Will Ferrell précis.

 

There are no words adequate to the horrific attack on a group of schoolchildren in Nigeria, carried out by the jihadist Boko Haram outfit, a partner to the Algeria-based al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which claimed the lives of 42 children and teachers on Saturday. The jihadists set fire to the school and then shot children as they tried to escape; many were burned alive. It was the group’s third attack on a school this summer. Randi Weingarten of the American Federation of Teachers sent out the obligatory press release — because when it comes to terrorist massacres, America needs to hear from its union bosses — in which she identified a “violent religious sect” (no word on which religion) as the malefactor. “No religion demands the callous murder of children,” she wrote. Perhaps George W. Bush could take a moment to tutor Ms. Weingarten on the finer points of the English language: No religion should demand the callous murder of children. But one does. The word “Islam” of course appears nowhere in that press release. It is necessary to hear what is said, and equally necessary to hear what is not said.

 

Liberal values — “our freedoms,” in President Bush’s words — are precisely what Boko Haram objects to, which is why the organization makes a point of attacking schools.

The organization’s name is the subject of some linguistic dispute, which may seem trivial but is not. “Boko” is a Hausa word meaning “education,” an adaptation of the English word “book.” “Haraam” and “haram” are related terms in Islamic jurisprudence, both denoting “forbidden.” “Haraam” is the opposite of “halal” and denotes the highest level of religious prohibition; “haram” means “sacred,” or forbidden in the sense that access to holy places and sanctuaries is restricted.

 

It is a linguistic irony that the Arabic word for “sacred” is closely related to the word for “sinful,” both deriving from an earlier Semitic word for “forbidden,” used to denote a restricted place, as in the English borrowing “harem.” It is another linguistic irony that Boko Haram, an anti-Western group (formally Jamā’a Ahl al-Sunnah li-Da’wa wa al-Jihād, or Congregation and People of Tradition for Proselytism and Jihad), cannot express its agenda without adapting an English word in Hausa. “Boko Haram” is generally translated as “Western education is sinful,” but it might well be rendered “books are banned.”

 

Boko Haram is a mutant: part indigenous group, part Islamist group, part motorcycle gang, founded by a virulently anti-Western cleric with a graduate degree, good English, and a Mercedes-Benz. Some analysts describe it as a cult. But we should not dismiss the group’s own words: It is an organization for Islamic proselytism and jihad, and its aim is, among other things, to forbid education.

 

Boko Haram is hardly the only group of Muslims opposed to education. The Taliban routinely attacks girls on their way to school in Pakistan. In Afghanistan, jihadists have managed to cripple the education of girls. Islam, deriving as it does from the Jewish tradition, venerates scholarship — but not all scholarship, and not all scholars. Boko Haram may not be orthodox in its understanding of Islam, but both its means and its ends would be more than familiar in many other Islamic societies. Likewise, its anti-Western agenda — killing Europeans, bombing the UN building in Abuja — is not at all dissimilar to what we have experienced in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

 

But while Afghanistan can (and probably will) simply sink into a more or less self-contained oblivion, Nigeria can hardly withdraw from the world. It is an important player in the global energy economy, and Lagos is a center of culture and commerce. Nigeria is the seventh-largest country in the world, home to 170 million people, half of them Christians. This isn’t Waziristan. Islam can hang a haram sign at the Afghan border, but it cannot do so in Nigeria.

 

The Bush project — creating reasonably liberal and democratic regimes in the Middle East — has failed. Its execution was faulty, and so were its premises. But Bush was right about the thing he was mocked for: Jihadists hate us for our values, and they hate schoolchildren in Nigeria and Pakistan to the extent that they share those values, an allegiance defined by the act of picking up a book or walking into a classroom. Islam and the West simply have competing and incompatible sets of values, and that discrepancy, while most dramatically apparent in actions such as those of Boko Haram, is not limited to extremists. Nor is it limited to such Muslim-dominated backwaters as Afghanistan. Walking to a kebab shop in the 1990s in Delhi, one of the most civilized cities in the world, I had garbage (and what I assume were insults) hurled at me by a crowd of angry young Muslims for reasons that mystified me until I learned that the source of offense was my girlfriend’s pants. (There was nothing remarkable about them, beyond their being pants.) We were not going to the famous Jama Masjid, but we were in the same neighborhood as that mosque, the haram-ness of which apparently is diffused through its precincts. Some years later, a busload of tourists was shot up a few blocks away by the Indian Mujahideen. Muslims may be outnumbered 7 to 1 in India, but still they intend to have their way.

 

As Andrew C. McCarthy always points out, we should not be surprised that Islamic societies are full of people who prefer Islamic civilization to Western civilization. It isn’t just the terrorists who reject our liberal values and democratic institutions. Our failure in Iraq and Afghanistan will make Americans more cautious about the prospects of military engagements in the Islamic world, and that’s for the better, but it will also tempt us to ignore that world so long as Boko Haram is in Nigeria instead of New Jersey. That is not really an option, either: Ron Paul types who believe that Islam will leave us alone if we leave Islam alone are deluding themselves, as are libertarians who believe that things like commercial relations and cultural exchange are going to be sufficient to lubricate away the friction between Islam and the West.

