O’Hanlon:
U.S. POLICY towards Syria since the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 has been a litany of miscalculation, frustration and tragedy. The ascendance of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as the major element of the opposition to the Bashar al-Assad regime may not amount to an imminent threat to American security; indeed, to date very few Americans have died at the hands of ISIL or its affiliates. But ISIL’s rise does place at much greater risk the security of Iraq, the future of Syria itself and the stability of Lebanon and Jordan. It could jeopardize the safety of American citizens as well, given the possibility of attacks by Westerners returning from the Syrian jihad or “lone wolves” inspired by ISIL propaganda. Massacres on a par with the Charlie Hebdo tragedy, or worse, could easily occur in the United States. The potency of the al-Nusra organization, Al Qaeda’s loyal affiliate, within the Syrian opposition is also of considerable concern.
This is
not a situation that requires an invasion of Syria by tens of thousands of
Western troops. But nor is it a situation that can be allowed somehow to burn
out on its own. Even if the Assad regime soon falls to combined opposition
forces, the problem will hardly be solved, since ISIL might then be in a
position to dominate an entire country rather than just half. An ISIL advance
westward would put the 10 to 15 percent of the population made up of “apostate”
Alawites, as well as the 10 percent of the population that is Christian
(according to prewar tallies), at severe risk of massacre. Upheaval in Syria
would intensify, having already displaced half the country’s population and
ended a quarter of a million lives. All of this would further validate ISIL’s
apocalyptic narrative of a caliphate beginning in Syria—a narrative that, even
if it has no chance of being realized, could aid the group in its
already-impressive recruiting efforts, which are currently bringing about one
thousand new fighters a month to the battlefield. This pace is probably
adequate to replenish the loss rate from U.S.-led airstrikes, estimated by one
U.S. official to have killed ten thousand ISIL fighters. Indeed, the U.S.
government’s upper-bound estimate of some thirty thousand ISIL fighters has not
changed for months despite the air campaign.
WHAT’S
NEEDED to end the carnage is a radically new approach: working toward a
confederal Syria. Put even more starkly, the only credible path forward is a
plan that in effect deconstructs Syria, especially in the short term. A
comprehensive, national-level solution is too hard even to specify at this
stage, much less achieve. Instead, the international community should work
hard, and devote substantial resources, to create pockets of more viable
security and governance within Syria over time. With initial footholds in
place, the strategy could develop further into a type of “ink-spot” campaign
that sought to join the various local initiatives into a broader and more
integrated effort. This approach builds on the ideas of classic
counterinsurgency efforts but has a much different application. In this case,
of course, the United States and foreign partners are taking the side of the
insurgents rather than the government, and the goal is not to defeat the
insurgency but to support and empower it.
This
strategy might produce only a partial success, liberating parts of the country
and then settling into stalemate. But that should not be seen as failure, even
if it happens. One possibility is two or three safe zones in more remote parts
of the country, backed up by perhaps one thousand American military personnel
and other countries’ special-operations forces in each (with an implied annual
cost of perhaps several billion dollars), rather than a snowballing and
successful nationwide campaign. Generalizing the strategy from, say, the
Kurdish areas of the country in the northeast (where a “lite” version of such
an approach is now being attempted by Ankara and Washington), to the heavily
populated and intermixed population belt from Idlib and Aleppo through Homs and
Hama to Damascus could be very difficult. It would be substantially more
dangerous, and also much more logistically challenging. It would be important
that Washington not precommit to comprehensive regime change on any particular
time horizon, since the number of available “moderate” partner forces may not
prove adequate to that task, even once recruiting and training begin within the
safe zones.
In
fairness to the Obama administration, a realistic and comprehensive plan for
Syria has always seemed elusive, without even factoring in self-imposed U.S.
political constraints. And now, American “allies” in the war together
constitute perhaps the fifth-strongest fighting force in the country, after
Assad’s own military, ISIL, al-Nusra and even Hezbollah. Some of these
so-called allies may not be so moderate, or dependable, after all. Kurdish
fighters in Syria have had some success, and are now integral to a plan Ankara
and Washington have developed to establish a safe zone in northern Syria that
will greatly complicate ISIL’s ability to connect logistically with the outside
world. But the ability of the Kurds to liberate any territory further south is
unclear, and Turkey’s willingness to go along with any such escalation of the
Kurdish role is also in doubt.
