Bolton:
America is debating how to respond to the terrorist attacks in Paris. Unfortunately, both President Obama’s current policy and other recent proposals lack a strategic vision for the Middle East once the Islamic State, or ISIS, is actually defeated. There are no answers, or only outmoded ones, to the basic question: What comes after the Islamic State?
Before
transforming Mr. Obama’s ineffective efforts into a vigorous military campaign
to destroy the Islamic State, we need a clear view, shared with NATO allies and
others, about what will replace it. It is critical to resolve this issue before
considering any operational plans. Strategy does not come from the ground up;
instead, tactics flow deductively once we’ve defined the ultimate objectives.
Today’s
reality is that Iraq and Syria as we have known them are gone. The Islamic
State has carved out a new entity from the post-Ottoman Empire settlement,
mobilizing Sunni opposition to the regime of President Bashar al-Assad and the
Iran-dominated government of Iraq. Also emerging, after years of effort, is a
de facto independent Kurdistan.
If, in
this context, defeating the Islamic State means restoring to power Mr. Assad in
Syria and Iran’s puppets in Iraq, that outcome is neither feasible nor
desirable. Rather than striving to recreate the post-World War I map,
Washington should recognize the new geopolitics. The best alternative to the
Islamic State in northeastern Syria and western Iraq is a new, independent
Sunni state.
This
“Sunni-stan” has economic potential as an oil producer (subject to negotiation
with the Kurds, to be sure), and could be a bulwark against both Mr. Assad and
Iran-allied Baghdad. The rulers of the Arab Gulf states, who should by now have
learned the risk to their own security of funding Islamist extremism, could
provide significant financing. And Turkey — still a NATO ally, don’t forget —
would enjoy greater stability on its southern border, making the existence of a
new state at least tolerable.
The
functional independence of Kurdistan reinforces this approach. The Kurds have
finally become too big a force in the region for Baghdad or Damascus to push
them around. They will not be cajoled or coerced into relinquishing territory
they now control to Mr. Assad in Syria or to Iraq’s Shiite militias.
The
Kurds still face enormous challenges, with dangerously uncertain borders,
especially with Turkey. But an independent Kurdistan that has international
recognition could work in America’s favor.
Make no
mistake, this new Sunni state’s government is unlikely to be a Jeffersonian
democracy for many years. But this is a region where alternatives to secular
military or semi-authoritarian governments are scarce. Security and stability
are sufficient ambitions.
As we
did in Iraq with the 2006 “Anbar Awakening,” the counterinsurgency operation
that dislodged Al Qaeda from its stronghold in that Iraqi province, we and our
allies must empower viable Sunni leaders, including tribal authorities who
prize their existing social structures. No doubt, this will involve former
Iraqi and Syrian Baath Party officials; and there may still be some moderate
Syrian opposition leaders. All are preferable to the Islamist extremists.
The
Arab monarchies like Saudi Arabia must not only fund much of the new state’s
early needs, but also ensure its stability and resistance to radical forces.
Once, we might have declared a Jordanian “protectorate” in an American “sphere
of influence”; for now, a new state will do.
This
Sunni state proposal differs sharply from the vision of the Russian-Iranian
axis and its proxies (Hezbollah, Mr. Assad and Tehran-backed Baghdad). Their
aim of restoring Iraqi and Syrian governments to their former borders is a goal
fundamentally contrary to American, Israeli and friendly Arab state interests.
Notions, therefore, of an American-Russian coalition against the Islamic State
are as undesirable as they are glib.
In
Syria, Moscow wants to dominate the regime (with or without Mr. Assad) and
safeguard Russia’s Tartus naval base and its new Latakia air base. Tehran wants
a continuing Alawite supremacy, with full protection for Hezbollah in Lebanon
and Syria.
As for
Iraq, Russia and Iran want the Sunni territories returned to Baghdad’s control,
reinforcing Iran’s regional influence. They may wish for the same in Kurdistan,
but they lack the capability there.
Sunnis
today support the Islamic State for many of the same reasons they once
supported Al Qaeda in Iraq — as a bulwark against being ruled by Tehran via
Baghdad. Telling these Sunni people that their reward for rising against the
Islamic State in Syria and Iraq will be to put them back in thrall to Mr. Assad
and his ilk, or to Shiite-dominated Baghdad, will simply intensify their
support for the jihadists. Why would they switch sides?
This is
why, after destroying the Islamic State, America should pursue the far-reaching
goal of creating a new Sunni state. Though difficult in the near term, over
time this is more conducive to regional order and stability.
Creating
an American-led anti-Islamic State alliance instead of Moscow’s proposed
coalition will require considerable diplomatic and political effort. American
ground combat forces will have to be deployed to provide cohesion and
leadership. But this would be necessary to defeat the Islamic State even if the
objective were simply to recreate the status quo ante.
The
Anbar Awakening and the American military’s 2007 “surge” provide the model, as
do Kurdish successes against the Islamic State. Local fighters armed, trained
and advised by the United States would combine with Arab and American
conventional forces.
The
military operation is not the hardest part of this post-Islamic State vision.
It will also require sustained American attention and commitment. We cannot
walk away from this situation as we did from Iraq in 2011.
The new
“Sunni-stan” may not be Switzerland. This is not a democracy initiative, but
cold power politics. It is consistent with the strategic objective of
obliterating the Islamic State that we share with our allies, and it is
achievable.