 

What we can do is be honest, at least with ourselves, about the nature of the problem. The world is shrinking, and the two main contenders for global cultural hegemony are Islam and Western liberalism. Islam is a serious underdog but, at its edges, is serious enough about prevailing that it is willing to declare education itself a sin and to enforce injunctions against it by burning children alive. President Bush got a lot of things wrong, but he got that much right: They do hate us for our freedom.


Sometimes Terrorists Win. By Walter Russell Mead. Via Meadia, July 8, 2013.

Boko Haram Leader Urges Global Jihad. By Walter Russell Mead. Via Meadia, December 1, 2012.

Boko Haram emir praises al Qaeda. By Bill Roggio. The Long War Journal, November 30, 2012.

Inside Story: Boko Haram and the Battle for Nigeria’s North. Video. AlJazeeraEnglish, May 18, 2013. YouTube.




Greg Gutfeld Talks Nigerian Children Killed by Boko Haram. Video. The Five. Fox News, July 9, 2013. YouTube.

Will Democracy Prevail in Egypt?

Will Democracy Prevail in Egypt? Video panel. Martha MacCallum with Lisa Daftari, Judith Miller, and Ralph Peters. America Live with Megyn Kelly. Fox News, July 9, 2013. YouTube.

How Morsi Wrecked Egypt in 369 Days. By Michael Wahid Hanna.

Blame Morsy. By Michael Wahid Hanna. Foreign Policy, July 8, 2013.

How to wreck a country in 369 days.

Unbroken by Adversity: Cleveland Kidnapping Victims Amanda Berry, Gina DeJesus, and Michelle Knight Speak Out.

I may have been through hell and back, but I am strong enough to walk through hell with a smile on my face, and with my head held high and with my feet held firmly on the ground. I will not let the situation define who I am. I will define the situation.

 

– Michelle Knight


“Thank you”: Cleveland kidnapping victims speak out for the first time. By Julie Cannold. CNN, July 9, 2013.

3 rescued Cleveland kidnap victims break silence. CBS News, July 9, 2013.

Amanda Berry, Gina DeJesus and Michelle Knight: Victims Of Ohio Kidnap Case Break Their Silence. By Thomas J. Sheeran. AP. The Huffington Post, July 9, 2013.

“Hell and back”: three US kidnap victims break silence over their ordeal. AFP. The Age, July 10, 2013.

New video: Amanda Berry, Gina DeJesus and Michelle Knight, Cleveland’s 3 missing women, thank you for your support. By John Caniglia. Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 9, 2013.

Thank You from Amanda Berry, Gina DeJesus, and Michelle Knight. Video. HennesPaynterComm, July 8, 2013. YouTube.

Ethnic Cleansing Is Better Than Genocide. By Ralph Peters.

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Netanyahu Could Save the Two-State Solution. By Ben Birnbaum.

Netanyahu Could Save the Two-State Solution. By Ben Birnbaum. The New Republic, July 9, 2013.

The End of the Two-State Solution. By Ben Birnbaum. NJBR, March 12, 2013. With related articles.

Salam Fayyad: The Visionary. By Ben Birnbaum. The New Republic, May 24, 2012. Also here.

Why Salam Fayyad Cannot Deliver. By Khaled Abu Toameh. Gatestone Institute, April 20, 2010.

The Palestinians Never Wanted Fayyadism. By Jonathan S. Tobin. NJBR, February 16, 2013.

Palestine After Fayyad: The Choice Between Cooperation and Conflict. By Nathan Thrall. Foreign Affairs, April 18, 2013. Also here.

A Third Way to Palestine: Fayyadism and Its Discontents. By Robert M. Danin. Foreign Affairs, January/February 2011.

Swap Meet: Trading Land for Peace. By Uzi Arad. The New Republic, November 28 & December 5, 2005.

A Wayward Prime Minister. By Daniel Pipes. National Review Online, July 9, 2013.

Netanyahu may betray his mandate and focus on a two-state solution with Palestine.

Solving the “Palestinian Problem.” By Daniel Pipes. DanielPipes.org, January 7, 2009.

Is Netanyahu planning a unilateral move? By David M. Weinberg. Israel Hayom, June 28, 2013.

Rafael Cruz, Father of Senator Ted Cruz, Compares Obama to Castro.

Rafael Cruz slams Obama’s rule by decree, compares him to Castro. By Jason Pye. United Liberty, July 8, 2013.

Ted Cruz’s dad explains why Obama is “just like” Fidel Castro. By Stephen C. Webster. The Raw Story, July 7, 2013.

Ted Cruz’s dad: Obama is “just like” Castro. By Gabe Finger. The Daily Caller, July 8, 2013.

A Great Speech By Sen. Ted Cruz’s Father. By Rush Limbaugh. RushLimbaugh.com, July 9, 2013.

A Conversation with Rafael Cruz, Father of Senator Ted Cruz (with Video). By Kyla Miliano. Heritage, April 7, 2013.

Rafael Cruz at Free the People. Video. FreedomWorksAction, July 6, 2013. YouTube.

Mud-Slinging for the Sake of Heaven: Religion and Politics in Today’s Israel. By Yehudah Mirsky.

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The Conflict in Syria: Who, How, and Where?

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Syria Needs Analysis website.

Syria: Mapping the conflict. BBC News, June 6, 2013.

Map of the Dispute in Syria. By Liam Stack and Sergio Peçanha. New York Times, March 12, 2013.