The
woes go on. The central peace process appears to be in tatters. Moderate forces
are not currently strong enough to achieve a significant governing role through
any plausible negotiation outcome. Any willingness by Assad to defect as part
of an integrated plan to produce a new power-sharing government (perhaps
backstopped by an international peacekeeping force) would likely be seen as
evidence of weakness by his enemies. It would probably fail to produce a
durable and stable outcome. An actual large-scale U.S. military intervention is
off the table, in light of what the nearly decade-long effort in Iraq produced;
not even the most hawkish candidates in the GOP field for president in 2016 are
calling for such an approach. Development of a new Syrian army of tens of
thousands, able to take on Assad as well as ISIL, may be conceptually
appealing. But it seems hugely ambitious in a situation where the United States
has failed to train even a few thousand moderate fighters a year, and where
there are few individuals who could provide political or military leadership of
an integrated Syrian opposition. An integrated army may be the right long-term
plan, but it is probably not a realistic goal with which to begin.
Instead,
a more limited strategy could have major benefits. It would help the United
States and other outside powers protect several million Syrians who would no
longer have to fear being overrun by Assad or ISIL, as well as allow them to
collectively attack and pressure ISIL from more locations than possible today.
Such a strategy would send a clear message of U.S. engagement to regional
partners and create new opportunities that may not presently be foreseeable.
QUALIFYING
STANDARDS for opposition fighters wishing for U.S. training, equipment and battlefield
assistance would be relaxed under this approach. Requiring that they are
untainted by past associations with extremists and that they swear to fight
only ISIL would no longer be central elements of the vetting process. To avoid
American legal issues, the subject could simply not be raised the way it is
now. The United States would not have to bless, or encourage, their aspirations
for overthrowing Assad, but it could stop trying so proactively and
unrealistically to squelch those ambitions. “Accidental guerrillas,” to use
David Kilcullen’s memorable phrase, who had previously been in cahoots with
some of these groups could in some cases be forgiven their transgressions, if
there were reason to think that they were dependable.
Training
opposition fighters in the safety of Turkey, Jordan and other friendly
countries would still be the first step. But it is not sufficient, and this new
strategy would recognize as much. Many opposition fighters are reluctant to
leave their home territories—and thereby leave their families and communities
unprotected—in order to go abroad for training. The wiser idea would be to help
moderate elements establish reliable safe zones within Syria as catalysts to
much broader recruiting and training efforts that would then occur within these
zones on Syrian territory. American and allied forces would act in support, not
only from the air but eventually on the ground via the deployment of
special-operations forces into Syria as well. This would entail risks, but
manageable ones. Syria’s open desert terrain would make it easier to monitor
for possible signs of enemy attack against these zones, through a combination
of technologies, patrols and other methods that outside special operators could
help Syrian local fighters set up.
Were
Assad foolish enough to challenge these zones, even if he somehow forced the
withdrawal of the outside special-operations forces, he would be likely to lose
his airpower in ensuing retaliatory strikes by outside forces, depriving his
military of one of its few advantages over ISIL. Deconflicting U.S./allied
efforts to attack ISIL with the expanding Russian activities in the country
would, however, be important.
With
this approach, given the direct American and other allied assistance that would
be provided, one could be confident that sanctuary sites would never again have
to face the prospect of rule by either Assad or ISIL. They would also
constitute areas where humanitarian relief could be supplied, schools could be
reopened and larger opposition forces could be recruited, trained and based. UN
agencies and NGOs would help in the effort to the extent they were willing and
able, focusing on health, education and basic economic recovery. Governing
councils would be formed, more likely by appointment than election, to help
international agencies make decisions on key matters relevant to rudimentary
governance. Regardless of details, relief could certainly then be provided more
effectively than today.
At
least one such area should adjoin Jordan and another Turkey, and these should
be created in cooperation with Amman and Ankara. These locations would allow
secure transportation lines for humanitarian as well as military supplies. They
would also provide bases from which to attack ISIL in its strongholds, a
mission that Western forces could carry out in conjunction with local allies.
