Why Egypt Fell Apart. By Juan Cole.
Egypt’s Transition Has Failed: New Age of Military Dictatorship in Wake of Massacre. By Juan Cole. Informed Comment, August 15, 2013. Also at History News Network.
Cole:
The
horrible bloodshed in Egypt on Wednesday marked a turning point in the
country’s modern history, locking it in to years of authoritarian paternalism
and possibly violent faction fighting. The country is ruled by an intolerant
junta with no respect for human life. Neither the Brotherhood nor the military
made the kind of bargain and compromises necessary for a successful democratic
transition. It is true that some armed Brotherhood cadres killed some 50 troops
and police, and that some 20 Coptic Christian churches were attacked, some
burned. But the onus for the massacre lies with the Egyptian military. Mohamed
Elbaradei, who resigned as interim vice president for foreign affairs, had
urged that the Brotherhood sit-ins be gradually and peacefully whittled Way at.
His plan was Egypt’s only hope of reconciliation. Now it has a feud.
Egypt
began a possible transition to parliamentary democracy in February of 2011
after the fall of Hosni Mubarak. Although the military had made a coup, the
aged Field Marshall Hussein Tantawi was not interested in ruling himself and
sought a civilian transitional government that the military could live with. He
wanted guarantees that the new government would not interfere with the
military’s own commercial enterprises and attempted to assert a veto over the
new constitution lest it veer toward Muslim fundamentalism.
The
major political forces said they were committed to free, fair and transparent
parliamentary elections. The Muslim Brotherhood, the best organized political
group, pledged not to run candidates in all constituencies so as to show they
weren’t greedy for power, and said they would not run anyone for president lest
they give the impression they were seeking control of all three branches of
government. The Brotherhood said it wanted a consensual constitution.
Behind
the scenes, generals like Omar Suleiman (d. 2012) were furious about the
constraints being lifted from the Brotherhood, convinced that they had a secret
armed militia and that they were angling to make a coup over time. His views
turn out to be more widespread than was evident on the surface.
In
2011-2012, the revolutionary youth, the liberals and the Brotherhood made
common cause to return the military to their barracks.
But
then the Brotherhood broke all of its promises and threw a fright into
everyone– youth, women, Coptic Christians, Liberals, leftists, workers, and the
remnants of the old regime. The Brotherhood cheated in the parliamentary
elections, running candidates for seats set aside for independents. Then they
tried to pack the constitution-writing body with their parliamentarians,
breaking another promise. They reneged on the pledge to have a consensual
constitution.
Once
Muhammad Morsi was elected president in June, 2012, he made a slow-motion coup. He pushed through a Brotherhood
constitution in December of 2012 in a referendum with about a 30% turnout in
which it garnered only 63%– i.e. only a fifth of the country voted for it. The
judges went on strike rather than oversee balloting, so the referendum did not
meet international standards. When massive protests were staged he had them
cleared out by the police, and on December 6, 2012, is alleged to have sent in
Brotherhood paramilitary to attack leftist youth who were demonstrating. There
were deaths and injuries.
Morsi
then invented a legislature for himself, declaring by fiat that the ceremonial
upper house was the parliament. He appointed many of its members; only 7% were
elected. They passed a law changing the retirement age for judges from 70 to
60, which would have forced out a fourth of judges and allowed Morsi to start
putting Brotherhood members on the bench to interpret his sectarian
constitution. He was building a one party state. His economic policies hurt
workers and ordinary folk. He began prosecuting youth who criticized him, his
former allies against the military. 8 bloggers were indicted. Ahmad Maher of
The April 6 youth group was charged with demonstrating (yes). Television
channels were closed. Coptic school teachers were charged with blasphemy. Morsi
ruled from his sectarian base and alienated everyone else. He over-reached.
In my
view Morsi and the Brotherhood leadership bear a good deal of the blame for
derailing the transition, since a democratic transition is a pact among various
political forces, and he broke the pact. If Morsi was what democracy looked
like, many Egyptians did not want it. Gallup polls trace this disillusionment.
But the
Egyptian military bears the other part of the blame for the failed transition.
Ambitious officers such as Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Morsi’s Minister of Defense, were
secretly determined to undo Morsi’s victory at the polls. They said they wanted
him to compromise with his political rivals, but it seems to me they wanted
more, they wanted him neutered. When the revolutionary youth and the workers
and even many peasants staged the June 30 demonstrations, al-Sisi took
advantage of them to stage a coup. Ominously, he then asked for public
acclamation to permit him to wage a war on terror, by which he means the
Brotherhood. I tweeted at the time: “Dear General al-Sisi: when activists call
for demonstrations, that is activism. When generals do, that is Peronism.”
Although
al-Sisi said he recognized an interim civilian president, supreme court chief
justice Adly Mansour, and although a civilian prime minister and cabinet was
put in place to oversee a transition to new elections, al-Sisi is in charge. It
is a junta, bent on uprooting the Muslim Brotherhood. Without buy-in from the
Brotherhood, there can be no democratic transition in Egypt. And after Black
Wednesday, there is unlikely to be such buy-in, perhaps for a very long time.
Wednesday’s massacre may have been intended to forestall Brotherhood participation in civil politics. Perhaps the generals even hope the Brotherhood
will turn to terrorism, providing a pretext for their destruction.
The
military and the Brotherhood are two distinct status groups, with their own
sources of wealth, which have claims on authority in Egypt. Those claims were
incompatible.