The Two Ukraines: Strategic Consequences. By Walid Phares.
The Two Ukraines: Strategic Consequences. By Walid Phares. History News Network, February 22, 2014. Also at WalidPhares.com.
Will Ukraine Break Apart? By Masha Lipman. The New Yorker, February 20, 2014.
Is It Time for Ukraine to Split Up? By Brian Whitmore. NJBR, February 21, 2014.
Phares:
The
world is now experiencing the reality of two Ukraines rising out of this former
Soviet Republic. The main overarching question to be considered from the
Kremlin to the White House is about the strategic consequences. How will these
two entities coexist, who will become their allies, how will this divide affect
regional alliances and international politics? Another series of perhaps even
more dramatic questions may also arise regarding the distribution of power
between these two entities—as it pertains to Moscow’s position, possible
intervention and reaction to what it may consider a Western advance into its
southern flank. It may be too early for daily observers and political analysts
focusing on the tactical considerations to weigh in. There is an endless number
of situations that may go awry and clashes to calm down—not to mention the
rising tensions between the West and Russia over Ukraine, but on the global
scale, in a historic perspective, the dice have been irreversibly rolled: the
two peoples forming the Ukrainian nation have now separated on the ground after
the ousting of President Viktor Yanukovych from his presidential palace in
Kiev. Two authorities have been declared within the country, one declared by
the parliament and the other by eastern local governments in the provinces.
After months and weeks of confrontation in Kiev’s downtown, a violent outburst
between the demonstrators and the police forces led to a long-brewing
explosion. The clashes showed the depth of disagreement, but they did not
create it. European mediations and road maps were not expected to succeed since
the issue was not about a new election or even about corruption. Such political
crises are omnipresent within all countries experiencing transition, but the
problem in Ukraine was one on a greater scale.
Historically,
from before, during and even after the end of the Cold War, there were two cultural
views in the country that became Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Western Ukraine, a land of farmers and Catholics, has been looking
toward Europe—where other former Eastern bloc members Poland, Slovakia and the
Czech Republic ended up after the Cold War. Eastern Ukraine, closer to Russia,
industrial and mostly Orthodox, has been looking toward Moscow as their
historical ally. These were, in fact, two nations contained in one set of
borders, a phenomenon experienced by dozens of official nation-states around
the world, such as in Czechoslovakia, Georgia, former Yugoslavia and Cyprus.
Some of these bi-national states can manage the internal differences as
relative successes of institutionalized liberal democracies, such as in Canada
and Belgium. Others descend into violence and chaos—as in Syria, Lebanon and
Sudan. Czechoslovakia underwent the swiftest separation in the history of the
world between its two “peoples.” But Ukraine’s politicians, dismissing the fact
that their constituencies were culturally divided, vied for two decades for
“all of Ukraine.” Both sides claimed the entire country as part of their
universal views. Governments and oppositions succeeded in power, but the deeper
issue of identity was never addressed. Each camp accused the other of
corruption, un-patriotism and violence, and both sides felt they represented
the “true values of the country.” But it was a country of two peoples, a matter
Ukrainian politicians and many of their intellectuals refused to admit.
The
2014 urban explosion in Kiev and across the country unleashed the profound
realities, rocketing them to the surface. The president represented the
“Eastern side” of Ukraine, and the opposition and its bloc in parliament
represented the “Western side” of the same country. The deepening clashes in
the capital ignited the underlying cultural differences into political action.
Within days, the towns and villages along the Polish borders declared their
rejection of Kiev’s government. And after the capital fell into the hands of
the protesters, backed by their lawmakers, the provinces in the East gathered
under one leadership to reject the new government. Ukraine is now
two—regardless of how events develop from here.
The
geopolitical consequences, hard to discern in the fog of confrontations to
come, are nevertheless projectable. The Europe Union will move to link up with
and absorb Western Ukraine. It may be slow and gradual, but it will eventually
happen. Millions of skilled workers in those provinces are needed by Europe’s
economies. Russia will cast its strategic umbrella over Eastern Ukraine and
notify the West that any further advance into their core ally will be a
crossing of a red line, prompting Moscow’s direct intervention. Western Ukraine
will become a partner of European countries, and some will welcome them warmly,
such as Poland and the UK. Others, such
as France, will be more cautious partners, fearing Ukraine’s Russian
sympathies. Eastern Ukraine will find itself a direct ally of Russia and will
insure to the latter greater facilities on the Black Sea. In fact, the core
strategic interest Moscow has in Ukraine—with or without President Putin—are
the seaports of the Black Sea, the only operational bases for Russia’s southern
fleet throughout the year. If these ports fall under Western Ukraine, Russia
will consider it as a casus belli, and Russia may move militarily on the
ground. If these ports remain under Eastern Ukraine’s Kharkov’s control, the
balance of power may be seen as maintained.
The
battle for Ukraine could have an impact on many strategic levels in the Middle
East and other regions. In Syria, Assad’s regime will lose meaningful Russian
logistical support if Crimea goes west. Iran’s Ayatollahs would also feel the
impact if Russia emerges weaker from the confrontation. The impact could be
felt as far as Venezuela and the Pacific depending on how Ukraine’s domestic
strife evolves or resolves. The hope now is that Washington will play smart cards
and transform the dividends of the outcome into gains for freedoms around the
world. The last few steps in U.S. foreign policy, however, have not been
encouraging.