The ultimate endgame for these zones would not have to be determined in
advance. The interim goal would be a deconstructed Syria; the ultimate one
could be some form of a confederal Syria, with several highly autonomous zones.
One of those zones might be for Alawites, perhaps partly protected by Russian
forces. But none of the zones could be for ISIL, al-Nusra or Assad and his
inner circle.
At some
point, the emergent confederation would likely require support from an
international peacekeeping force, once it could be somehow codified by
negotiation. The United States should be willing to commit to being part of a
force, since without it, it is dubious that the conflict’s various parties will
have confidence in the stability of any settlement. The challenge of creating
governance structures that protect the rights of Syria’s various communities
would be especially acute in the intermixed central population belt of the
country. But in the short term, the ambitions of this strategy would be
limited—they would be, simply, to make individual zones defensible and
governable, to help provide relief for populations within them and to train and
equip more recruits so that the zones could be stabilized and then gradually
expanded.
As safe
zones were created, over time some would eventually coalesce. For example, once
appropriate understandings were reached with Turkey, a single Kurdish zone
would make sense. Major sectors in the south near the Jordanian border, and in
the north near Idlib and Aleppo, could be logical. Over time, if and when
feasible, zones near some of the central cities such as Hama and Homs could be
envisioned, though the logistical challenges and the safety challenges for
Western forces (and the difficulty of collaborating safely with any Russian
forces) could be greater in those cases. Prudence would have to be the
watchword. In some cases, even the various members of the so-called moderate
opposition might come into conflict with each other; outside parties might have
to threaten to withhold support of various types to discourage such behavior.
The
plan would be directed in part against Assad. But it would not have the
explicit military goal of overthrowing him, at least not in the near term.
American forces could concentrate on supporting opposition units fighting ISIL.
Still, this plan would probably have the effect of gradually reducing the
territory that Assad governs, since it would train many more opposition fighters
and would not try to prevent them from liberating areas of the country
currently controlled by the central government. If Assad then delayed too long
in accepting a deal for exile, he could inevitably face direct dangers to his
rule and even his person. The plan would still seek his removal, but over a
gradual time period that allowed for a negotiated exit—with stronger moderate
opposition groups part of the negotiation than is the case today—if Assad were
smart enough to avail himself of the opportunity. In the short term, however,
the current tacit understanding with Assad, whereby he chooses not to challenge
Western airpower in Syria when it is used against ISIL, ideally would continue.
The
opposition would need to accept that a peace deal that includes post-Assad
Alawite elements remained Washington’s goal—and if they wished economic and
other help down the road for rebuilding a new Syrian state, they would have to
tolerate some influence for the United States as well as other key outside
players. This approach, while not ideal for many elements of the opposition who
surely seek more systematic revenge against Assad and his cronies, could
nonetheless provide a more workable basis for making common cause than is the
case today, since it would in fact ultimately aim for an end to Assad’s rule.
For these reasons, whether they fully endorsed it or not, America’s main
regional allies in the effort—Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf
states—would likely welcome such an approach since it would move significantly
in the direction they have advocated. Moreover, it would be more credible than
previous American strategies, stated or implied, because its means would better
match ends.
This
strategy might soften Iran and Russia’s opposition to the broader approach as
well—perhaps reducing their inclination to escalate support for Assad and also
possibly even enlisting them in an eventual negotiated deal about Syria’s
ultimate future and associated peace-enforcement operations. Indeed, the
strategy strikes a balance in its approach to Iran and Russia. It would grant
neither a major role. But it would seek to mitigate the risks of escalating
rivalry with them by holding out political hope and the prospect of an
autonomous region for Alawites (even those previously associated with the Assad
regime, as long as they were not from Assad’s inner circle). This approach may
appeal even more to Moscow and Tehran if Assad continues to suffer battlefield
setbacks. Damascus and Moscow would be much more likely to support a confederal
Syria to the extent they believe that the alternative has become the complete
overthrow of Assad and his government, the elimination of meaningful Alawite
influence in a future government or, in a best case, civil war of indefinite
duration.
An
ultimate settlement could include outright partition of the country if
necessary. However, partition would not solve the question of how to address
the mixed cities of the country’s center belt. As such, while it should not be
taken off the table, it would hardly represent a panacea.
Should
Assad fall, the essence of this strategy would still apply, but in a modified
way. Moderate insurgents would still need strongholds from which to build up
capacity to challenge ISIL (the presumed main winner in such a defeat of
Assad).
Ideally,
the U.S. Congress would explicitly support this strategy, but existing
authorities and funds are adequate to start now. Ideally, the UN Security
Council would endorse the approach, too—including the near-term idea of
providing relief (without Assad’s blessing) in some safe zones, and the
longer-term goal of deploying a peace-implementation force to support an
eventual peace deal. But again, given the emergency situation, the security
stakes and the UN’s interest in the notions of the responsibility to protect and
the prevention of genocide, existing authorities are sufficient to embark on
this strategy.
THE
BASIC logic of this ink-spot and regional strategy is not radical. Nor is it
original or unique to Syria. In effect, variants of it have guided Western powers
in Bosnia, in Afghanistan in the 1980s and since 1993 in Somalia. The last case
is particularly relevant. Somalia, while a site of tragedy for U.S. forces in
1993, has since shown some signs of hopefulness. The Puntland and Somaliland in
the north are largely self-governing and autonomous. Similar types of zones
would be the interim goal for Syria as well.
We must
be honest with ourselves: the interim period, including some type of American
engagement in the war effort, could last a long time. For a country weary of
long wars in the Middle East, this would constitute an on-the-ground role in
yet another. That said, it is worth bearing in mind that while the Afghanistan
war today continues to consume American resources and cost some American
casualties, it is not a major source of domestic political acrimony within the
United States. Perhaps Americans are more patient with long military operations
than is often argued. That is especially the case if the strategy that the
operations are designed to serve is responsive to a real security threat, and
if it is at least moderately successful in its implementation.
There
would of course be risks associated with this strategy. The most glaring would
be the possibility of American casualties—either through “green on blue”
insider attacks of the type that have taken dozens of American lives in
Afghanistan, or through ISIL or regime elements overrunning a safe zone in
which American forces are located. This is a significant risk, to be sure, and
one that would have to be carefully managed, as noted above, by careful
selection of where the safe zones are to be. It would also require deployment
of American quick-reaction forces in the area, in more locations than they
currently are found today, to improve the odds of coming to the aid of such
U.S. forces in a timely fashion if their positions are brought into danger. In
these ways, the operation in Syria would resemble the beginning phases of the
Afghanistan campaign in 2001 and 2002, in which modest numbers of U.S. forces
worked closely with the Northern Alliance and then the fledgling Afghan
government, participating in raids and occasionally suffering casualties.
Casualties could also be expected in any future peace-implementation mission,
as spoilers use suicide bombs and other weapons to attack outside forces.
It is
worth noting that two other types of risks associated with this strategy would
be no greater, and in most ways probably less, than under current policy.
First, there is the matter of U.S. prestige. Some would argue that by declaring
itself committed to a change in battlefield dynamics, the United States would
lose more prestige if in fact that proved more difficult to achieve than
anticipated. But this risk must be measured against the real blow to American
credibility that has already resulted from four years of an ineffective policy.
Moreover, even partial success would help liberate and improve the lots of
millions of Syrians who are now living under ISIL, Assad or anarchy.
Washington
is already at war with ISIL—not only as a matter of formal policy but also in
the ongoing bombing campaign underway in Iraq and Syria today. ISIL has already
demonstrated its lack of restraint in its dealings with the United States in
the 2014 beheadings of American hostages within its reach. Its social-media
outlets are already trying to encourage lone-wolf attacks against the United
States and its civilian population today. ISIL is currently encouraged by a
sense of sanctuary and a sense of military momentum. Making Western attacks
against ISIL more effective seems just as likely to put the group on the
defensive as to occasion new attacks. In acting more aggressively to stabilize
Syria and defeat ISIL, the Obama administration would not be plunging America
into a new conflict. Instead, it would be recognizing that it is already
engaged in one.
